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Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and
Antitrust's Concerted Action Requirement
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE*
Antitrust law makes a fundamental distinction between unilteral conduct
and concerted action to restrain trade. Concerted action is treated more harshly
because it creates more risks of anticompetitive harm. Because the law
encourages individual firms to compete aggressively, antitrust law does not
proscribe unilateral conduct unless it threatens actual monopolization of a
market. Current antitrust law treats all tying arrangements as concerted action
under Section One of the Sherman Act.
Professor Leslie argues that most tying arrangements are essentially
unilateral, not concerted. By condemning unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements as concerted action, tying cases create significant doctrinal
inconsistencies across antitrust law. The Article analyzes the structure of
American antitrust law, its legislative history, and economic theory to conclude
that courts should distinguish between unilateral and concerted tying
arrangements and that only the latter should be condemned under Section One.
Finally, the Article proposes a fundamental reorganization of all tying law that
would insure doctrinal consistency while prohibiting anticompetitive tying
arrangements and protecting those tying arrangements that are either benign or
pro-competitive.
I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law reveres substance over form.1 But in the doctrine that emerges
from antitrust cases involving tying arrangements, form reigns supreme. A tying
arrangement exists when a seller refuses to sell one product, "the tying product,"
unless the buyer also purchases a second product, "the tied product." Current
tying law does not recognize that a tie-in can be imposed either unilaterally or
through concerted action. Yet this distinction is critical because antitrust law
treats concerted action more harshly than unilateral conduct. Nevertheless, courts
treat all tying arrangements as concerted action, reasoning that all tie-ins involve
an agreement between two parties in the form of the purchase contract between
the buyer and seller. This monolithic approach of treating all tie-ins as concerted
action fundamentally misconstrues the nature of unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements because in substance such tying arrangements are quintessential
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author wishes to thank
David Gerber, Mark Lemley, David McGowan, and Howard Shelanski for their comments on
earlier drafts.
I See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,772 (1984) (rejecting
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in antitrust because it "looks to the form of an enterprise's
structure and ignores the reality").
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single-firm conduct. Tying arrangements imposed by a single seller, not
operating in concert with any competitors or other businesses, should not be
evaluated as concerted action under Section One of the Sherman Act; rather,
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements should be treated as unilateral conduct
under Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act.
Correctly characterizing the substance of each tying arrangement will restore
doctrinal consistency to antitrust law and insure that anticompetitive tie-ins are
condemned, while protecting beneficial or benign tying arrangements.
Part II lays out the overall structure of American antitrust jurisprudence,
which draws a critical distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct.
Section One of the Sherman Act proscribes concerted trade restraints if they are
unreasonable, while Section Two of the Sherman Act proscribes unilateral
conduct, but only if it creates, maintains, or threatens an actual monopoly
through anticompetitive means. Thus, unilateral conduct receives greater
protection under antitrust laws than does concerted action. Part II explains how
the unilateral-concerted dichotomy, which is critical throughout antitrust law, is
not applied to tying arrangements. Under existing precedent all tying
arrangements are evaluated under Section One of the Sherman Act. The current
case law makes no inquiry into or distinction based on how many parties are
imposing the tying arrangements. This Article argues that there are, in fact, two
types of tying arrangements: unilateral tying arrangements and concerted tying
arrangements. Courts should determine which type of tying arrangement is at
issue in any given case in order to decide whether the trade restraint should be
analyzed under Section One or Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section
Three of the Clayton Act.
Part Im explains that although some courts have explicitly treated tying
arrangements as concerted action because there is a contract between a seller and
a buyer, there are several persuasive arguments against evaluating unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements as concerted action under Section One of the
Sherman Act. Part III explains that although a contract is legally a form of
agreement, not every contract embodies the type of concerted action the
Sherman Act was intended to reach. First, the Supreme Court has eschewed a
literal approach in many aspects of antitrust jurisprudence, including whether
every contract is necessarily an agreement for antitrust purposes. Second, the
Sherman Act does not proscribe contracts in general, but only bans contracts in
restraint of trade. To determine whether a contract is in restraint of trade, one
common inquiry is whether the parties to the contract share a mutual intent to
restrain trade. To the extent that the buyer in a tying arrangement does not desire
to suppress competition, this counsels against concluding that unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements constitute contracts in restraint of trade for Section
One purposes. Furthermore, the legislative history of the Sherman Act does not
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support the argument that Congress intended sales contracts between buyer and
seller to be within the reach of Section One. Finally, Part III concludes by
demonstrating the number of anomalies that are created within Section One by
including unilaterally imposed tying arrangements within its reach.
Part IV argues that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements are more
properly considered as unilateral restraints, evaluated under either Section Two
of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act. It begins by noting that
the current test for evaluating tying does not require proof of an injury to
competition; rather, a plaintiff need only show that a "not insubstantial" volume
of commerce in the tied product is affected. Such a low standard for liability is
arguably inconsistent with the bulk of antitrust law, which requires proof of
injury to competition, usually measured in terms of market share. This low
standard is certainly inconsistent with Section Three of the Clayton Act, the only
explicit statutory prohibition of tying arrangements in federal antitrust law. Part
IV then argues that the market power requirement of current tying doctrine is
more consistent with the structure of Section Two than Section One.
Furthermore, evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section
One creates inconsistencies with Section Two conduct and Section Three
jurisprudence. Part IV also explains why analyzing unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements under Section Two makes sense of leveraging theory as a whole.
Part V shows how analyzing unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under
Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act achieves
doctrinal consistency while permitting beneficial tie-ins and proscribing
anticompetitive tie-ins. Removing unilaterally imposed tying arrangements from
Section One scrutiny will necessarily mean that some currently proscribed tying
arrangements would escape antitrust liability. However, there would not be a
tying free-for-all. Like all unilateral restraints, unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements are subject to Section Two liability if they threaten, create, or
maintain a monopoly. This is a fairly high threshold for liability, which means
that many tying arrangements that are harmless or beneficial to consumers would
no longer be proscribed. To the extent that Congress believed that tying
arrangements were more pernicious than other forms of unilateral conduct and
enacted specific legislation condemning them, Section Three of the Clayton Act
should be the statute of first resort in tying cases. Section Three of the Clayton
Act employs a higher standard of liability than current Section One tying law,
but a lower standard than Section Two. As such, it represents a reasonable
middle ground, disregarding those tying arrangements that affect a "not
insubstantial" volume of commerce but do not seriously threaten competition,
while condemning those tying arrangements that substantially lessen competition
but do not yet threaten actual monopolization.
Finally, Part VI shows how tying arrangements, both unilateral and
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concerted, should be evaluated in a manner that restores the critical inquiry into
whether an antitrust defendant has engaged in concerted action. If a tie-in is
challenged under the Sherman Act, then unilaterally imposed tying arrangements
should be evaluated under Section Two, while concerted tying arrangements
should continue to be analyzed under Section One. Both unilateral and concerted
tying arrangements can be challenged under the Clayton Act. When a tie-in is
challenged, under Section One, the legal test for judging concerted tying
arrangements should be reformulated to parallel the Section One test applied to
all other concerted conduct. Part VI lays out what specific elements should be
required for establishing that a tying arrangement violates the antitrust law,
depending on whether the tying arrangement is being judged under Section One
or Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act.
I. DISTINGUISHING BETwEEN UNLATERAL
AND CONCERTED CONDUCT
A. The Distinction Between Unilateral and Concerted Activity in Antitrust
Law
The Sherman Act establishes a two-front approach to anticompetitive
conduct. Section One of the Sherman Act addresses anticompetitive conduct that
results from concerted action.2 Section One concerns only concerted activity
between separate business entities: "[U]nilateral activity by a single firm cannot
be reached via this section."' 3 If there is no agreement, there is no case under
Section One.
Section Two addresses unilateral conduct to maintain or acquire a monopoly
or to attempt monopolization.4 A cause of action for monopolization requires
monopoly power in a relevant market that has been acquired or maintained
through anticompetitive conduct.5 Attempted monopolization requires specific
intent to monopolize a market, anticompetitive acts taken to that end, and a
2 Section One of the Sherman Act provides, in relevant part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994).
3 Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 286 (5th Cir. 1978)
(citations omitted).
4 Section Two of the Sherman Act provides, in relevant part: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
5 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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dangerous probability of success. 6 The tests for each cause of action under
Section Two are designed to insure that a business, acting unilaterally, has
sufficient latitude to compete aggressively in a free market. As such, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that "[Section Two] makes the conduct
of a single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously
threatens to do so."' 7
The Sherman Act does not specify what precise trade restraints are
proscribed.8 Rather, through over a century of case law, courts have developed a
list of restraints condemned by the Sherman Act. Although some anticompetitive
conduct can violate both sections of the Sherman Act, most trade restraints are
usually categorized as either Section One or Section Two restraints. Thus,
concerted action-such as price fixing, territorial restraints, and bid rigging-is
evaluated under Section One. And unilaterally imposed trade restraints-such as
predatory pricing, price squeezes, and denial of access to essential facilities-are
considered under Section Two.
Whether or not a restraint is treated under Section One or Section Two has
practical consequences because each section employs a different threshold for
liability. Concerted action need only be judged "unreasonable" to violate
Section One. Section Two proscribes certain unilateral conduct, which must be
more than merely unreasonable; it must create, maintain, or threaten actual
monopolization before it violates the Sherman Act. Thus, Section One and
Section Two conduct are evaluated under different standards.9
This distinction between unilateral and concerted action represents the heart
of the Sherman Act's structure. Federal courts have repeatedly noted that this
distinction is both "critical" to the entire structure of American antitrust law 10
6 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456 (1993).
7 Id at 459 (emphasis added).
8 Thus, despite the fact that some trade restraints are widely recognized as illegal, the
Sherman Act does not mention price-fixing agreements, division of territory, predatory pricing,
or any other specific restraint by name. In contrast to the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act
explicitly prohibits tying arrangements. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 in response to
congressional concerns that anticompetitive conduct was thriving despite the Sherman Act. In
particular, Congress was vocally upset over the Supreme Court's early opinions interpreting
the Sherman Act The Clayton Act was intended to shore up the Sherman Act. Despite the
Clayton Act's explicit prohibition on tying arrangements, most tying arrangement cases are
brought and evaluated under Section One of the Sherman Act. See infra notes 384-86 and
accompanying text, comparing different standards for evaluating tying arrangements under
Section One of the Sherman Act and Section Three of the Clayton Act.
9 See Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Montell, 944 F. Supp. 1119, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,767-69 (1984)).
10 Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266 (1986); Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d
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and "fundamental in deciding whether a cause of action exists."11 Pursuant to
this dichotomy between concerted and unilateral behavior, concerted action is to
be "judged more sternly than unilateral activity."' 2 Because a single firm can
engage in anticompetitive conduct so long as it does not threaten
monopolization, activity that (if concerted) would be illegal under Section One,
is permitted under Section Two (if it is unilateral). Thus, correctly labeling
challenged conduct as unilateral or concerted can often determine whether the
conduct violates federal antitrust laws.
The Sherman Act's distinction between concerted and unilateral conduct
makes economic sense because the former is uniquely dangerous to a
competitive marketplace. The Supreme Court has explained:
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than
unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is
fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent
centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests
separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit This not only
reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly
increases the economic power moving in one particular direction. 13
Whereas concerted activity is inherently suspect, conduct by a single firm is
given greater latitude because "intense antitrust scrutiny... would heighten 'the
risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single
aggressive entrepreneur."1 4 Antitrust law recognizes that business needs room
to maneuver and to innovate. Such innovation can be in terms of marketing and
1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,
761 (1984) (stating that there is a "basic distinction" between unilateral and concerted action).
I I Cohen v. Primerica Corp., 709 F. Supp. 63, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); see also SCFC ILC,
Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D. Ut. 1993) ("This is the structure of the
Sherman Act. The structure may be arbitrary. It may or may not be economically unsound. It
is, however, the law."). Some commentators have criticized this distinction. See, e.g., Thomas
A. Piraino, Jr., The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on
Distribution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1988) ("The distinction... between
unilateral and concerted conduct is simply illogical.").
12 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); see also
Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1988) ("I]he Sherman Act
treats concerted action more harshly than unilateral behavior[.]"); Shaw v. Rolex Watch,
U.S.A., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that the distinction between
unilateral and concerted activity "imposes a stricter standard on the conduct of concerted
activity").
13 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768-69.
14 Jeanery, 849 F.2d at 1152 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768).
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packaging, as well as creating new products. 15 This is the essence of a free
market economy: businesses woo consumers through the complex, iterative
process of competition. In short, courts should not be "subjecting the day-to-day
activities of a single firm to antitrust scrutiny[,]"' 16 lest individual firms be
deterred from competing vigorously, as the antitrust laws intend.17
But the Sherman Act, while it protects the ability of single firms to adopt
unilateral policies, does not give a firm unfettered discretion to compete in any
manner it chooses. The Section One-Section Two dichotomy of the Sherman Act
recognizes that unilateral conduct is dangerous only when it threatens
monopoly. 18 In short, relaxing regulation of unilateral conduct to give individual
firms latitude to compete does not grant them permission to monopolize. 19
By treating unilateral and concerted action differently, the Sherman Act
creates a gap whereby some conduct that would be illegal if agreed to between
competitors is perfectly legal when done unilaterally. Thus, much
anticompetitive conduct that is illegal when performed in combination is
permitted when done by a single seller even though such unilateral conduct is
still technically anticompetitive. 20 This is simply the cost of allowing individual
15 See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 478-79 (1992);
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984); see also infra notes 349-54
and accompanying text.
16 William S. Brewbaker Im, Antitrust Conspiracy Doctrine and the Hospital Enterprise,
74 B.U. L. REV. 67,71 n.16 (1994).
17 Cf Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) ("[I]t is in the
interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition[.]")
(citation omitted); Matsushita Radio Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986).
Regardless of whether a business is found liable for treble damages, even the process of
antitrust scrutiny can chill business activity. In debating the Sherman Act, Senator Morgan
noted that the law "ought not to be a breeder of lawsuits. If there is any one duty we have got
higher than another in respect of the general judiciary of the United States, it is to suppress
litigation and have justice done without litigation as far as we can." 21 CONG. REC. 3145, 3149
(1890) (statement of Sen. Morgan), reprinted in 1 TBE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
ANTrrRUsT LAWs AND RELATED STATUTES 279, 288 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Analyzing the reasonableness of any given restraint is a cumbersome
process that should not be undertaken unless necessary. When a seller has unilaterally imposed
a restraint, courts should not partake in analyzing the reasonableness of that restraint unless it is
the result of concerted action.
18 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456 (1993).
19 While unilateral conduct is afforded deference, it is not given free rein. Unilateral
conduct that is generally legal can be forbidden by the Sherman Act when it is done by a
monopolist, or a business attempting to achieve monopoly power. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co.
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 4 72 U.S. 585 (1985).
20 As the Third Circuit has recognized, "the Sherman Act does not make unlawful the
entire universe of anticompetitive conduct. It does not proscribe anticompetitive unilateral
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businesses room to experiment, make mistakes, and, perhaps, acquire market
share. As a result, the critical first juncture in most antitrust analysis is whether
the challenged conduct is unilateral or concerted. The answer to this question
determines whether a court will apply the framework of Section One or Section
Two, which in turn determines how much latitude a court will allow the firm
whose actions are challenged.
B. Applying the Sherman Act's Unilateral-Concerted Dichotomy to Tying
Arrangements
Current antitrust law does not recognize a distinction between unilateral and
concerted tying arrangements. Nonetheless, like other trade restraints, tying
arrangements can be categorized as either unilateral or concerted. A unilateral
tying arrangement exists when one seller, acting alone, decides that she will not
sell her tying product unless the prospective buyer also purchases the designated
tied product.21 A concerted tying arrangement, on the other hand, is created
when two sellers agree to jointly impose a tying arrangement.22 Just as there is a
distinction between concerted and unilateral anticompetitive conduct in antitrust
law generally, concerted and unilateral tying arrangements should receive
disparate antitrust scrutiny.
1. Unilateral Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement is "defined as an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or
tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any
other supplier."' 23 Under this classic definition of a tying arrangement, the tie-in
appears unilaterally imposed.24 The seller does not conspire or agree with any
other seller to impose the tie-in. Rather, the seller unilaterally decides to tie two
products together in much the same way that a seller unilaterally decides what
conduct that falls shy of threatened monopolization." Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus.,
980 F.2d 171,205 (3d Cir. 1992).
21 This Article focuses on the most traditional form of a tying arrangement whereby a
seller "forces" a buyer to purchase two products. Another form of tie-in exists when Seller A
announces that she will only sell Product X to consumers who agree not to purchase Product Y
from Seller B. Seller A does not demand that consumers actually purchase Product Y from
Seller A; they simply cannot purchase it from Seller B.
22 See infra Part II.B.2.
23 Northem Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (footnote omitted).




price to charge for a product.
Unilateral tying arrangements are condemned because of their effect on
competition. According to traditional leverage theory, a lone seller with market
power in a tying product may attempt to impose a tie-in as a way to leverage
market power from one market to another.25 The seller who controls the tying
product, so the argument goes, can refuse to sell the tying product unless the
consumer also purchases the tied product, thereby diminishing competition on
the merits for the tied product.26 Traditional theory holds that tie-ins eliminate
competition because the consumer must take the tied product, regardless of its
quality, in order to obtain the tying product.27
Independent of its effect on competition in the market for the tied product, a
unilaterally imposed tying arrangement can also be used to price discriminate.2 8
For example, suppose the Xymox Corporation manufactures and sells both
copiers and copy paper. It sells copiers to two consumer profiles, a large paper-
intensive business (such as a law fir) and a small business that has fewer
copying needs (such as a real estate office). The law firm cannot operate without
the ability to do large amounts of copying, and therefore it values the copier
more than does the real estate firm, which does less copying. Suppose the law
firm were willing to pay $50,000 for a decent copier, whereas the real estate firm
is willing to pay $5,000.29 Ideally, Xymox would like to charge the law firm
$50,000 and the real estate firm $5,000. However, it cannot. Not only would
such blatant price discrimination run afoul of the Robinson-Patman Act, but
there is a significant risk of arbitrage because the real estate firm could buy the
copier for $5,000 and then sell it to the law firm for $30,000, a beneficial
arrangement for everybody but Xymox. Xymox's dilemma is to find a way to
price its copiers so that it does not lose sales to low-volume users, such as the
real estate firm, but still extracts a significant amount of the consumer surplus
25 See infra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
26 See Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 6.
27 Even if both the tying product and the tied product are competitively priced, the tying
arrangement gives the seller, in effect, two sales where otherwise she might only have made
one. Thus, while the seller does not necessarily receive supra-competitive profits, she
nonetheless eams competitive profits on a greater dollar value of transactions and thereby
increases her net profits.
2 8 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,478-79 (1992);
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984); ROBERT BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 376-78 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 173-74 (1976);
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 926
(1979) ("A tie-in makes sense only as a method of price discrimination."); Kurt A. Strasser, An
Antitrust Policyfor Tying Arrangements, 34 EMORY L.J. 253, 276-77 (1985).
2 9 If the market price for copiers were higher, the real estate firm would find it more cost-
beneficial to take its copying to an outside vendor.
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from high-volume users, such as the law firm. Tying may do the trick. Xymox
can impose a tying arrangement between its copiers and its copy paper, whereby
purchasers of Xymox copiers must exclusively use Xymox paper. Xymox can
then price its copiers at $4,000 and its paper at a supra-competitive price, say 100
per sheet. The low-volume user, who does not use much paper, will end up
spending $5,000 over the life of the copier. Conversely, the high-volume user,
who uses substantial quantities of copy paper, will end up paying closer to
$50,000 for the copier and paper supplies over the life of the copier. Both low-
and high-volume users will find the arrangement cost-beneficial and Xymox will
extract maximum consumer surplus from different consumer groups. However,
because both sets of consumers see the same shelf-price for their copiers, there is
no blatant price discrimination. Additionally, there is no risk of arbitrage because
the low-volume user cannot sell her copier to a high-volume user in a mutually
beneficial trade; thus, the tying-implemented price discrimination is not easily
circumvented.30
A seller can also employ a unilateral tying arrangement to evade a price
ceiling on the tying product.31 For example, suppose a government-federal,
state, or local-imposes a price ceiling of $10 on Product X, which would
otherwise sell for $15 in a competitive market. A seller could not then directly
charge $15 for X, but she could achieve the same result by implementing a tie-in
whereby a consumer desiring X must also purchase Product Y. The seller then
increases the price of Y, the tied product, to five dollars greater than its
competitive price. As a bundle, X and Y are sold at a price that is equivalent to
the price that would be paid for both goods in a competitive market without price
regulation.32 This tying arrangement is not intended to extend the seller's market
power from the market for the tying good into the tied product market rather, it
provides a mechanism to circumvent governmental price regulation.33
30 While tie-ins can theoretically be used to effect price discrimination, there are
reasonable arguments for why tying law should not be used to police price discrimination. See
9 PHILip E. AREEDA, ANTrmusT LAW 17113, at 134 (1991). First, it is not the most
effective tool against such conduct. Tying law is more concerned with leveraging between
markets and legal tests are designed to address this problem, not price discrimination. Ward S.
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 33 (1957)
("To make a tie-in illegal in the price discrimination situation is arbitrary, for it resolves a very
complicated problem in a manner totally different from the law directly concerned with price
discrimination."). Second, the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-
13b, 21a (1994), is specifically tailored to deal with price discrimination and is, therefore, a
more appropriate tool.
31 See 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, 1712d, at 141-42; Bowman, supra note 30, at 21-23.
32 Additionally, the seller has sold two items instead of simply the tying product at the
competitive price that would have been prevailing but for the price ceiling.
33 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 23. Similarly, a tying arrangement can be a means to
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In sum, tying arrangements imposed by a single seller are condemned
because of concern that such restraints suppress competition for the tied product
facilitate price discrimination, and can be used to evade price regulations.
34
Whether a tying arrangement represents an effective means to achieve these ends
will largely depend on the seller's market power35 and the existence of market
imperfections.
2. Concerted Tying Arrangements
The above arguments against tying arrangements presume that tie-ins are
imposed by a single seller even though tie-ins can be imposed by multiple
sellers. Given this presumption, it is ironic that current antitrust law treats all
tying arrangements as inherently concerted action evaluated under Section One
of the Sherman Act.36 This Article argues that a tie-in imposed by a single seller
is not concerted, but unilateral. Concerted tying arrangements are fundamentally
different from unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. And just as the Sherman
Act recognizes in general that concerted action is inherently more dangerous
than unilateral action, concerted tying arrangements similarly present many more
anticompetitive risks than do unilaterally imposed tying arrangements.
Concerted tying arrangements come in at least three forms. First, two
suppliers of tying and tied products (i.e., each supplier sells both products) may
agree to jointly impose a tying arrangement as a variant of horizontal price
fixing. Second, a supplier of a tying product and a supplier of a tied product may
agree that the first supplier will condition all sales of the tying product on the
purchase of the tied product from the second seller. Third, a concerted tying
arrangement exists when a dominant supplier convinces alternative suppliers of
the tying product not to sell the tying product to consumers attempting to
circumvent the dominant seller's tying arrangement
evade a cartel. See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 809-10 (2d
ed. 1981).
34 Some courts and commentators also condemned tying arrangements as a barrier to
entry that diminishes competition. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495, 509 (1969); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTRusT POLICY § 10.6b1l, at 372-
73 (1994).
Another theoretical use of tying arrangements that is related to price discrimination is
metering. Arguably, the tying arrangements in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947), and International Business Machine Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936),
were metering tie-ins. In many instances, however, tie-ins are not an appropriate metering tool.
See Bowman, supra note 30, at 35 (stating that tie-ins are an inappropriate metering tool when
more than one product is tied).
35 See infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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a. Concerted Tying Arrangements Between Competitors
Perhaps the most dangerous form of concerted tying arrangement exists
when competitors-each of whom traffic in both the tying and tied products--
collude and agree that each supplier will tie two products together. A concerted
tying arrangement between competitors is basically a form of horizontal price-
fixing.37 This can be seen on several levels. First, to the extent that a tying
arrangement represents a backdoor way of increasing cost to a consumer-by
forcing consumers to buy two products instead of one-a concerted tying
arrangement is fundamentally a joint price increase. By way of a hypothetical,
consider two sellers, A and B, both of whom sell two separate products, X and Y.
A and B would like to fix the price of X at supra-competitive levels, but fear that
they would be easily caught if they had to continually meet to change the fixed
price in response to changing market conditions. Also, A and B would worry
about raising suspicions if their prices moved in unison. As an alternative to
explicit price fixing, A and B may agree to tie all sales of X to sales of Y. In
doing so, they have not fixed the price of X, but they have effectively increased
the net profits received from each sale of X by coupling it with Y, especially if Y
is a high-ticket item.
Second, tying arrangements facilitate joint efforts to stabilize prices at higher
levels. Tying arrangements create noise that makes it more difficult for
consumers to determine true long-term prices and therefore create a significant
barrier to comparison price shopping.38 In many instances, it may be more
difficult for consumers to calculate the cost of a bundle of goods than the tying
product alone. This is particularly true when the tied product is a service, which
does not have an up-front cost.39 Depending on the level of noise created, the
concerted tying arrangement can have similar effects to horizontal price-fixing
because if two competitors agree to impose tying arrangements, there may be
less price competition for the tied product.4 ° Also, a tying arrangement can be
used to obscure a traditional price-fixing scheme because the sellers can
37 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 10.4b, at 366 ("One of the most plausibly
anticompetitive uses of tie-ins is to facilitate cartelization or other coordination of prices in the
market for the tying product."); see also 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, 1703a, at 33 (stating that
tie-ins "may ease tacit coordination among oligopolists").
3 8 See 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, 1712f, at 144-45 (demonstrating how tie-ins can be
used to" [d]eceptively understate price").
3 9 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,473-76 (1992).
However, the service costs may be determinable when a warranty is bundled with a durable
good.
40 See 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, 1707c, at 80 (stating that tie-ins may reduce incentives
for price competition in an oligopolistic market).
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simultaneously impose tie-ins but charge different prices for the tying and tied
product (for example, Seller A charges a higher price for the tying product than
Seller B but a lower price for the tied product), whereby the price for the bundle
is the same. Buyers will not see the same price for the tying product and will be
less likely to detect the price-fixing.
On a similar note, a concerted tie-in can facilitate cartelization of the tied
product by providing a mechanism to detect cheating by cartel members. Tying
case law contains examples of tie-ins whereby the consumer was required to
purchase the tied product from the tying seller only if no other supplier were
selling the product for less. 4 1 Scholars have argued that this provision essentially
converted consumers into cartel police who would report to the dominant tying
seller if any suppliers were selling the tied product for below the market price,
which was fixed by the cartel.42
Finally, a concerted tying arrangement between competitors could be used to
eliminate a mutual foe. Suppose Sellers A and B both supply Products X and Y,
but are facing potential or actual competition from Seller C in the market for Y,
but not X. Through a concerted tying arrangement, A and B can decrease the
competitive threat posed by C. If A and B each require every purchaser of X to
also purchase Y, there may not be enough residual demand for Y for Seller C to
remain in business. 43 Even if A and B cannot force C from the market it is
rational to continue the concerted tying arrangement because it imposes a
significant barrier to entry for any new firms.44
Each of these concerted efforts at tying is inherently more harmful to
competition than its unilateral counterpart. By agreeing to engage in
simultaneous tying arrangements, competitors can provide air cover to each
others' tying arrangements. In a competitive market, if Seller A were to impose a
tying arrangement, consumers could buy the tying product from Seller B without
41 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 n.6 (1958);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394 n.5 (1947).
42 See F. Jay Cummings & Wayne E. Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 329 (1979); HOVENKAM, supra note 34, § 10.6b3, at 374-75.
43 Such would be the case if there were a minimal scale of production necessary to
conduct business profitably and the concerted tying arrangement had the effect of driving
independent demand for the tied product below this minimum threshold. Similarly, A and B
could raise C's relative costs if economies of scale are achievable. See generally Thomas G.
Krattenmake & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve
Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
44 Cf. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513 (1969) (White,
J., dissenting) (" [T]he practice of tying forecloses other sellers of the tied product and makes it
more difficult for new firms to enter that market"); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594,605 (1953).
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the requirement of purchasing the tied product.45 The existence of alternative
suppliers of a tying product who are willing to sell that tying product alone
would substantially undermine the force of any unilaterally imposed tying
arrangement, in the same way that a unilaterally announced increase in price is
likely to be ineffective if one's competitors do not follow suit. If, however, other
sellers agree not to sell the tying product alone, all sellers are then able to impose
a profit-maximizing tying arrangement, which would otherwise be easily
circumvented in a free market. Thus, to the extent that consumers do not want
the tied product or they desire to purchase it independently, an agreement
between two competitors to impose a tying arrangement decreases consumer
welfare more than any competitor imposing a tying arrangement unilaterally.
46
Similarly, in the context of a joint tie-in intended to eliminate an independent
supplier of the tied product, the concerted action makes the scheme more likely
to succeed and is, therefore, more dangerous to competition. For example, take
the previous hypothetical in which Sellers A and B both sell Products X and Y,
Seller C sells only Product Y, and Seller A wants to eliminate Seller C as a
competitor in the market for Y. If Seller A unilaterally imposed a tying
arrangement between X and Y in an effort to drive Seller C from the market for
Y, consumers could still purchase X from Seller B and Y from Seller C. By
enlisting Seller B in its plan, Seller A's tie-in scheme to eliminate Seller C as a
competitor becomes much more viable.
In sum, the concerted tying arrangement in each of these scenarios is more
injurious to competition than the same plan implemented unilaterally by a lone
seller.
4 5 See Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 7 ("[1]f one of a dozen food stores in a community
were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain
competition in sugar if its competitors were ready and able to sell flour by itself.").
46 In theory, a concerted tying arrangement between competitors should decrease
consumer welfare by the same amount as price-fixing. The analogy to price-fixing is apt in that
unilateral efforts by a seller to increase her price are permitted under antitrust laws. For
example, a seller with market power can engage in unilateral monopoly pricing, even though it
decreases consumer welfare. However, two sellers cannot get together and agree to charge the
profit-maximizing monopoly price, precisely because it will decrease consumer welfare. What
one seller may do alone, two may not do together. The economic analysis is similar with tying
arrangements. Because two sellers cannot legally agree to charge a higher price in order to
maximize their respective profits, they may not attempt to jointly impose a tying arrangement




b. Concerted Action Between a Supplier of a Tying Product and a
Supplier of a Tied Product
A concerted tying arrangement can also be formed between the seller of a
tying product and the seller of a tied product. For example, if Seller A sells
Product X and Seller B sells Product Y, a concerted tying arrangement exists if
Seller A refuses to sell X unless the consumer also purchases Y from Seller B.47
At first glance, it may be difficult to see why the supplier of the tying
product, Seller A, would agree to such an arrangement. 48 After all, the Chicago
School argues that Seller A must decrease the price charged for the tying product
in order to force a consumer to purchase the tied product.49 Nevertheless, the
antitrust case law is peppered with instances in which two businesses who sell
two separate products (or services) combine to impose a concerted tying
arrangement. Such a restraint can be found in at least three instances.
First, the supplier of the tying product and the supplier of the tied product
may have an ongoing business relationship, or one seller may own an interest in
the other. An extreme version of this exists when the two actors are a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.50 Three Supreme Court tying cases
illustrate this scenario: Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,51 Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. [Fortner 1] 52 and United States
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. [Fortner R/].53 In less extreme cases, the
47 If the tied product is sold by another party, then there are multiple parties-not
including the purchaser-who form an agreement with the intent to restrain trade and thus the
tying arrangement properly falls under Section One.
4 8 In recognition of this apparent paradox, some case law requires that the seller of the
tying product have an economic interest in the tied product before a tie-in is condemned. See,
e.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 104 (4th Cir. 1987); Carl Sandburg
Village Condominium Ass'n v. First Condominium Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207-08 (7th Cir.
1985). But this rule does not appear universal. In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 V.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the defendant hospital did not have an economic interest in the
defendant anaethesiology firm, but the Supreme Court nonetheless characterized the
relationship as a tying arrangement.
49 See infra notes 336-37 and accompanying text.
50 Before the Supreme Court's decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), a parent and subsidiary were legally capable of forming a
combination in violation of the Sherman Act.
51 356 U.S. 1, 2-4, n.3 (1958); see also infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
52 394 U.S. 495,496-97 (1969).
53 429 U.S. 610, 613-14 (1977). Northern Pacific is particularly important because it is
the case in which the Court gave birth to the traditional language defining an illegal tie-in being
imposed by a seller on a buyer. The language suggests that the Court was dealing with-and
applying-Section One analysis to a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement. But the tying
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tying seller merely has a financial interest in the supplier of the tied product.54
Second, two suppliers of separate goods may tie their products together as a
quid pro quo or because both benefit from the tie-in, each in its own way. For
example, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,55 a hospital
developed a tying arrangement with a group of anesthesiologists, whereby
patients having services performed at the hospital were required to use an
anesthesiologist from the approved group. Both parties to the agreement
benefited from the tie-in. The anesthesiologists received increased demand for
their services, while the hospital received a guaranteed supply of competent
doctors who were familiar with the hospital's rules and procedures. The contract
between the hospital and the firm of anesthesiologists represented a concerted
tying arrangement.56 Even without a clear quid pro quo, independent businesses
may combine to impose a tying arrangement because of their long-standing
business relationship.57
Third, the dominant seller of the tying product may be imposing a tie-in with
the tied product of another seller because the latter provides the dominant seller
with a commission, rebate, or other kickback as payment for the tying
arrangement.58 Thus, although the dominant seller has no direct financial interest
arrangements in Northern Pacific were not unilaterally imposed; rather, they were the result of
concerted action. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Fortner I, the
Court described the relationship between the parent and its subsidiary as "a continuing
agreement," 394 U.S. at 497, and in Fortner II, it quoted the district court's finding that the
parent and subsidiary "did combine or conspire to increase sales" through a tie-in. 429 U.S. at
612 n.1 (emphasis omitted).
54 See, e.g., Midwestem Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705,712 (11th Cir.
1984).
55 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984). Also, the Fortner I Court described the tying arrangement as one
in which the tying product "is provided by one corporation on condition that a product be
purchased from a separate corporation[.]" 394 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added).
56 Ibis statement is descriptive, not normative. To describe the tying arrangement in
Jefferson Parish as concerted is not to condemn it out of hand. The rationale for the tie-in may
constitute a legitimate business justification that renders the restraint reasonable.
57 See, e.g., Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1310 (3rd
Cir. 1975) (examining an alleged concerted tying arrangement between a seller of tying
product and a seller of a tied product because of a long-standing business relationship); see also
Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing
concerted tying arrangement allegedly imposed to deny plaintiff access to tying product).
58 See Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n v. First Condominium Dev. Co., 758
F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1985); Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.,
732 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1984); Roberts v. Elaine Powers Figure Salons, Inc., 708
F.2d 1476, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1983); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d
821, 835 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Osbom v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
286 F.2d 832, 832 (4th Cir. 1960).
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in the tied product seller as an entity, the tying seller is nonetheless receiving
monetary compensation for imposing the tie-in.
In sum, not only is it conceivable for two entities who are not competitors to
agree to implement a concerted tying arrangement, such concerted tying
arrangements can be found throughout antitrust jurisprudence.59
c. Concerted Action Between a Dominant Seller and Alternative Suppliers
of the Tying Product
A third form of concerted tying arrangement exists when the dominant seller
of a tying product cajoles alternative suppliers of the tying product only to sell
their product to consumers who accept the dominant seller's tie-in. For example,
the tying arrangement in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 60
represents such a concerted tie-in. Kodak controlled almost one hundred percent
of the market for parts for Kodak copiers. Kodak imposed a tying arrangement
whereby consumers could not purchase Kodak parts unless they also purchased
Kodak service or, at a minimum, agreed not to purchase service from any
independent service organizations (iSOs). Although at first blush the tying
arrangement in Kodak appears unilateral because Kodak alone tied its parts to
Kodak service, Kodak's tying arrangement was in fact concerted: Kodak's parts
suppliers agreed with Kodak not to provide parts to ISOs that competed with
Kodak to service Kodak copiers. The Supreme Court explained how Kodak
worked in concert with other suppliers to effect its tying arrangement:
As part of the same policy [of selling parts only to equipment owners who
refrain from using ISOs for service], Kodak sought to limit ISO access to other
sources of Kodak parts. Kodak and the OEM's [original equipment
manufactures, independent companies thatmanufactured Kodak parts to Kodak's
specifications,] agreed that the OEM's would not sell parts that fit Kodak
equipment to anyone other than Kodak. Kodak also pressured Kodak equipment
owners and independent parts distributors not to sell Kodak parts to ISO's.
Kodak intended, through these policies, to make it more difficult for ISO's
to sell service for Kodak machines. It succeeded. ISO's were unable to obtain
parts from reliable sources, and many were forced out of business, while others
lost substantial revenue. Customers were forced to switch to Kodak service even
though they preferred ISO service.61
59 See supra notes 51-58; see also Gonzalez v. St. Margaret's House Hous. Dev. Fund
Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1515 (2d Cir. 1989).
60 504 U.S. 451,458 (1992).
61 Id. at 458 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at 485 (referring to
"evidence that Kodak forced OEM's, equipment owners, and parts brokers not to sell parts to
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The Kodak case illustrates why this form of concerted tying arrangement is
far worse for consumers than the same tying arrangement without concerted
action. If Kodak had simply announced a tying arrangement by which consumers
purchasing spare parts from Kodak must also use Kodak service, then consumers
not wanting Kodak service could have circumvented the tie-in by purchasing
parts from other suppliers and then contracting with ISOs to provide service. By
restraining trade in the parts market in concert with other suppliers, Kodak put
teeth in its tying arrangement. Consequently, this concerted tying arrangement
decreased consumer choice (and consumer welfare to the extent that ISOs
charged less for service than Kodak) much more than a unilaterally imposed
tying arrangement would have.62
3. The Courts'Failure to Recognize the Distinction Between Unilateral
and Concerted Tying Arrangements
Just as unilateral and concerted business conduct in general receive disparate
treatment under antitrust laws, unilateral tying arrangements should be treated
differently than concerted tying arrangements. 63 This is because, as with most
ISO's").
Some litigants have argued that Kodak held that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements
are violative of Section One. See Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Lab. Corp., 85 F.3d 465,470 (10th
Cir. 1996), rev'd en banc, 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997). Such an argument reads too much
into the Court's opinion in that the Court did not address the issue head on because Kodak did
not ask the Court to determine whether unilaterally imposed tying arrangements are immune
from antitrust liability under Section One. The closest that Kodak came to advancing such a
position was its characterization of a policy as a unilateral refusal to deal. In response to
Kodak's argument, the Supreme Court did not consider the issue of unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements, but rather found that Kodak's policy constituted a tying arrangement and not a
unilateral refusal to deal. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462-63. The Court then emphasized the
inherent concerted nature of Kodak's policy by noting that even if "Kodak's refusal to sell
parts to any company providing service can be characterized as a unilateral refusal to deal, its
alleged sale of parts to third parties on condition that they buy service from Kodak is not." Id
at 463 n.8. Thus, the tying arrangement in Kodak was not unilaterally imposed, but required
the participation of separate parties. Indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized the central role of
Kodak's agreements with third parties in affecting Kodak's tying arrangement.
62 If Kodak parts are defined as a relevant market unto itself, then even if Kodak's tying
arrangement were clearly unilateral, it could still be violative of Section Two. Kodak arguably
had a monopoly over Kodak parts that it could leverage into a monopoly over the market for
service of Kodak equipment.
6 3 Presumably, while the Chicago School defends tying arrangements as harmless, see
infra notes 336-37 and accompanying text, even hard-core Chicagoans would concede that
concerted tying arrangements pose significant anticompetitive dangers. See POSNER, supra
note 28, at 171 ("[C]ollusion poses the most serious danger to the maintenance of a
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trade restraints, concerted tying arrangements present an inherent risk of
anticompetitive harm that unilateral tying arrangements do not.64 If all sellers
collude to tie Product X to Product Y, consumers are in a significantly worse
situation than if a dominant seller unilaterally implemented such a policy. In the
latter scenario, if the consumer does not want Product Y, she can simply
purchase Product X from another seller.65 If there were a concerted tying
arrangement, this would not be an option.
The current law on tying arrangements fails to recognize the fundamental
distinction between unilateral and concerted tie-ins. Thus, despite the Sherman
Act's clear distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct all tying
arrangements are presently evaluated under Section One, which governs only
concerted action. As a result all tying arrangements are treated as concerted
action without any inquiry into whether the tie-in is unilaterally imposed or the
result of collusion among separate business entities.
The Supreme Court has not acknowledged the fact that tying arrangements
can be unilateral or concerted. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not explicitly
addressed the issue of whether (or why) a unilaterally imposed tying
arrangement violates Section One.66 For the first half century of the Sherman
competitive economy.").
64 A concerted tying arrangement whereby the seller of a tying good and the seller of a
tied product bundle their products together does not necessarily pose the same anticompetitive
threats of the other two forms of concerted tying arrangements: those in which two competitors
jointly impose a tie-in or in which a dominant seller coerces other sellers to acquiesce in the tie-
in. Whereas these latter two forms of tie-in decrease consumer bargaining power in the tying
market, the former does not because there is no increase in anyone's market power over the
tying market by acting in concert.
65 See William R. Andersen, Kodak and Afiermarket Tying Analysis: Some Comparative
Thoughts, in ANTirRusT: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY 277, 278 (John 0. Haley &
Hiroshi Iyori, eds.) (1995) ("When the buyer has adequate substitutes for the tying product, the
tie may have no force-a meaningless gesture by the seller."). The free market can act to
correct unilateral tying arrangements because if consumers do not want the bundled goods, the
bundling seller will lose market share and be compelled to modify or eliminate the bundling, in
the same way that the existence of other sellers deters a dominant seller from raising her price
to supra-competitive levels.
66 See City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 650 n.10 (10th Cir.
1992). The Supreme Court has never articulated a distinction between unilateral and concerted
tying arrangements, but neither has it explicitly explained how unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements satisfy the concerted action requirement of Section One. Nor is the Supreme
Court likely to address the specific issue of unilateral versus concerted tying arrangements.
Until recently, however, there was a slight split among the circuits, with the Tenth Circuit
holding that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements do not satisfy Section One's concerted
action requirement. See Systemcare, 85 F.3d at 469-70, rev'd en banc 117 F.3d 1137 (10th
Cir. 1997); City of Chanute, 955 F.2d at 650; McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367
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Act the Supreme Court did not invalidate a unilaterally imposed tying
arrangement under Section One of the Sherman Act 67 Although the Court had
invalidated tying arrangements, most cases clearly involved two businesses
collectively agreeing to impose a tying arrangement thus satisfying (at least
impliedly) Section One's requirement of concerted action,68 or involved
unilateral tying arrangements that were held violative of Section Three of the
Clayton Act.69
Half a century into Sherman Act jurisprudence, International Salt, Inc. v.
United States70 represented a turning point.71 International Salt was the first case
in which the Supreme Court applied per se analysis to tying arrangements.72 But
(10th Cir. 1988). The Tenth Circuit has since resolved an intracircuit split of authority by
adopting the majority rule. See Systemcare, 117 F.3d at 1142-43 (en banc). Furthermore, the
federal circuits will not soon reexamine the jurisprudence of unilateral tying arrangements
because of their collective reticence to consider-let alone concede--that a lirie of cases was
incorrectly decided. For example, questioning the (recently overruled) Tenth Circuit line of
authority holding unilateral tying arrangements outside of Section One's reach, one
commentator asked, "If correct in its reasoning that absent an agreement between the
defendant and a third party, there can be no Section 1 violation, then what is the status of this
long history of accepted caselaw?" WILLIAM C. HOLMEs, ANTITRUsT LAW HANDBOOK 58-59
(1997).
67 Indeed, many early tying arrangements were upheld by the Court. See, e.g., Pick Mfg.
Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3, 4 (1936); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co.,
247 U.S. 32,66-67 (1918) [UnitedShoel]; Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1912).
6 8 See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 613-14 (1977); Fortner
Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,496-97 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4n.3 (1958).
69 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); Intemational Bus.
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134-35 (1936); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1917). In some cases, a unilateral tying
arrangement was challenged under Section Three of the Clayton Act, and Section One
violations were tacked on without significant analysis. Unfortunately, this line of cases, in
which unilaterally imposed tying arrangements were treated under the Clayton Act and
concerted tying arrangements were analyzed under the Sherman Act, became conflated and
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements began to be analyzed under Section One.
70 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
71 In International Salt, the government initiated a civil action to enjoin the International
Salt Company from enforcing lease provisions that tied patented machines (the tying product)
to International Salt's products. The government brought suit under Section One of the
Sherman Act and Section Three of the Clayton Act. Id. at 393.
72 See id. at 396. Although tying arrangements continue to be nominally per se illegal, in
reality the current test contains many elements of Rule of Reason analysis, in that the plaintiff
must show that the defendant possesses market power and defendants are afforded an
opportunity to present business justifications for their conduct.
The initial decision to impose per se liability seems suspect. In imposing per se liability,
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most importantly, for our purposes, International Salt appears to be the first case
in which the Supreme Court invalidated an apparently unilaterally imposed tying
arrangement under Section One of the Sherman Act.73 Since International Salt,
subsequent Supreme Court decisions have invalidated tying arrangements that
appear to be unilaterally imposed.74
But the single most important act that the Court has taken to encourage the
position that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements should be analyzed under
Section One is how the Court has defined tying arrangements. The classic
definition of a tying arrangement comes from Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States,75 in which the Court defined a tying arrangement as "an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer
also purchases a different (or tied) product."' 76 This definition implies that all
tying arrangements are unilaterally imposed because the definition speaks only
in terms of one seller imposing a tie-in on one buyer.77 Subsequent courts have
repeated this singular language from Northern Pacific.7 8 By defining the tying
arrangement as being imposed by a single seller while condemning it under
Section One, the Northern Pacific opinion gave the impression that unilaterally
the Court in International Salt relied on Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1947). Fashion Originators' was a case brought under Section Five of the FTC Act.
See id. at 460.
73 It is not clear whether the tie-in in International Salt would have been considered
unilateral or concerted action when the case was decided. There were multiple defendants in
International Salt. However, International Salt was the only corporate defendant. See United
States v. International Salt Co., 6 F.R.D. 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). The Supreme Court's
opinion is in the singular (i.e., refers to only one defendant) because the plaintiff only brought a
summaryjudgment motion against the one corporate defendant. See id. The issue of agreement
was never discussed by the lower court or the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court spoke in the
singular because there was only one defendant before it and there was no issue regarding the
requirement for concerted action. The issue of unilateral tying arrangements was neither briefed
by the parties nor addressed by the Supreme Court.
74 See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 39 (1962).
75 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
76 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
77 Northern Pacific stated the tying arrangement rule in the singular, despite the fact that
there was arguably concerted action by multiple defendants. This unfortunate language laid the
foundation for what is now taken as a given, namely that unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements violate Section One. See generally id.
78 For example, after quoting the Northern Pacific singular definition of a tying
arrangement, the Court in Kodak stated that the "'essential characteristic of an invalid tying
arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the
buyer into the purchase of a tied product."' Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 n.9 (1992) (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 12 (1984)) (emphasis added).
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imposed tying arrangements should be evaluated under Section One.
However, the Court's use of the singular language in Northern Pacific is
misleading because it makes the tying arrangement at issue appear unilaterally
imposed. In reality, at the time the case was decided, the tie-in constituted
concerted action between two businesses conspiring to restrain trade. The
challenged tie-in was the product of an agreement between Northern Pacific
Railway and its wholly owned subsidiary, Northwestern Improvement Co.7 9
When the Supreme Court decided the case in 1958, a corporation could be liable
for conspiring with its own wholly owned subsidiary.80 Not until the 1984
Copperweld decision did the Supreme Court hold that a corporation was legally
incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned subsidiary.81 In short, the
agreement between Northern Pacific and Northwestern Improvement constituted
concerted action when the case was decided, although it would be considered
unilateral conduct today.
The Court used singular language--"a seller" imposes the tie-in on a
buyer-as a convenience. After using language suggesting that there was only
one defendant, the Court explained in a footnote:
Actually there are two defendants here, the Northern Pacific Railway Company
and its wholly owned subsidiary Northwestern Improvement Company which
sells, leases and manages the Railroad's lands. For convenience and since
Northwestern is completely controlled by the Railroad we shall speak of the two
of them as a single "defendant" or as the "Railroad." 82
Thus, the tying arrangement in Northern Pacific was the product of an agreement
between two defendants.8 3 By employing language that gave the appearance of
one defendant, instead of two, the Court inaccurately suggested that the tying
7 9 See infra note 82.
80 See generally Milton Handler & Thomas A. Smart, The Present Status of the
Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (1981). The Supreme Court's
own jurisprudence clearly indicated that a parent corporation could legally conspire with its
wholly owned subsidiary to violate Section One of the Sherman Act. See Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218,227 (1947).
81 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
82 Northem Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1958).
83 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 679, affid, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
It is also interesting that while the govemment brought its case against Northern Pacific under
both Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act, its motion for summary judgment was
grounded solely on Section One. See Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at 8, Northem Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1 (1958) (No. 59).
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arrangement was unilaterally imposed. But this use of singular language was not
meant to define the legal test for tying, but was merely a linguistic convenience.
In essence, the current definition used to condemn unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements was built on a foundation (that a corporation can conspire with its
wholly owned subsidiary) that has since shifted, yet the original structure built on
an outdated foundation remains in place. Whether Northern Pacific would have
come out the same way if the Copperweld doctrine had been in place is
indeterminable because no tying defendant has argued that a unilaterally
imposed tying arrangement should not fall within Section One of the Sherman
Act. The defendants in Northern Pacific did not advance this argument because
that particular tie-in was clearly concerted action under the then-prevailing law.84
Forty years later in the post-Copperweld era, courts and commentators read
Northern Pacific as condemning a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement;
nobody recognizes that this was, in fact, a concerted tying arrangement. In short;
although the Court's language appears to indict unilateral tying arrangements,
the restraint in Northern Pacific was a concerted tying arrangement. The
distinction is lost because, by today's legal standards, the tying arrangement in
Northern Pacific is seen as unilateral. Given this misreading of Northern Pacific,
no one has ever argued to the Supreme Court that unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements do not belong within Section One of the Sherman Act, despite the
fact that the Court has never explicitly held to the contrary.
III. MISCHARACTERiZING UNILATERALLY IMPOSED TYING
ARRANGEMENTS AS CONCERTED ACTION
The current assumption that all tying arrangements-whether unilateral or
concerted-are to be analyzed under Section One of the Sherman Act is at odds
with the rest of Section One jurisprudence. The traditional formulation of a
Section One violation includes three elements: (1) a contract, conspiracy, or
combination, also referred to as an agreement or concerted action; (2) an
unreasonable restraint of trade; and (3) an interstate commerce requirement. 85
Under this traditional formulation, the court must first find an agreement or
concerted action before advancing to the second element of whether or not a
84 If Coppenveld had governed, Northern Pacific could have argued that it could not
conspire with its wholly owned subsidiary and that its unilaterally imposed policies should not
be evaluated under Section One.
85 See American Ad Management, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781,784 (9th Cir. 1996).
Some courts also include antitrust injury as an element, but this is not done uniformly. This
may be explained by the fact that antitrust injury is often considered a standing requirement in
antitrust litigation. Thus, many courts consider antitrust injury as a threshold standing issue and
not as a substantive element of each individual Section One violation.
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challenged restraint of trade is unreasonable.
Tying arrangements are not analyzed under this traditional formulation.86
Rather, tying arrangements are evaluated under a four- (or sometimes five-) part
test of elements unique to tying arrangements. In general, the required elements
of a Section One tying violation are: (1) two separate products or services; (2)
"conditioning" the sale of one product or service on the purchase of another;, (3)
sufficient market power over the tying product by the seller to force the buyer to
purchase the tying product; and (4) affected volume of interstate commerce in
the tied product is "not insubstantial." 87
This is the entirety of the test for proving an illegal tying arrangement under
Section One. It does not parallel the traditional Section One elements.88 There is
86 Tying arrangements could be evaluated under this standardized framework. See infra
Part VI. After all, a tying arrangement is simply a form of an unreasonable restraint of trade--
one way of meeting the second element of a Section One violation. However, courts do not
employ the traditional Section One test when condemning tying arrangements.
87 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992);
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969). An example of
a five-part test is found in DeJesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,948, at 74,298 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), which noted that the Second Circuit requires:
[A]ilegations and proof of five elements before finding a tie illegal: (1) a tying and a tied
product; (2) evidence of actual coercion by the seller that forced the buyer to accept the
tied product; (3) sufficient economic power in the tying product market to coerce
purchaser acceptance of the tied product; (4) anticompetitive effects in the tied market;
and (5) involvement of a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce in the tied
product market.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Legal & Prof'! Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1044 (1996); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1995).
Some courts also add an element requiring the tying seller to have an economic interest in
the tied product market. See Midwestem Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705,
712 (11th Cir. 1984); Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir.
1979); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977); Venzie Corp.
v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1317 (3d Cir. 1975). Other courts have
rejected such a requirement. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. St. Margaret's House Hous. Dev. Fund
Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1517 (2d Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has never recognized an
economic interest element. See id. Given the reasons for condemning tying arrangements, there
is a strong argument to reject an economic interest requirement See Penn Galvanizing Co. v.
Lukens Steel Co., 59 F.t.D. 74, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Eric D. Young, The Economic Interest
Requirement in the Per Se Analysis of Tying Arrangements: A Worthless Inquiry, 58 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1353, 1364 (1990). Arguably, the economic interest requirement does not make sense
given that a concerted tying arrangement raises its own collusion issues. See supra notes 39-62
and accompanying text.
8 8 However, the tying arrangement test does include the element of interstate commerce
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no explicit inquiry into or discussion of an agreement or concerted action
requirement, which is the first (and often threshold) inquiry in all other Section
One cases. While the element of agreement is arguably implicitly folded into the
coercion requirement and the fact that there must be an actual purchase, it is not
discussed or analyzed independently. The omission of a specific discussion of
concerted action is ironic, given that it is often treated as the sine qua non of
Section One violations. In essence, the tying test starts at the second element of
the Rule of Reason test and asks simply whether the restraint (the tie-in) is
unreasonable. Part I explains why this failure to analyze the agreement
requirement explicitly creates significant doctrinal inconsistencies.
A. Unilateral Tying Arrangements as Unilateral Conduct
The fact that all tying arrangements are evaluated under Section One of the
Sherman Act raises serious questions about whether unilateral conduct is being
condemned under Section One in contravention of the basic framework of the
Sherman Act. A tying arrangement that is unilaterally imposed-and not the
result of concerted implementation-looks like the type of conduct that has
traditionally been immune from Section One scrutiny. In United States v.
Colgate,89 the Supreme Court held that a manufacturer can unilaterally announce
its pricing policy and refuse to do business with those distributors who decline to
follow the announced policy.90 The Colgate Court opined that:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman
Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may
announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.91
As long as a manufacturer does not become too involved in micro-managing
its retailers' policies 92 and does not engage the assistance of third parties in
by requiring that a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product be affected. Like
the interstate commerce requirement in general, this element has few teeth.
89 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
90 See id. at 307.
91 Id. Similarly, in nonantitrust contexts, courts have generally held that a party to a
contract can set the terms of that contract. See, e.g., Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y.,
Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,450 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding HMO's ability to refuse to
negotiate with providers of anesthesia services).
92 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,45 (1960).
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enforcing its unilaterally announced policy,93 the manufacturer's announcement
of the terms upon which it will deal is, as a matter of law, deemed unilateral
conduct outside of the reach of Section One. For over three-quarters of a century,
the Colgate doctrine has clearly delineated a safe harbor for a nonmonopolist to
announce its terms and stick to them.94 It remains the law of the land.95
A unilaterally imposed tying arrangement closely resembles the type of
conduct upheld in Colgate. After all, what is a tying arrangement if not a
unilateral announcement of the terms upon which a seller will deal? For
example, a tying arrangement exists when a seller simply announces that she will
not sell Product X separately from Product Y, but will only sell them as a
bundled package. A clear illustration would be a shrink-wrapped package, which
physically ties two products into one commodity for sale. In essence, shrink
wrapping two products together and putting them on a store shelf is simply a
variation of Colgate's unilateral announcement of the terms upon which the
seller will deal. In the same way that a seller's unilateral act of setting a price
becomes illegal only when done in concert with a competitor, the unilateral act
of bundling products should not create any antitrust issues unless such bundling
is done in concert with another entity or threatens monopolization. 96
Through the Colgate Doctrine, the structure of federal antitrust laws creates
a safe harbor for unilateral conduct by a nonmonopolist. A nonmonopolist
should not have to worry about whether its unilateral conduct violates the
Sherman Act. If she takes unilateral action in setting prices and packaging her
wares, she should have assurances that she will not be liable for treble damages
unless the conduct creates, maintains, or threatens a monopoly. Otherwise,
sellers may not attempt innovative methods of packaging. 97 It is the safe harbor
for unilateral (nonmonopolizing) action that provides the seller the latitude to
9 3 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). When a manufacturer seeks outside assistance in enforcing
its unilaterally imposed policy, courts are apt to find concerted action. In Albrecht, the Supreme
Court reasoned that a newspaper publisher's unilateral price scheme became concerted action
when the publisher hired outside agents to replace offenders. See id. at 150.
94 Cf Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
95 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 US. 752,761--63 (1984).
9 6 Alternatively, if Section Three of the Clayton Act is employed, a tying arrangement can
be condened if it substantially lessens competition. See infra notes 384-92 and
accompanying text.
97 Sellers are devising more innovative ways to market their wares, structuring sales in
different ways and packaging goods in different forms. See infra notes 341-48 and
accompanying text. Yet, according to many courts, a seller employing a strategy of "buy X,
get Y free' is forcing a tying arrangement on its customers. See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.




engage in aggressive competition.98 To protect this safe harbor, a tying
arrangement in which a seller bundles two goods should not be subject to
scrutiny under Section One.
In sum, unilateral packaging and marketing decisions should not be subject
to Section One scrutiny. A tying arrangement conceived, announced, and
enforced by a single seller is quintessential unilateral business conduct. Treating
a single seller's sale of bundled goods as concerted action trivializes the
concerted action requirement.
B. Divining ConcertedAction from Unilateral Conduct
If a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement resembles the type of unilateral
announcement of sales terms that is protected under Colgate, how then have
courts brought unilaterally imposed tying arrangements within the reach of
Section One? Section One of the Sherman Act requires proof of concerted action
in the form of a "contract, combination... or conspiracy in restraint of trade."
Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably by courts,99 there are
clear differences between a contract and a conspiracy.' 00 To determine whether a
unilaterally imposed tying arrangement constitutes concerted action, it is
instructive to examine individually each form of concerted action delineated in
the Sherman Act.
1. Conspiracies and Combinations
A unilaterally imposed tying arrangement between a seller and a buyer
cannot constitute a conspiracy under Section One of the Sherman Act for several
related reasons. First, in order to find an antitrust conspiracy there must be two or
more wrongdoers. 1° 1 This is consistent with the general purpose of punishing
98 See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Kennametal, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 79, 87 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (noting
that unilateral action is not illegal).
9 9 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 31.
100 See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("The words hit two classes of cases, and only two-contracts in restraint of trade
and combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.").
101 See W. W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 430 (1913)
("The gist of an offense in a conspiracy is the unlawful agreement. A conspiracy cannot be
committed by one person alone. There must be two wills acting together. A single defendant,
under a charge of conspiracy, cannot be convicted alone."). Thus, in criminal law, an apparent
agreement between a lone defendant and an undercover government agent cannot constitute an
agreement for conspiracy purposes. See United States v. Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d 360, 365
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 957 (1987); United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126
(1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987); United States v. Fincher, 723 F.2d 862, 863
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conspiracies, namely, that concerted activity poses a greater danger to order than
does individual wrongdoing. 10 2 There are not two wrongdoers in a unilaterally
imposed tying arrangement because only the seller imposing the tie-in has
potentially broken the law.103
Second, in order to establish an antitrust conspiracy there must exist a
mutual intent to achieve the objectives of the conspiracy. 104 Conspiracy law
requires that at least two parties agree to pursue an unlawful course of action.105
It is well-established that each conspirator must be a knowing participant who
seeks to advance the objectives of the conspiracy.10 6 The objective of a Section
One conspiracy is to limit competition. 107 While a single seller imposing a tying
arrangement may intend to restrain trade, the unwilling buyer shares no such
intent. Thus, in the case of a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement, there is no
mutual intent to achieve a common objective and thus no conspiracy.10 8
(111h Cir. 1984).
10 2 See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693 (1975); Krulewitch v. United States,
336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[Tb unite, back of a criminal
purpose, the strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and
more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer.").
103 See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text (discussing how a unilaterally
imposed tying arrangement represents the only Section One violation in which there is but one
defendant).
104 See Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosps., Inc., 703 F.2d 942, 949 (6th Cir. 1983) ("To
establish a violation of section 1 ... plaintiff must establish that the defendants combined or
conspired with an intent to unreasonably restrain trade.").
105 See United States v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hayes, 775 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1552
(11 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Goldberg, 756 F.2d 949, 958 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1009 (1985); United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.
1984); United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907
(1967).
10 6 See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 933 (1977).
Similarly, the Sample Jury Instructions in Civil Antitrust Cases of the Antitrust Section of
the American Bar Association define the participation and intent requirements for conspiracy
as follows: "Before you can find that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy alleged by
plaintiff, the evidence must show that that defendant knowingly joined in the unlawful plan at
its inception or at some later time with the intent to advance or further some object or purpose
of the conspiracy.' SECnON OF ANITrRUSr LAW, ABA, SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCriONS IN CIVIL
ANTrrRUST CASEs at B-11 (1999). The Sample Instructions specifically note that "a person
who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but happens to act in a way that furthers some object or
purpose of the conspiracy, does not thereby become a conspirator." Ia
107 See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
* 10 8 Furthermore, as a matter of both logic and law, a wrongdoer cannot conspire with her
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Another way of demonstrating concerted action under Section One is by
proving the existence of a "combination." 10 9 The buyer and seller in a
unilaterally imposed tying arrangement do not constitute a combination for
Section One purposes for at least two reasons. First, combination as used in the
Sherman Act refers to business combinations, such as trusts.110 The precise
wording of the Sherman Act proscribes every "combination in the form of trust
or otherwise." 11  Congress did not limit the Act to trusts alone because business
combinations such as pools and holding companies were also common and had
similar anticompetitive effects.112 In short, combination means business
combinations, not every individual transaction in which a consumer purchases
goods from a single seller.
Second, as in the case of conspiracies, combinations generally require a
mutual intent to achieve a common purpose. Black's Law Dictionary defines
combination as "[t]he union or association of two or more persons for the
attainment of some common end." 1 1 3 Thus, because the seller imposing and the
buyer accepting a tying arrangement do not share a common purpose,1 14 these
parties do not represent a combination.
victim. If the mere acquiescence of a crime victim could constitute a conspiracy, then whenever
a robbery victim handed over his property, he would be guilty of participating in a conspiracy
to commit robbery. Similarly, a person who pays ransom would be a participant in a
kidnapping conspiracy.
109 Courts in the modem era rarely discuss combinations as such, instead relying on the
statutory language of "conspiracy" and "contract," or the accepted shorthand of " agreement"
and "concerted action."
IlO See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. S3147-48 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1890) (statement of Sen.
George) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17.
111 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
112 21 CONG. REC. H4092 (daily ed. May 1, 1890), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 17.
In general terms, we all know that a trust is the latest and most perfect form of
combination among competing producers to control the supply of their product in order
that they may dictate the terms on which they shall sell in the market and may secure
release from stress of competition among themselves. From the very beginning of trade
perhaps, certainly in all its known history, there have been various forms of combination,
and we have long been familiar with them in this country under the name of pools,
comers, combines, and the like.
Id
113 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 266 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367
F.2d 517, 523 (8th Cir. 1966)).




Ruling out conspiracy and combination leaves only contracts as the possible
form of concerted action. And this-either explicitly or impliedly-is what
courts have relied on to hold that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements fall
within Section One.
2. Contracts with Tying Clauses as Concerted Action
Between a Buyer and a Seller
Because it would be difficult to establish concerted action under either the
conspiracy or combination prong of Section One, plaintiffs and courts are more
likely to rely on the Sherman Act's prohibition of contracts in restraint of
trade. 115 Under the theory that a tying arrangement constitutes a contract
between the seller who ties two products and the buyer who accepts the tie-in,
courts have held that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements meet the statutory
requirement of "a contract, combination or conspiracy."' "16 While a sale
between a buyer and a seller on agreed-upon terms is literally a contract, that
does not necessarily mean that it is a contract for Section One purposes. This is
true for several reasons. First, the Sherman Act's text has not been read so
literally. Second, the parties to the contract do not share an intent to restrain
trade. Third, forced acquiescence does not generally constitute an agreement for
antitrust purposes. Fourth, Congress did not intend Section One of the Sherman
Act to reach contracts between a seller and a buyer.
a. The Trouble with Literalism
The literalist argument is simple: Section One proscribes contracts in
restraint of trade and a tying arrangement is a contract that restrains trade; thus,
tying arrangements violate Section One. But the literalists have a difficult row to
hoe. The mere presence of a contract does not convert unilaterally imposed
policies into concerted action. If it did, Section One would swallow Section Two
and the protective wall between unilateral and concerted action would
crumble.1 17
First, the Supreme Court has eschewed literalness in Section One cases. The
1 1 5 See 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 12 ("The 'contract, combination, or conspiracy' that
triggers § I is obviously present when the buyer promises to take his requirements of the
second product from a supplier as an express quid pro quo for being allowed to buy the tying
product."). However, the vast majority of courts have assiduously avoided the question of why
and how unilaterally imposed tying arrangements constitute concerted action.
116 E.g., Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir. 1997) (en
banc).
117 See infra notes 281-312 and accompanying text.
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entire body of Section One jurisprudence is built on the foundation that Section
One is not read literally. By its clear text, the Sherman Act forbids "[e]very
contract ... in restraint of trade."' 118 However, the Supreme Court recognized
early in Standard Oil Co. v. United States119 that because all contracts
necessarily restrain trade on some level, Section One is limited to those contracts
that "unreasonably" restrain trade.120 Decades later, reiterating the principle of
Standard Oil, the Court opined that if the Sherman Act were read and applied
literally, it would "outlaw the entire body of private contract law." 121 Thus,
despite the statute's clear language, Section One does not apply to "every
contract," but only to "unreasonable contracts." More recently, the Supreme
Court recognized in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS122 that in antitrust
jurisprudence " [l]iteralness is overly simplistic and often overbroad." 123 Perhaps
more to the point, the Court in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 124
held that even a literal agreement is not necessarily an agreement for Section
One purposes.125 In sum, merely pointing at the existence of a contract does not
118 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
119221 U.S. 1 (1911).
120 Id at 66-67.
121 National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978); see
also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) ("[E]very
contract is a restraint of trade[.]"); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) ("Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence.").
122 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
123 Id at 9 ("When two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally
'price fixing,' but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.") (citing United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), affld, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)). Cf
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992). ("Legal
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are
generally disfavored in antitrust law.").
124 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
125 See id.
The distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct is necessary for a proper
understanding of the terms "contract, combination.. . or conspiracy" in § 1. Nothing in
the literal meaning of those terms excludes coordinated conduct among officers or
employees of the same company. But it is perfectly plain that an internal "agreement" to
implement a single, unitary firm's policies does not raise the antitrust dangers that § 1 was
designed to police.
Id; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 230. "In Chicago Board of Trade and Broadcast
Music the Court was willing to consider arguments that agreements among competitors,
conceded to 'fix' prices, were not 'price fixing' and did not warrant per se treatment." Id.
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automatically end the inquiry into whether Section One's concerted action
requirement has been satisfied.126
Second, there is good reason that the Court has avoided the literal approach
in its antitrust jurisprudence: the literal argument proves too much. Not only
would every contract be illegal, but read literally the Sherman Act would subject
consumers who accede to a tying arrangement to antitrust liability and treble
damages. Section one of the Sherman Act explicitly provides that "[e]very
person who shall make any contract" declared illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony and punished accordingly.127 As half of the illegal contract the buyer has
engaged in illegal conduct. The obvious response to this literal reading of the text
is that the Sherman Act was not intended to punish consumers who have been
victimized or even consumers who willingly purchased bundled goods. The
literal reading is necessarily wrong because "every person" does not actually
mean "every person." One has to look beyond the words to the intent, purpose,
and structure of the Sherman Act to bestow the words with their contextual
meaning.128 The same process of contextual interpretation needs to occur when
determining which contracts fall within the Sherman Act's reach.
Third, well-established principles of statutory interpretation require that
words be analyzed in context rather than in isolation.129 Section One of the
Sherman Act does not proscribe every contract; rather it proscribes only those
"contract[s] ... in restraint of trade." There is arguably a difference between a
contract that has the effect of restraining trade and a contract in restraint of
126 Similarly, the fact that tying arrangements are often called "tying agreements," see,
e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958), does not mean that tying
arrangements inherently meet the concerted action requirement of Section One. Such an
argument begs the question; simply because courts sometimes refer to the restraint as a tying
agreement does not mean it should be considered an agreement for Section One purposes.
Calling tying arrangements "tying agreements" is a moniker, not analysis. Similarly, tying
arrangements are sometimes defined in terms of the buyer "agreeing" to buy a tied product.
See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1519 (6th ed. 1990) ("[A] condition imposed by a seller or
lessor that a buyer or lessee may obtain a desired product (the "tying" product) only if it also
agrees to take an additional product (the "tied" product), which may or may not be desired.").
This concept of "agreement" ignores the fact that a tying arrangement (to be illegal under
Section One) must not be desired and indeed, must be forced upon an unwilling buyer. See
infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
On the same note, the Court has suggested that "restraint of trade" does not merely refer
to the existence of an agreement, but rather to the economic consequences of the agreement
See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,731-32 (1988).
127 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
128 After all, if one is going to read words literally, one can hardly enjoy the luxury of
picking and choosing which words to so read.
129 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1911).
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trade.130 After all, to the extent that every contract restrains trade, "a contract in
restraint of trade" must mean more than simply "a contract." 131
In short, although any given sale represents a contract-regardless of
whether or not it includes a tying component-not every sale constitutes a
contract that falls within the parameters of Section One for antitrust scrutiny. To
read Section One otherwise would mean that federal courts had jurisdiction to
review-and approve, reject, or modify-the over one million sales that take
place every day in the American economy. 132
b. The Absence ofMutual Intent to Restrain Trade
The intent element often applied to Section One claims supports the position
that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements do not resemble concerted
action. 133 Antitrust laws are only concerned with those contracts that
unreasonably restrain trade. To determine whether a restraint is unreasonable,
courts employing the Rule of Reason often examine the intent or purpose of the
contract or restraint at issue.134 This element of intent as used in Section One
130 This argument is more fUlly developed in the following section discussing intent. See
infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
131 It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that each word in a statute
carries meaning. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 295 (1994) (stating the
"settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has
operative effect") (citations omitted); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993) ("To avoid
'deny[ing] effect to a part of a statute,' we accord 'significance and effect... to every word."')
(citations omitted).
132 See infra note 368 and accompanying text.
133 Intent is often not articulated as a separate, independent element. Rather, most courts
state the intent element in civil cases as an alternative element to anticompetitive effects, such
that a plaintiff must show either an anticompetitive intent or effect. See, e.g., Summit Health,
Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1991). The supposition appears to be that intent can be
inferred from anticompetitive effects. But this inferred intent is still a mutual intent, which
makes sense only if there are two wrongdoers. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying
text.
134 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences"); Oltz v. St. Peter's
Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (anticompetitive intent is
essential); Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosps., 703 F.2d 942,949 (6th Cir. 1983) ("To establish a
violation of section 1 ... plaintiff must establish that defendants combined or conspired with an
intent to unreasonably restrain trade."); Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 290 (9th
Cir. 1979) (stating that illegality under the Rule of Reason requires "[a]n agreement among
two or more persons or distinct business entities ... [w]hich is intended to harm or
unreasonably restrain competition"). However, if there is a significant anticompetitive effect, a
lawful intent will not save a restraint from liability. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
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case law must be different than the mere intent to form a contract, because
hombook law holds that there is no contract without intent.135 In other words, if
intent is a separate element from the existence of a contract, that intent must be
the intent to do more than simply enter a contract because the latter is subsumed
by establishing the existence of a contract. 136 Furthermore, while every contract
restrains trade, not every contract is entered into with the intent of restraining
trade.
The intent inquiry of Section One is properly characterized as a mutual
intent to restrain trade. The Supreme Court has stated that an antitrust plaintiff
must establish that more than one defendant shared a common intent to achieve
an illegal goal. 137 Thus, under the Rule of Reason, an antitrust plaintiff must
prove that "the persons or entities to the agreement intend to harm or restrain
competition." 138 It is not enough that more than one party agreed to a scheme;
rather, both parties must share an intent to restrain trade.139 For example, in
States, 288 U.S. 344,372 (1933).
Anticompetitive intent is, however, required in criminal antitrust cases. See United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1978). However, it is unlikely that
criminal charges would be brought against a tying arrangement.
Some may argue that to the extent that tying arrangements can be per se illegal, intent is
not an element. But "an agreement" is a requirement under both Rule of Reason and per se
analysis. The intent discussion above merely drives home the point that this agreement must be
an agreement to reduce competition. Per se analysis does not require an intent discussion
because agreements between competitors on certain issues-price, market division, and certain
boycotts-necessarily reflect a meeting of the minds between the parties to reduce competition.
13 5 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRAcrS §§ 2-1 to 2-2 (2d ed. 1977).
Similarly, there is no conspiracy or combination without intent. See supra notes 104-14 and
accompanying text.
13 6 In terms of general contract formation, the common purpose could simply be to enter
the contract or to exchange the recited consideration. There is no general requirement that both
parties enter a contract for the same purpose. For example, a seller wants money and a buyer
wants a product or service. They have different objectives for entering the contract, yet they
both mutually assent to the contract However, the intent requirement for "a contract in
restraint of trade" goes further in order to find antitrust liability.
137 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
13 8 American Ad Management, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 789 (9th Cir. 1996); see
generally Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, 924 F.2d 1555 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Dunkley v.
Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 728 F. Supp. 560 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
669 F. Supp. 998, 1020-21 (E.D. Cal. 1987), affld, 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1991). But see Bolt
v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924
(1990).
139 By analogy, in order for one defendant to be guilty of a Section Two conspiracy to
monopolize, at least two defendants must be found to have a specific intent to monopolize. See
Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177, 183 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1067 (1988); International Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 796 (2d
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United States v. Parke, Davis & CO.,14 0 individual dealers acquiesced in a
supplier's pricing program. However, the Supreme Court reasoned that because
each individual dealer acquiesced not to restrain trade but solely to remain a
dealer, there was no concerted action for Section One purposes. 141
This mutual intent element is sometimes expressed as a requirement that
both parties to the contract stand to benefit from the restraint in trade.142 For
example, in Borg-Warner Protective Services Corp. v. Guardsmark Inc.,143 a
security firm allegedly forced its employees to sign covenants not to compete. 144
The court reasoned that there could be no plurality of actors because the
employees were required to sign the agreements to maintain their employment
and, thus, the "employees did not have any independent personal stake and did
not stand to benefit from conspiring to restrain trade." 145 The court specifically
held that it did not matter that the applicants were not employees when they
signed the covenants because they were "not acting as independent economic
forces with any reason to restrain trade." 146 In short, if a party to a bilateral
contract does not intend to restrain trade and receives no benefit from the
restraint, the contract is not a "contract in restraint of trade." 147
The buyer in a tying relationship has no intent to harm competition; she does
not desire to lessen competition. In fact, she has the opposite intent, or so tying
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987).
140 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
141 See id. at 45; cf. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271,282-83 (6th
Cir. 1898), affld, 175 U.S. 211,244-45 (1899) (holding that the Sherman Act does not prohibit
activity whose competitive harm is "ancillary" to its main purpose). This is not to suggest that
acquiescence never constitutes agreement. Conflicting authority exists on this point; however,
there are cases supporting the position that parties must share a mutual intent to restrain trade.
142 The importance of a shared desire to restrain trade has been decisive in cases
challenging covenants not to compete as violative of Section One of the Sherman Act For
example, in Carenark Homecare, Inc. v. New England Critical Care, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1033
(D. Minn. 1988), employees were sued by a health care service provider for a breach of
covenant not to compete. The employees counterclaimed that their former employer had
violated Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act by forcing them to sign the covenants. The
court dismissed the Section One claim for lack of agreement because the employees did not
have an independent personal stake in restraining trade. See id. at 1035; see also Marshall v.
Miles Labs., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
143 946 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
144 See id. at 498.
14 5 Id. at 499.
14 6 Idt at 500.
147 The one nontying exception to this principle may be vertical restraints, such as resale




theory informs us. She would rather be free to purchase the tied product from
someone else (on the same or different terms) or forego purchasing the tied
product altogether. Because the buyer in a traditional tying relationship does not
intend to reduce competition and does not benefit from the restraint, there is no
shared intent to reduce competition.148
In sum, a reasonable argument can be made that in order for a contract to
violate Section One of the Sherman Act, the parties-both parties-must intend
by their agreement to reduce competition. If only one person desires to reduce
competition, there is not an agreement to reduce competition. There may be an
agreement that reduces competition, but that alone does not satisfy the intent
requirement of a Section One violation. Courts that have found that a single sales
contract embodying a tie-in satisfies Section One's "combination, contract, or
conspiracy" requirement have not addressed the mutual intent issue that courts in
non-tying contexts have often found dispositive.
c. Contracts and Coercion
i. Acquiescence as Concerted Action
To the extent that a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement constitutes a
contract, it does so because the buyer has acquiesced to terms that she would not
agree to but for the seller's coercion through its exercise of market power.
Indeed, there is a coercion requirement: the plaintiff must show that her
agreement to accept a tie-in was coerced. 149
This raises the issue of whether acquiescence (or "coerced agreement")
constitutes an agreement for antitrust purposes. The answer is "probably not."
First, the coercion requirement presents a paradox to the extent that legal
contracts are generally the products of voluntary agreements. 150 It is a matter of
148 Cf Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1985)
("Certainly the plaintiff in a tying case need not show that it wanted the anticompetitive
scheme to succeed; the buyer in a tying case is a victim, and few victims want to pay monopoly
overcharges.").
149 See infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
150 For example, the Seventh Circuit has observed that "[a]s a linguistic matter, proof that
the buyer took both products in a package against his will negates the existence of a 'contract,
combination, or conspiracy."' Will, 776 F.2d at 669 (nonetheless concluding that coerced tying
arrangements violate Section One).
Arguing that someone forced you to make a contract in a situation where the existence of
a contract is a necessary part of the illegality smacks of arguing "he forced me to make a
voluntary agreement." The argument appears internally inconsistent and should negate the
finding of a legal contract.
This reasoning only negates a finding of a contract, not a conspiracy. Duress is not a
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hornbook law that a contract derived from force is not a legally binding contract
and a coerced contract is voidable at the duressed party's option.151 In other
words, a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement is only a legal contract if the
buyer says it is. 152
Second, in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service,153 the Supreme Court
specifically held that unwilling compliance with a unilaterally announced policy
does not constitute concerted action. 154 Rather, in Section One cases, a plaintiff
must prove that there exists "a conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective" among multiple parties. 155
Subsequent courts have invoked Monsanto to hold that unwilling compliance
does not constitute concerted action for Section One purposes. 156 Similarly, in
Fisher v. City of Berkeley,157 the Court held that a landowner's unwilling
defense to a charge of conspiracy, but is a defense in a contract dispute.
151 See CALAMARI & PERILL, supra note 135 § 9-2.
152 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 175 (1979). In theory, a buyer wanting
only the tying product could acquiesce to the seller's coercion by accepting the tying
arrangement, receiving the tying product, and then rejecting or returning the tied product. This,
of course, is only a theory because the entire contract would be voided and it is debatable
whether the buyer has any claim to the tying product.
153 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
154 See id. at 761. Prior to Monsanto, several lower courts had held the same. See, e.g.,
Polytechnic Data Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1, 8 (N.D. Il. 1973) ("The alleged mere
acquiescence by certain individual Xerox lessees in the unilateral policy of Xerox does not give
rise to an illegal combination.').
155 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768 (requiring plaintiff present "evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility of independent action"); see also Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan.,
Inc., 899 F.2d 951,964 (10th Cir. 1990); accord Contractor Util. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp.,
638 F.2d 1061, 1075 (7th Cir. 1981) (no unlawful concerted action may occur without proof
that distributor "encouraged or participated in this decision [by manufacturer to market through
distributor] for anticompetitive reasons.').
156 See, e.g., International Logistics Group Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904, 907 (6th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990) ([Flhere is no conspiracy between a
manufacturer and dealer when the latter involuntarily complies with a manufacturer's
unilaterally formulated policy in order to avoid termination[.]); Famous Brands, Inc. v. David
Sherman Corp., 814 F.2d 517, 523 (8th Cir. 1987); Acton v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc.,
1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,025, at 74,818 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (rejecting claim that pressuring
distributors to stop selling competitors' products was an exclusive dealing arrangement
because no agreement is formed when a dealer "unwillingly complies [with a demand] solely
because he wished to avoid termination"); see also Cohen v. Primerica Corp., 709 F. Supp. 63,
65 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (" [Unilateral action by one single entity does not constitute concerted
activity, and therefore does not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act[.]") (citing Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,768 (1984).).
157 475 U.S. 260 (1986).
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compliance with a city's rent control ordinance did not constitute concerted
action.158 Lest there be any doubt about the Court's Monsanto holding, Professor
Areeda noted that in Monsanto, "the Court was very explicit that unwilling
compliance by dealers to avoid termination does not create an agreement and
that compliance with a suggestion or announced condition does not amount to an
implied agreement." 159
By definition, a Section One tying arrangement requires coercion, yet
Monsanto clearly holds that coerced compliance does not constitute concerted
action for Section One purposes. So, why then do unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements continue to be evaluated under Section One of the Sherman Act?
Courts and commentators have refused to apply the "very explicit" holding from
Monsanto to tying cases. 160 The reason for such mutiny is a concerted refusal by
courts to abandon that line of tying cases that creates a glaring inconsistency in
the body of antitrust case law.161 For example, the Ninth Circuit has declined to
follow Monsanto because if unilaterally imposed tying arrangements "were to be
labeled 'independent,' virtually all tying arrangements would be beyond the
reach of [Section One]." 162 Thus, "a number of lower courts have implicitly
158See id. at 266-67. The Court's subsequent holdings in Monsanto and Fisher
effectively negate the Court's previous dicta in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), which suggested that unwilling acquiescence can constitute
concerted action. See id. at 142. ("['Each petitioner can clearly charge a combination between
Midas and himself, as of the day he unwillingly complied with the restrictive franchise
agreements... ."). Perma Life was already overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,765-66 (1984).
159 7 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 83.
160 See, e.g., Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 670 (7th Cir.
1985); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., 732 F.2d 779, 780 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 854 (1984).
161 Some commentators have acknowledged that Monsanto, at a minimum, creates
problems for tying law. See Jean Wegman Bums, The New Role of Coercion in Antitrust, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 427 n.214 ("The only way to avoid the 'coerced agreement' paradox
in tying cases is to consider tying as a unilateral action of a monopolist subject to antitrust
attack under section 2 of the Sherman Act, if at all."). Professor Bums concludes that "this is
an unlikely development," based on Richard Posner's interpretation of the legislative history of
the Clayton Act. Id. (citing RICHARD POSNER, ANTIRUsT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVE
182-83 (1976)). But Judge Posner's argument is merely that the Clayton Act cannot be
ignored by the courts, not that tying arrangements cannot be evaluated under Section Two.
Indeed, Judge Posner notes that tie-ins can be prohibited under Section Two. Furthermore, the
current state of the law on tying ignores (and is inconsistent with) the Clayton Act's limitations
on tying. See infra notes 384-407 and accompanying text.
162 Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir.
1990), affd, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The court asserted that it did "not believe that Monsanto,
without discussing the courts' tying decisions, meant to overturn them." Id
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recognized that Monsanto is wrong and have taken the position that Monsanto's
requirement of a 'common plan' or agreement cannot possibly apply to tying
cases." 163 Such a mistake in thinking flows from the courts' failure to appreciate
the distinction between unilateral and concerted tying arrangements. Contrary to
the Ninth Circuit's assertion that Monsanto removes "all tying arrangements"
from Section One, only unilaterally imposed tying arrangements are beyond the
reach of Section One. Concerted tying arrangements are still analyzed under
Section One;164 furthermore, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements can be
prohibited under Section Two of the Sherman Act and Section Three of the
Clayton Act.165
I. Distinguishing Vertical Distribution Relationships
The one non-tying area in which courts have occasionally held that forced
compliance might constitute combined action is vertical relationships between
manufacturer and distributor. For example, a retailer can sue a manufacturer for
imposing retail price maintenance.166 It is difficult to reconcile the implicit
holdings in these cases with the explicit holding of Monsanto.167 Regardless,
cases involving coercion in vertical distributorships can be easily distinguished
from the buyer-seller relationship in a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement.
First, in a coerced distributor situation, the ultimate consumer is not a party
to the anticompetitive agreement between a manufacturer and its distributors.
When a manufacturer and distributor agree on resale price, they are not merely
agreeing on the price that the distributor pays the manufacturer, but rather the
163 Bums, supra note 161, at 427 n.214 (citations omitted). As a general matter of federal
jurisprudence, it is difficult to fathom how lower federal courts can decide that a binding
Supreme Court precedent "is wrong" and refuse to apply it. At least one court has tried to
resurrect the rule of Perma Life, which suggested that a coerced franchisee could sue under
Section One, to hold that Monsanto does not apply to tying cases. But Perma Life was not a
tying case between seller and consumer, rather, it was a vertical distribution scenario in which
the downstream player claimed its participation with the franchisor's scheme was coerced.
How the dicta of Perma Life, which was already partially overruled by Copperweld, could
somehow survive the explicit holding of Monsanto is not explained. Why this dicta of
questionable case should trump the explicit holding of a more recent Supreme Court case is
even harder to understand.
164 See infra Part VIA.
165 See infra Parts VI.B & VI.C.
166 See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990). The dicta in Atlantic Richfield appears inconsistent with the holding
of Monsanto.
167 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see also supra notes
153-59 and accompanying text.
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price that will be charged to a third party to their negotiation. This is manifestly
different from a tying arrangement in which the buyer and seller agree what price
they will pay and receive, respectively. The parties to a tying arrangement are not
determining the price paid by any person who is not a party to the agreement.1 68
Thus, a tie-in does not raise the same competitive dangers as those raised by two
parties agreeing how to treat a third person uninvolved in the negotiations.
Second, the hypothetical "coerced distributor" who acquiesces in a vertical
distribution agreement case often benefits from the concerted action. When a
manufacturer orchestrates a price-fixing scheme for its product, all distributors
collectively benefit from the concerted action, even if they lose isolated sales by
refusing to cut the price on an individual transaction. 169 This distinction is
important because merely alleging acquiescence is insufficient to show a
combination for Section One purposes. Rather, as the Fifth Circuit has explained,
any "finding of an illegal combination has traditionally been based upon the fact
that the third parties benefited from their acquiescence."' 170 Whereas the
distributor in a manufacturer's price-fixing conspiracy could benefit from its
acquiescence, opponents of tying arrangements claim that the buyer does not
benefit from acquiescence.171
Third, and most important a contract between a buyer and seller to structure
a transaction for bundled goods is not inherently illegal. For example, if a buyer
asks for a discount when she purchases two separate goods and the seller
(believing the customer is always right) accedes to her wishes, that contract does
not violate antitrust laws. The ultimate contract looks the same as a tying
arrangement but it has no antitrust consequences. Absent coercion, a tying
arrangement is perfectly legal. In contrast an agreement between a manufacturer
168 Of course, other people may be affected by the tying arrangement between a buyer
and seller, most notably the competing seller who might have sold the tied product to the
consumer if the consumer were not bound by the tying arrangement. See Tic-X-Press v. Omni
Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1415 & n.15 (11th Cir. 1987). But non-parties to a contract
are always affected in this manner by all business transactions. Every sale a business makes is a
sale denied to its competitor.
169 This is basically an illustration of a solution to the tragedy of the commons. See
Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to
HorizontalPrice-Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243, 268 n.170 (1993).
170 Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 289 (5th Cir. 1978);
see also supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
171 In theory, the consumer benefits from acquiescence in that she can purchase the tying
product. But this is a different type of benefit than that received by the acquiescing distributor.
The latter benefits directly from that which makes the scheme illegal, namely the nonmarket
control over prices. In contrast, the consumer does not benefit from the tie-in itself. The
consumer only benefits from the legal part of the contract (the sale of the tying product), not the
illegal aspect (the conditioning of the sale as a tie-in).
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and distributor to set retail prices violates antitrust laws even if the agreement
were not the product of coercion.
This distinction provides an independent insight into why unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements should not be proscribed under Section One. In the
absence of coercion, a buyer and a seller could freely agree that in return for a
certain price on a tying product, the buyer would purchase a tied product. Such a
contract would not violate the Sherman Act. Buyers and sellers are supposed to
negotiate over the terms of a sale, including the price and package. A
manufacturer and a retailer are not allowed to agree on resale prices, regardless
of whether or not the retailer's acquiescence is coerced.
iii. Legislative Intent
Examining the legislative intent behind the Sherman Act casts doubt upon
the wisdom of analyzing unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section
One. There are several indications that Congress did not intend Section One to
condemn unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. First, contracts between a
buyer and a seller are not the type of concerted action that Congress intended the
Sherman Act to address.172 A buyer and seller are allowed to make a contract
that restrains trade; competitors are not. This distinction is critical. 173 The
purpose of Section One is to prohibit collusion among independent business
people, not contracts between a seller and the ultimate consumer.
Congress wanted to stop anticompetitive business combinations. For
example, the Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he sponsor of the bill which was
ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only 'business
combinations."' 174 In particular, Congress was concerned about concerted action
among competitors. Early in its antitrust jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
recognized that "[t]he Sherman Act was specifically intended to prohibit
172 Contracts between buyer and seller are not inherently suspicious; indeed, they are
precisely the act that free markets are intended to foment. Relations between a buyer and a
seller are not the type of concerted activity that the Sherman Act was intended to reach; such
concerted activity is the sine qua non of any trade, the very essence of competition. It is not
"fraught with anticompetitive risk." Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 761 (1984).
173 See THORNTON, supra note 101, at 364 ("Thus contracts or combinations that merely
diminish or prevent competition among those who are parties to them, without restraining the
trade or commerce of others and without constituting a monopoly, or an attempt to
monopolize, are not unlawful at common law[.]").
174 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (citing 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2459, 2461,
2562 (1890)); see also J. W. Stewart, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 332 (the
Sherman Act's "only object was the control of trust, so called, so far as such combinations in
their relation to interstate trade are within the reach of Federal legislation").
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independent businesses from becoming 'associates' in a common plan that is
bound to reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the things in which
the groups compete." 175 Early commentators made similar pronouncements.' 76
The rationale for this congressional assault on concerted action supports the
conclusion that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements were not intended to fall
within Section One. Congress was concerned with contracts and combinations
between would-be competitors because such contracts permitted businesses to
concentrate economic power and wield it in a concerted manner.177 The
concentration of market power is dangerous because the businesses can exercise
175 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945). The language and tenor of
early Supreme Court cases confirm that the thrust of the Sherman Act was to prevent contracts
between competitors, not regulate contracts between a buyer and a seller. For example, in
1899, the Supreme Court articulated:
We have no doubt -that where the direct and immediate effect of a contract or
combination among particular dealers in a commodity is to destroy competition between
them and others, so that the parties to the contract or combination may obtain increased
prices for themselves, such contract or combination amounts to a restraint of trade in the
commodity, even though contracts to buy such commodity at the enhanced price are
continually being made.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,244 (1899).
176 See Herbert Pope, The Legal Aspect of Monopoly, 20 HARv. L. REV. 167, 187 (1907)
("To be illegal, the combination must rest upon an understanding or agreement between actual
competitors who, by removing competition between their established independent enterprises,
are able at the time to control the market or industry in which they are engaged.") (emphasis
added); see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 30 ("In sum, the proscription in
section 1 of the Sherman Act against contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade looks to concerted activity and agreement among competitors.") (emphasis added).
177 Representative George noted:
It is well known that the great evil of these combinations, these conspiracies, as they are
called, these monopolies, as they are denominated by the bill, consists in the fact that by
combination, by association, there have been gathered together the money and the means
of large numbers of persons, and under these combinations, or conspiracies, or trusts, this
great aggregated capital is wielded by a single hand and guided by a single brain, or at
least by hands and brains acting in complete harmony and co-operation, and that in this
way, by this association, by this direction of this immense amount of capital, by one
organized will, to a very large extent, these wrongs have been perpetrated upon the
American people.
Representative George, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 284. The Supreme Court
has noted "that Congress feared the concentrated power of business organizations to dominate
markets and prices." Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302, 313 (1971)
(quoting Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,325 U.S. 797,811 (1945)).
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their concentrated market power against consumers, who would have fewer (and,
in some cases, no) alternative suppliers from whom to purchase their products on
competitive terms.178 When a buyer purchases a bundle of products from a
single seller acting unilaterally, there is no concentration of market power.179
The buyer and seller are not combining their market power against a third party;
indeed they cannot because they are on opposite sides of the transaction. A
contract between a seller and a buyer is not the type of concerted action that
concentrates market power and thus, does not constitute concerted action as that
term was intended to be interpreted under Section One.
Furthermore, evidence from subsequent antitrust debates indicates that the
1890 Congress did not believe tying arrangements were within the reach of the
Sherman Act.180 As a general rule, a statute should not be interpreted in a
manner that is inconsistent with later amendments to that statute. For the
purposes of tying law, the relevant amendment to the Sherman Act is the Clayton
Act. Twenty-five years into the Sherman Act, Congress passed the Clayton Act,
which "in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies, seeks to prohibit
and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in
themselves, are not covered by the [Sherman Act] ... or other existing antitrust
acts ...... 181 In short, the Clayton Act was intended to address practices beyond
178 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
179 While the Court has asserted that tying arrangements force consumers to abdicate
"independent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits[,]"Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13 (1984) (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 605 (1953)), this ignores the Court's insight in other cases of the economic reality that
consumers evaluate the entire tied package. See infra notes 347-56 and accompanying text.
The consumer does not abdicate her "independent judgmenf' about the tied product; rather,
she exercises her independent judgment about the bundle.
180 See Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as
History, 69 MiNN. L. REV. 1013, 1019 (1985) ("Concern about the Sherman Act's apparent
inability to reach tying arrangements was augmented by a general dissatisfaction about
Supreme Court applications of the Act in other contexts.").
The same legislative intent arguments for why tying arrangements are not proscribed by
Section One also apply to Section Two. After all, if Congress passed Section Three of the
Clayton Act because it believed that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements were not
adequately covered by the Sherman Act, then it must have thought that neither section
proscribed unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. However, unlike Section One, Section
Two is more clearly geared toward the category of conduct in which tying arrangements fit.
Section 2 is directed against monopoly leveraging in many forms, such as price squeezes, and
other unilateral conduct by which a monopolist seeks to extend monopoly power in one market
into another. Unlike current Section One case law, evaluating unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements under Section Two does no damage to the integrity of the statutory scheme; it
does not create absurd anomalies or tortured reading of statutory text and intent.
181 2 AREEDA, supranote 30, at 6.
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the reach of the Sherman Act.182 Section Three of the Clayton Act proscribes
tying arrangements that substantially lessen competition. The congressional
debate and final legislation provide two insights. First, Congress believed that
tying arrangements do not fall within the Sherman Act.183 Second, in prohibiting
tying arrangements under Section Three of the Clayton Act, Congress decided
not to proscribe tying arrangements that did not substantially lessen competition
or tend toward monopoly. However, Section One has been used to condemn
tying arrangements that affect a not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce,
but that do not necessarily substantially lessen competition. 184 By using Section
One of the Sherman Act to reach the precise restraints that Congress chose not to
condemn in the Clayton Act, the underlying legislative intent of antitrust law is
thwarted. 185
Finally, there is nothing in the legislative debates or history of the Sherman
Act that suggests Congress intended to vest federal courts with the power to
review individual sales contracts to determine whether they were the result of
economic duress.186 Indeed, such a result would have represented an
unacceptable federal intrusion into contract law, which continues to be
predominantly the province of state law.187 Those who believe a statute
condemns an activity must bear the burden of showing that such condemnation is
182 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 30. Some senators believed that Section Three of the
Clayton Act was unnecessary because tying arrangements could be better handled by the
newly established Federal Trade Commission. See Kramer, supra note 180, at 1020-21. Other
senators believed that the Federal Trade Commission would not outlaw tying arrangments
because the Supreme Court had held that they do not violate the Sherman Act. See Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297 n.4 (1949) (citing 51 CONG. REC. 14088, 14090-
92, 14223 (1914)).
18 3 See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 297 ("[Section Three] of the Clayton Act was directed
to prohibiting specific practices even though not covered by the broad terms of the Sherman
Act[.]").
184 See infra notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
18 5 See West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("[T]he purpose of
a statute includes not only what it sets out to change, but also what it resolves to leave
alone[.]"); Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522,526 (1987) (per curiam) ("Deciding what
competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is
the very essence of legislative choice-and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the
law.") (italics omitted).
186 Reading the hundreds of pages of legislative debate on the Sherman Act confirms that
no congressperson or senator ever mentioned tying arrangements or any form of contract
between a seller and a buyer.
187 See THORNTON, supra note 101, at 364 ("The object of the act is to protect the public
against unlawful restraints of trade and commerce, not to protect individuals from the
consequences of their own acts or contracts.").
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consistent with the legislative intent of the underlying statute.
iv. Summary
Some courts have suggested that to hold that Section One does not reach
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements effectively reads the word "contracf'
out of Section One.1 88 This is wrong. Section One reaches contracts to restrain
trade in the form of concerted tying arrangements. All contracts restrain trade,
but not all contracts are entered with the intent or purpose of restraining trade;
only the latter are proscribed by the Sherman Act. This interpretation unifies
Colgate, Monsanto, and the original intent of the 1890 Congress that enacted the
Sherman Act.
C. Analyzing Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements Under Section
One Creates Serious Anomalies in Antitrust Law
The wisdom of evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under
Section One becomes more suspect when one considers how many anomalies
are created in antitrust law by treating unilateral fie-ins as concerted action. The
Sherman Act's distinction between unilateral and concerted action forms the
primary foundation upon which American antitrust regulation is structured.
Courts can determine whether challenged conduct more closely resembles
Section One concerted action or Section Two unilateral conduct. This is possible
because Section One violations share common characteristics that Section Two
violations do not. This Part explains how unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements do not share these Section One characteristics.
Structurally, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements do not resemble other
Section One violations. With the glaring exception of tying arrangements, all
Section One conduct is evaluated under a common three-prong test.189 A tying
arrangement is the only Section One cause of action with its own separate
elements.190 Some of these elements and other characteristics make tying
arrangements different from all other Section One violations. 191
188 See generally Systemcare v. Wang, 787 F. Supp. 179, 182 (D. Colo. 1995), affd 85
F.3d 465 (10th Cir. 1996), rev'den banc, 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
189 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. There are three basic elements:
(1) agreement; (2) unreasonable restraint; and (3) interstate commerce requirement. How courts
apply the second element differs depending on whether the conduct is horizontal or vertical and
whether it is considered per se illegal or analyzed under the Rule of Reason. But the macro
structure of the violation in terms of the three elements remains the same.
190 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
191 Unilaterally imposed tying arrangements also created an anomaly because of the
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1. Anomaly: Victim Participation Is Required
Prohibiting unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section One
creates an anomaly whereby conduct is not illegal unless the victim
participates. 192 If a seller attempts to unilaterally impose a tying arrangement
standards applied to evaluate them. Section One conduct is evaluated under either per se or
Rule of Reason analysis. Per se rules are applied only to conduct that "facially appears to be
one that would always or almost always tend to restrain competition and decrease output."
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982); see also Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980). Currently, the per se rule is applied to horizontal
trade restraints-such as horizontal price-fixing, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1979), territorial and customer divisions, see United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
596, 608 (1972), and bid rigging-and vertical price restraints, such as resale price
maintenance, see Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 373 (1911).
However, vertical maximum resale price maintenance is now evaluated under the Rule of
Reason. See generally State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). In addition to horizontal and price
restraints, the per se rule is applied against unilaterally imposed tying arrangements, making
tying arrangements the only nonprice vertical restraints evaluated under the per se rule. Not all
tying arrangements are evaluated under per se rules. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29-31 (1984); Town Sound v. Chrysler Motors, 959 F.2d 468,482-83 (3d
Cir. 1992) (showing that absent proof of market power, tie-ins are analyzed under the Rule of
Reason). But see Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that the market power is necessary under Rule of Reason). In reality, even those
tying arrangements allegedly analyzed under per se rules are not per se illegal.
This anomaly is not serious because unilaterally imposed tying arrangements, even if
evaluated under the Rule of Reason, would still be proscribed under Section One. Nonetheless,
analyzing tying arrangements under the rubric of per se rules is inconsistent with the entire
rationale of per se analysis in antitrust. For example, one purpose of the per se rule is that courts
do not have to look at specific issues like market power. But market power is an element of a
per se illegal tying arrangement. No other per se category of anticompetitive conduct requires a
showing of market power.
This anomaly further shows the usefulness of distinguishing between unilateral and
concerted tying arrangements. While applying the per se rule to unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements creates inconsistencies within Section One, the per se rule against tying
arrangements makes sense if applied to concerted tying arrangements. To the extent that a
concerted tying arrangement operates like a price-fixing scheme, see supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text, it should be treated like one. Otherwise, cunning cartelists could avoid per
se illegality by structuring their price-fixing as tying arrangements. But a unilaterally imposed
tying arrangement does not resemble price-fixing; at most, it resembles price discrimination,
which of course, is not a violation of Section One.
192 While some may claim that the excluded competing seller is the true victim, this is
problematic because the letter of the tying arrangement itself is not illegal. The contract is legal
if it is voluntary. It is the presence of coercion that makes it illegal. In short, a seller and buyer
are free to agree that the buyer will make all of her purchases from one seller. Thus, while the
excluded competitor suffers injury, he suffers no more injury than by a legal contract, which he
could not challenge. It also bears noting that victim participation only applies to the contract
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that the buyer rejects, then there is no agreement and no violation of Section One.
In no other Section One cause of action does the victim have to agree in order for
a violation to have occurred. 193 For example, no buyer has to actually buy a
product at a fixed price in order for there to be a Section One violation for price
fixing.
Tying arrangement case law requiring victim participation is not only
anomalous, it is misguided. Relying on the contract between the buyer and seller
as the requisite agreement means that a consumer must accept an onerous term in
order to have a claim. Conversely, if the buyer refuses to submit, then there is no
agreement and no violation. This is a bad rule of law because it is conceivable
that a consumer may purchase bundled goods merely to have a legal cause of
action.194
In any case, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements represent the only
Section One violation in which the victim must participate in order for anyone-
the consumer, the competitor, or the government-to have a cause of action.
2. Anomaly: Only One Defendant Is Possible
Related to the anomaly of victim participation is the corollary that
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements represent the only Section One violation
language of the Sherman Act, not the conspiracy language. See supra notes 101-08 and
accompanying text.
193 See John P. Ryan, Jr. & Robert C. Schnitz, The Justice Department's Guidelines on
Vertical Restraints, 74 ILL. BAR J. 66, 72 (1985) ("Unlike most vertical restraints, the typical
per se illegal tying arrangement constitutes a unilateral offense which cannot benefit the person
who is being forced to buy the tied product."). However, in dicta, the Supreme Court in
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), observed that "petitioner could have claimed a combination between
respondent and himselft.]" See also Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 51-52 (2d Cir.
1980); Amott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 885 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
918 (1980). Albrecht is distinguishable to the extent that unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements create a related anomaly in that they represent the only trade restraint whereby
the underlying agreement is between a seller and the ultimate consumer. (The word consumer
is used to exclude a middleman, retailer, or other reseller, who may in effect be considered a
"buyer" for some limited purposes.) Furthermore, victim participation is not generally required
in cases of terminated dealers because "[tlhe typical vertical restraint case is brought by a
dealer claiming that its dealership was terminated pursuant to an illegal conspiracy between its
supplier and competing dealers." Marc A. Fajer, Taming the Wayward Children of Monsanto
and Sylvania: Some Thoughts on Developmental Disclosure in Vertical Restraints Doctrine,
68 'TEMP. L. REV. 12, 12 (1995). Thus, the terminated dealer can prove an agreement without
acquiescing herself.
194 See infra note 287. See 10 PHLLIP E. AREEDA Er AL., ANTrRUST LAW 285 (1996)
(discussing difficulty of determining whether the buyer acted "voluntarily").
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in which there can be but one possible defendant, namely the seller imposing the
tie. It is axiomatic that in order to have concerted action, there must be at least
two actors.195 While the buyer and seller in a tying transaction represent two
separate parties, there must be more than simply two parties involved in the
transaction; there must be at least two wrongdoers. The Seventh Circuit in
Contractor Utility Sales. v. Certain-teed Products96 explained that "[t]he
fundamental prerequisite [of Section One cases] is unlawful conduct by two or
more parties pursuant to an agreement, explicit or implied."' 197 Yet this
"fundamental prerequisite" is simply ignored in unilateral tying cases.198 By its
concerted action requirement, Section One is intended to reach conduct if there
are two culpable parties engaging in anticompetitive conduct, not merely if one
party's unilaterally imposed restraint is memorialized in a contract.199 Because
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements have only one culpable party,
evaluating them under Section One creates a serious anomaly.
This anomaly presents another opportunity to distinguish the coerced
agreements found in some vertical distribution relationships from the coercion
found in tying arrangements.200 In those cases in which a coerced agreement has
been held to satisfy the concerted action requirement of Section One, both parties
to the coerced agreement were potential defendants.201 But in a unilaterally
imposed tying arrangement, only one-half of the coerced agreement, the seller, is
liable under antitrust laws. In contrast, in non-tying cases involving coerced
agreements courts have generally reached one of two holdings: (1) the coerced
agreement is still an agreement and both parties are potential defendants; or (2)
the coerced agreement is not an agreement and neither party is liable. Only in the
195 See Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1160 (9th Cir. 1988);
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 31 ("Section 1 applies only to concerted activity
between two or more persons .... ).
196 638 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985).
197 Id. at 1074; see also McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).
198 Compare City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Cos., 955 F.2d 641,650 (10th Cir.
1992) (noting the absence of a second defendant in holding that there was no concerted action
to bring the tying arrangement within Section One), overruled by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang
Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that a contact between a
buyer and seller satisfies the concerted action element of Section One when the seller coerces a
buyer's acquiescence in a tying arrangement imposed by the seller).
199 Cf infra notes 281-312 and accompanying text (explaining that if concerted action
includes unilaterally imposed restraints, Section One would swallow much of Section Two
conduct).
200 See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
201 Cf supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text
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context of a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement is one party to a coerced
agreement deemed liable and the other party deemed not liable as a matter of
law.202 This creates a suspicious anomaly in antitrust law.
3. Anomaly: Coercion Is Required
The third anomaly caused by evaluating unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements under Section One is the requirement of forcing or coercion. The
Supreme Court has explained that coercion is the essence of tying. In Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,20 3 the Court noted that "[b]y
conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller
coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the 'tied' product's
merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market." 204 The
Court noted that the "common core" of a tying arrangement "is the forced
purchase of a second distinct commodity."205 Similarly, in Jefferson Parish, the
Court observed:
202 Although there exist vertical restraint cases under Section One in which there has been
one defendant, the challenged restraint did not have one defendant as a matter of law. For
example, in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), and Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968), the Court implied that the downstream distributor in a vertical price-fixing arrangement
could sue its upstream supplier under Section One. In such a case, one party to the illegal
contract is suing the other party and thus, there is one defendant. But this is fundamentally
different from unilateral tying cases; in the vertical price restraint cases, there are at least two
potential defendants, the upstream and the downstream supplier. If a consumer who purchased
the product at the fixed price brought suit, she could sue both parties to the agreement (even if
the downstream producer only reluctantly agreed to the scheme). In contrast, in unilateral tying
cases there is inherently only one possible defendant. No matter who initiates litigation, courts
would not allow a plaintiffto sue the consumer who bought the bundled products.
Similarly, although other vertical restraint cases may have only one defendant, that may
represent a litigation strategy by the plaintiff or the second defendant's exit from the litigation
(either through settlement or a decision not to appeal). For example, there was but one apparent
defendant in Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S. 717 (1988), namely the
manufacturer, Sharp. However, the terminated dealer based its complaint on Sharp's alleged
agreement with another dealer, Hartwell, to terminate the plaintiff. See Business Electronics,
485 U.S. at 721. Thus, although there was only one defendant before the Court, the underlying
facts presented two potential defendants-Sharp and Hartwell-whom the plaintiff alleged to
have entered into an illegal agreement in restraint of trade.
203 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
204 Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
205 Id at 614 (emphasis added).
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Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying
arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product
to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.
When such "forcing" is present competition on the merits in the market for the
tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is violated.2 06
While anomalous, the requirement of coercion makes sense in the context of
unilateral tying arrangements because absent coercion, a buyer could legally
agree with her supplier to purchase a bundle of goods. Such a voluntary
transaction need not have an adverse impact on competition. 20 7 In contrast,
coercion should not be a requirement for other Section One combinations (or for
concerted tying arrangements) because even absent coercion a distributor is not
permitted to agree with a manufacturer on what specific price to charge
buyers.20 8 In short, coercion is required before condemning a unilaterally
2 06 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). Consistent with the
Supreme Court's language in Jefferson Parish, the vast majority of circuits hold that in order to
be liable for a Section One violation, a defendant must have coerced a buyer into purchasing a
product that she did not want. See, e.g., Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d
1566, 1577 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (stating that plaintiffs must show that defendant wielded market
power to force real estate brokers to alter choice of professional associations); Stephen Jay
Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 991 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[TJhe seller must
coerce the buyer into purchasing the tied product."); H.J., Inc. v. ITT, 867 F.2d 1531, 1542
(8th Cir. 1989) ("Coercion is an essential element of a tying claim."); Foremost Pro Color v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A significant element of an illegal
tying arrangement is coercion by the seller"); Unijax, Inc. v. Champion Int'l, Inc., 683 F.2d
678, 685 (2d Cir. 1982); Shop & Save Food Markets, Inc. v. Pneumo Corp., 683 F.2d 27, 30
(2d Cir. 1982); Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982); Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1352 n.8 (9th Cir. 1982); Bob Maxfield, Inc.
v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[A]ctual coercion is an
indispensable element of a tie-in charge."); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d
Cir. 1980) ("The law of tying requires proof of... actual coercion by the seller[.]"). Although
a minority of courts have held that proof of coercion is not required, see, e.g., Bell v. Cherokee
Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123, 1130-32 (6th Cir. 1981); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d
434, 450 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), such holdings are in doubt after
Jefferson Parish. However, at least one court has interpreted Jefferson Parish as not requiring
coercion as an element of a tie-in arrangement claim, but rather as "simply a manifestation of
market power." Casey v. Diet Ctr., 590 F. Supp. 1561, 1566 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1984). But again,
the majority of courts seem to have interpreted Jefferson Parish as requiring proof of coercion
or forcing. See, e.g., Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F. Supp. 861, 882 (D. Del. 1987).
207 See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 323 (1976).
208 This would constitute vertical price fixing, which violates the Sherman Act. See
generally Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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imposed tying arrangement lest antitrust law criminalize an entire category of
mutually beneficial sales contracts.
But while the coercion requirement makes sense if one is going to punish
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section One, that same
requirement also compels the observer to question the premise that unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements should be evaluated under Section One at all. The
coercion requirement provides two insights. First, it illustrates another anomaly
created by the current treatment of unilaterally imposed tying arrangements.
While some non-tying cases have allowed coerced conduct to satisfy the
concerted action requirement,20 9 no other Section One violation actually requires
coercion as an element Second, the anomaly highlights the fact that requiring
coercion for a Section One violation stretches the concept of agreement as that
term is traditionally employed. The fact that one party must, as a matter of law,
be forced or coerced suggests lack of agreement since agreement usually implies
lack of force.210
4. Drawing Inferences from Anomalies
In sum, analyzing unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section
One creates a series of anomalies, which at a minimum demonstrate that this
cause of action does not look like other Section One violations. This forces one
to consider whether Section One provides the appropriate framework to evaluate
unilateral tying arrangements, especially because these anomalies do not exist if
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements are analyzed under Section Two of the
Sherman Act211 or Section Three of the Clayton Act.212 For instance, Section
Two conduct usually has only one defendant and often requires some form of
coercion-usually the exercise of monopoly power. Furthermore, victim
209 See, e.g., MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., 62 F.3d 967, 975 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("So long as defendants knew that they were acquiescing in conduct that was in all
likelihood unlawful, we have no difficulty concluding that they thereby joined a combination
or conspiracy for which they can be held accountable under section 1."); Isaksen v. Vermont
Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1003 (1989) ("[A]n
agreement procured by threats is still an agreement for purposes of Section 1 ').
The rationale applied in these cases does not apply to litigation concerning unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements because the consumers buying bundled goods do not know that
they are engaging in unlawful conduct. Indeed, their conduct is not unlawful because it is not
illegal to buy bundled goods.
210 A reluctant agreement is not "forcing"; therefore, a reluctant agreement by a retailer
to follow the manufacturer's directive is different from a buyer submitting to a tying
arrangement. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text discussing Monsanto.
211 See infra Part V.B.
2 12 See infra Part V.C.
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cooperation would not be required if unilateral tie-ins were treated under Section
Two.
Additionally, it is significant that these anomalies disappear if: (1) courts
make the distinction between unilateral and concerted tying arrangements; and
(2) only the latter are considered under Section One. To punish concerted tying
arrangements under Section One, the victim would not have to participate
because the concerted action requirement would be satisfied by the two
businesses implementing the tie-in. Similarly, the existence of these two
businesses acting in concert would provide for two or more defendants. Finally,
no coercion element would be necessary when a tying arrangement is concerted
because it is jointly imposed by two competitors.21 3 To the extent that a
concerted tying arrangement represents a form of hidden price fixing or
concerted refusal to deal, there is no need to require coercion. Thus, recognizing
the distinction between unilateral and concerted tying arrangements would
restore consistency to Section One by insuring that only truly concerted action
fell within its reach, thereby eliminating the need for the anomalous coercion
requirement.
IV. UNILATERALLY IMPOSED TYING ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE
TREATED AS UNILATERAL CONDUCT
Although unilaterally imposed tying arrangements are currently evaluated as
concerted action under Section One of the Sherman Act, this Article argues that
they should be treated as unilateral conduct. The thrust of the argument is that a
claim based on a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement more closely resembles
unilateral conduct under Section Two than concerted action under Section
One.214
This Part advances four arguments. First, the current Section One test for
tying does not require that competition be affected before condemning the
challenged tie-in. Treating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements as unilateral
action under either Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the
2 13 See supra notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
2 14 For example, the Seventh Circuit has observed that "[t]ying is not cooperation among
competitors, the focus of § I [;] it is aggressive conduct akin to monopolization under § 2 of the
Sherman Act.' Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1985).
Under current law, a claim alleging a tying arrangement can be brought under either
Sections One or Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act. While plaintiffs
sometimes bring tying claims under multiple sections, see, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), given a choice most plaintiffs would much rather pursue their
claim pursuant to Section One because, assuming concerted action, it is significantly easier to
prevail under Section One. See infra Parts V.B & V.C.
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Clayton Act insures that competition is injured before a unilateral restraint is
condemned. Second, treating the economic power to force a tie-in as akin to
monopoly power insures that the coercion requirement is meaningful. Third, the
failure to treat unilaterally imposed tying arrangements as unilateral conduct
creates serious doctrinal inconsistencies in Section Two law and invites litigants
to circumvent the higher liability of thresholds of Section Two by characterizing
much Section Two conduct as a Section One violation. Finally, conceptually, a
tying arrangement imposed by a single seller looks more like Section Two
conduct or like tying under Section Three of the Clayton Act
A. Evaluating Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements as Unilateral
Conduct Is More Consistent with the Antitrust Requirement That
Competition Be Substantially Lessened
The essence of antitrust law is the protection of competition. 215 Concerted
action is proscribed under Section One not merely because it is unreasonable in
the abstract, but because it injures competition. Unilateral conduct is proscribed
under Section Two only when it threatens, creates, or maintains a monopoly
because monopolization is antithetical to competition. Protecting the competitive
process is the touchstone of all antitrust inquiries. However, current Section One
tying law does not share the same focus on competitive conditions and market
structure that represents the core of most antitrust violations.
The current Supreme Court test for tying under Section One does not require
a meaningful inquiry into the effect of any particular tying arrangement on actual
competition in the market for the tied product.216 Tying arrangements are illegal
under Section One so long as a "not insubstantial" volume of the tied product
market is affected.2 17 This test is not difficult to satisfy and does not sufficiently
2 15 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,488 (1977).
2 16 See 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 27 (tying has "a most peculiar per se rule: It appears
to exclude only attention to harmful effects"); John F. Homick, The Per Se Rule in Tying
Contexts: A Critical View, 10 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 703, 709 (1985) ("The most important
attribute of the per se standard, as it applies to tying arrangements, is that a showing of
anticompetitive effect is not required and need not even be addressed."). Although some
circuits list competitive injury as an independent element see, e.g., Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc.,
630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1980), most courts do not perform a separate inquiry into the
competitive impact of a challenged tie-in, nor has the Supreme Court endorsed one.
217 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 94. Originally, the "not insubstantial volume?'
requirement was meant to satisfy the interstate conrmaerce requirement But now the
requirement is often stated without reference to interstate commerce. (Indeed, because the
interstate commerce requirement has lost much of its teeth, this requirement is often presumed
and usually not discussed at all.) The element has remained; however, its purpose has shifted.
Now it is used as a mechanism for showing that competition has been restrained. The thinking
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require that competition be injured. The test is measured in dollar terms 2 18
Courts have held that dollar amounts as low as $10,000 satisfy the
requirement. 219 The Ninth Circuit recently held that a single tied sale of
$100,000 to one consumer satisfies the "not insubstantial" requirement. 220
While such a holding presents a low threshold, it is consistent with the Supreme
Court's direction that the amount of competition affected need only be
"substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de
minimis .... "221 In short the "not insubstantial volume" test does not have
many teeth. 2 2
2
Antitrust law traditionally measures market power and effect on competition
in terms of market share. A seller with low market share presumptively enjoys
little market power and therefore is in less of a position to inhibit competition.
Decades of caselaw and hundreds of antitrust cases recognize that market share
is the single most appropriate currency by which to measure competitive effects.
Current tying law, however, does not use market share to evaluate whether a
challenged restraint has substantially lessened competition.22 3 As the Supreme
of the current regime is that if a not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce in the tied product
is affected, then competition is substantially lessened. See Homick, supra note 216, at 710 n.35
("Athough the Court [in Jefferson Parish] uses the word 'substantial,' the four Supreme Court
cases which it cites as support use the term 'not insubstantial.' Thus, 'not insubstantial' is
probably still the standard[.]").
2 18 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969).
2 19 See Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1419 (1 1th Cir. 1987)
($10,091.07 is not insubstantial); see also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962)
($60,800 is "not insubstantial"); Microbyte Corp. v. New Jersey State Golf Ass'n, 1986-2
Trade Cas. 67,228, at 61,163 (D.N.J. 1986) (stating that $27,264 is not de minimis). But see
M. Leff Radio Parts, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 387, 399 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ($12,000 is
insubstantial in a multibillion dollar industry); I. Haas Trucking Corp. v. New York Fruit
Auction Corp., 364 F. Supp. 868, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ($31,000 is insubstantial).
2 20 See Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 1424-26 (9th Cir. 1995); cf
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) ("If only a single purchaser
were 'forced' with respect to the purchase of a tied item, the resultant impact on competition
would not be sufficient to warrant the concern of the antitrust law...").
221 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501. See also 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 31 (describing "not
insubstantial volume of commerce" requirement as "a de minimis test").
222 Some courts require that a "substantial volume" of the tied product market be
affected, using the standards "substantial" and "not insubstantial" as if they were
synonymous. Regardless of the nomenclature, the test has minimal rigor.
This is ironic given that tying arrangements were initially condemned because they
threatened actual monopolization of the market for the tied product. Earlier cases dealt with
tying arrangements that were creating monopolies, not merely restraining competition. See,
e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
223 See Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995)
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Court explained in Fortner 1224 "[t]he requirement that a 'not insubstantial'
amount of commerce be involved makes no reference to the scope of any
particular market or to the share of that market foreclosed by the tie .... "225
From the fact that a minimal dollar volume of the tied product is affected, the
destruction of competition is presumed.226 Thus, under Section One analysis, the
dollar volume affected in the tied product market untethered to any inquiry into
market share, is the sole indicator of whether competition is stifled by a
unilaterally imposed tying arrangement.
Relying on the dollar value of the tied product affected provides no insights
into the competitive process and whether that process is broken.2 27 For example,
if ABC Corporation loses $50,000 worth of business (to a tying competitor) in a
multibillion dollar market the tying arrangement probably has no meaningful
(discussing Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
473 U.S. 908 (1985), and its holding that "the 'not insubstantial' element" does not
"include[ ] a requirement that a substantial portion of the market in the tied product be
affected."); cf 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994) (Section Three of the Clayton Act).
224 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
225 Id. at 501; see also Shafer v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., 569 F. Supp. 621, 627 (E.D. Wis.
1983) (stating that the "not insubstantial" amount of commerce requirement is "not
necessarily dependent on market shares"). For support, the Fortner I Court cited United States
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1957), and International Salt, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 418, 499, 503.
Yet, these are all cases in which there was market dominance; the Court simply defined the
relevant market so narrowly that it made the defendant's product in each case almost a market
unto itself.
226 See International Salt, 332 U.S. at 398; see also Byron A. Bilicki, Standard Antitrust
Analysis and the Doctrine of Patent Misuse: A Unification Under the Rule of Reason, 46 U.
P-rr. L. REv. 209,228 (1984). Bilicki states:
EiThe holding in International Salt amounts to a per se ruling in that anticompetitive
effects were presumed from foreclosure of a certain dollar volume. The Court neither
considered the availability of satisfactory substitutes for the patented machines nor the
market share possessed by the patentee. Similarly, the Court deemed it irrelevant that
there was no evidence of the actual effect of the tying clauses upon competition.
Id.
227 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that numbers alone, without competitive
context, are illusory. Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 (1953)
("Obviously no magic inheres in numbers; 'the relative effect of percentage command of a
market varies with the setting in which that factor is placed."') (quoting United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 528 (1948)); see also HOVENKAWlP, supra note 34, at 352
("The rule [using dollar amount] seems to be one of those rather silly requirements thought up
with no good reason articulated in support of it, but from which the lower courts rarely
deviate.").
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effect on competition. However, if ABC Corp. were to lose that same amount of
business in a half-million dollar market, the injury to competition is significant.
The same fifty thousand dollar loss has extremely different implications for the
competitive landscape, depending on the size of the overall market in which the
loss-occurs.
Only one statistic tells how important, from a competitive harm viewpoint,
that a $50,000 loss is: market share. In the first hypothetical, ABC Corp. has lost
less than one one-thousandth of one percent of the available market. In the
second scenario, ABC Corp. has lost 10% of the available market. There is
clearly a significant difference in the competitive impact. The former loss is
trivial, the latter is consequential. Merely examining the lost volume in dollars is
not particularly helpful in determining the effect on competition of a tying
arrangement.228 Examining the percentage of the available market foreclosed
provides a substantially more meaningful measurement of the injury to the
competitive process. 229
Evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section Two of
the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act provides the proper focus
on market share and, therefore, competition. For example, Section Two uses
market share to determine whether anticompetitive conduct should be
condemned as an unlawful acquisition or exercise of monopoly power.2 30 No
Section Two liability is imposed without an elaborate inquiry into the
defendant's market share, which is the single most appropriate measurement for
competitive injury.
In the same vein, evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under
Section Three of the Clayton Act guarantees a more meaningful inquiry into the
anticompetitive effects of any given tie-in. The only explicit prohibition of tying
arrangements in any federal antitrust statute231 is in Section Three, which
22 8 The Supreme Court in Fortner I basically conceded half of this argument when it
stated that "analysis of market shares might become relevant if it were alleged that an
apparently small dollar-volume of business actually represented a substantial part of the sales
for which competitors were bidding.' 394 U.S. at 501.
229 See HOvENKAMP, supra note 34, at 352 ("To the extent that tying law is concerned
with limits on competition facilitated by foreclosure or increased collusion, the correct number
should be some percentage of a relevant market foreclosed by the arrangement.'). By way of
comparison, European competition authorities are unlikely to attack a tying arrangement unless
a significant percentage of the market is foreclosed. See James D. Veltrop, Tying and Exclusive
Purchasing Arrangements Under EC Competition Law, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 549, 550
(1994); see also id. at 552 (" [l]n the absence of genuine foreclosure effects... the market will
correct deficiencies so long as competitors and consumers have alternatives[.]").
2 30 See e.g., R.C. Bigelow v. Unilever, 867 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1989); Health Care
Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Med. Socy., 851 F.2d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 1988).
231 Despite Section Three's explicit proscription of tying arrangements, the vast majority
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provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce... to lease or make a
sale of contract for sale of goods ... on the condition, agreement or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods... of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect
ofsuch... condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.232
By its clear text, the Clayton Act requires that the challenged tying
arrangement "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce." Thus, a tie-in must have a significant impact on
competition before it will be condemned under Section Three.233 Like Section
Two, Section Three uses market share, not dollar volume, to determine whether
of tying arrangements are evaluated under Section One of the Sherman Act, not Section Three
of the Clayton Act. See Kramer, supra note 180, at 1037 (noting that "all of the tying
arrangements reviewed in opinions of the Court since International Salt have involved
Sherman Act challenges"). The reason plaintiffs prefer Section One over Section Three is
readily apparent; Section One has a much lower threshold for liability because the plaintiff
does not have to show a substantial injury to the competitive process. Section Three also has'
more limited coverage than Section One, in that, unlike the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act does
not cover services. This limitation of the Clayton Act could be dispositive in many cases. For
example, because the tied product in Kodak was services, the tying arrangement would not
violate the Clayton Act. In such an instance, the reasonable plaintiff would certainly bring suit
under the Sherman Act, independent of the lower injury threshold.
232 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994). Section Three, in its entirety provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale of contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the
condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or
deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
Id.
233 Cf Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961) (declining to
condemn exclusive dealing arrangement under Section Three of the Clayton Act absent proof
of substantial market foreclosure and injury to competition).
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competition has been injured.234
In sum, reviewing unilateral tying arrangements under Section Two of the
Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act would better insure that a tying
arrangement actually threatened competition and would protect those unilateral
actions that do not injure competition.
B. Analyzing Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements as a Unilateral
Restraint Under Section Two Provides the Proper Focus on Monopoly
Power
A Section One tying claim requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant
has sufficient economic power in the tying product market to force consumers to
accept the alleged tying arrangement.235 Courts refer to this market power
requirement by many different names, including "sufficient economic
power," 236 "appreciable economic power," 237 and sometimes simply "market
power."' 238 The rationale of the sufficient economic power requirement is that
absent such power, the defendant is not distorting competition by foreclosing
consumers' access to either the tying or tied product.239
Although the Supreme Court has identified three principal sources of market
power for tying purposes, 240 it has not articulated a meaningful standard as to
what constitutes sufficient economic power to force a tie. For example, courts
generally do not engage in any rigorous discussion of the relevant product
market in tying cases despite the fact that in other contexts the Supreme Court
has made clear that "[w]ithout a definition of that market there is no way to
234 See infra notes 389-398 and accompanying text.
235 See generally United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977);
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). Some circuits hold that
the threshold requirement that a defendant should have substantial market power in the tying
product is only applicable if the plaintiff wants to proceed on a per se theory. See, e.g., Breaux
Bros. Farms, Inc. v. Teche Sugar Co., 21 F.3d 83, 87 (5th Cir. 1994); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru
of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir. 1988). But see Hardy v. City Optical, Inc.,
39 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that "substantial market power is a threshold
requirement of all rule of reason (as well as some per se) cases.").
236 See, e.g., Fortnerl, 394 U.S. at 502; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
262 (1963) (citation omitted); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38,47 (1962); Northem
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
237 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992);
Fortner I, 429 U.S. at 611-12.
23 8 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984).
23 9 See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1224, 1226 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
240 See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
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measure [a defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy competition. ' 241 Because
there is not a coherent test (or even competing tests) for determining when a
seller has such "sufficient economic power" to force consumers to accept a tie-
in, this important requirement is not built on a sound foundation. In many ways,
it is basically a standardless standard.
The most appropriate test to determine whether any individual seller has
sufficient market power to force consumers to accept a tie-in is the "monopoly
power" standard of Section Two jurisprudence. First, a strong argument can be
made that the ill-defined sufficient economic power standard of Section One
tying cases is best characterized as the "monopoly power" element of Section
Two law. Monopoly power is "the power to control market prices or exclude
competition." 242 To the extent that monopoly power is the power to exclude
competition, then the power to force a tie-in is monopoly power. After all, the
primary justification for proscribing tying arrangements is that they exclude
competition in the market for the tied product.2 43 Whatever the source of its
market power,244 a seller needs monopoly power to eliminate this competition.
Absent monopoly power in the tying product market, a seller does not have
sufficient economic power to impose a tying arrangement on an unwilling
consumer. As long as the seller imposing the tie-in is not the only supplier of the
tying product, the consumer can turn to alternative suppliers.245 An example
241 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965). An example of imprecise market definition can be found in United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1962), in which the Court found "sufficient economic power"
without clearly articulating the relevant product market or what the defendants' market shares
were. The Court found market power based on the existence of a copyright. See id. at 48. Many
commentators have argued that economic theory precludes such a presumption. See J. Dianne
Brinson, Proof of Economic Power in a Sherman Act Tying Arrangement Case: Should
Economic Power Be Presumed When the Tying Product Is Patented or Copyrighted?, 48 LA.
L. REV. 29 (1987); Melissa Hamilton, Software Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws:
A More Flexible Approach, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 607, 626-31 (1994); William Montgomery,
The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying
Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1141 (1985). Such a flawed connection could not be
imposed if plaintiffs (and courts) had to define the relevant market (based on reasonably
interchangeable products) and then determine the defendant's market share and market power
in that defined market.
242 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). Because
price and competition are inherently intertwined, the inquiry often focuses on the issue of
ability to raise prices. See id. at 391-92.
243 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
244 See infra note 250 and accompanying text (detailing Court-identified sources of
economic power to force a tie-in).
245 eeHERBERT HOVENKAMP, EONOMCS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 8.10 at 238
(1985). ("[A] perfect competitor could not coerce any buyer into taking anything."). Of course,
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illustrates the point: a seller has 60% of the market and she imposes a tying
arrangement on a buyer. In order to buy her widgets, the buyer must also buy his
cogs from the dominant widget seller. If the buyer does not want to buy cogs
from the dominant widget seller, then he can simply buy his widgets from one of
the sellers who supplies the remaining 40% of the market.246 So long as there are
alternative suppliers, a seller cannot force a buyer to purchase a tied product
against her will. 47 In the absence of monopoly power, market discipline should
prevent a seller from imposing a tie-in because the buyer could simply purchase
the tying product from another seller. 248 Finally, the Supreme Court itself has
this option is not available if the dominant seller has cajoled alternative suppliers into not
assisting consumers in their end-run around the tying arrangements. That is why this form of
concerted tying arrangement is so dangerous to competition. See supra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text.
24 6 The only reason he would not be able to buy from another seller is if the competing
widgets would not meet his purposes or were somehow inaccessible. But, this would mean that
the dominant widget seller in fact had a monopoly over the relevant product and geographic
markets.
247 Some commentators have argued that monopoly power is not necessary if the seller
charges less than the competitive price for the tying product. See W. David Slawson, Excluding
Competition Without Monopoly Power: The Use of Tying Arrangements to Exploit Market
Failure, 36 ANarRUST BULL. 457, 474-75 (1991). Slawson's argument is inconsistent with
even the current test for tying because it suggests any seller can successfully implement a tying
arrangement, regardless of market power or the competitiveness of the particular market See
id. at 479 ("[B]uyers are not necessarily more coerced when sellers have monopoly power than
when a market is perfectly competitive."). Independent of these questionable assertions, the
anticompetitive conduct at the heart of the seller's scheme in such a case is predatory pricing,
not tying. Finally, all of the arguments questioning the viability of predatory pricing as a
business strategy apply doubly when a seller is trying to leverage between two markets, neither
of which she has market power in.
248 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 31 ("A tie-in is a useless device unless the supplier
possesses substantial monopoly over the tying product."). Scholars consistently suggest that
the tying seller must possess monopoly power to impose a tie-in. See, e.g., Bowman, supra
note 30, at 20 ("To sell or lease one commodity, the tying product, advantageously on
condition that it be used with another commodity, the tied product, requires the existence of
monopoly power.... ."); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85
COLuM. L. REv. 515, 546 (1985) ("Mo extend monopoly from one market to another, there
must be some monopoly in the first market to begin with.'); see also M. L. Burstein, A Theory
ofFull-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 62 (1960) (assuming implicitly that the tying seller is
a monopolist).
Even if the seller imposing the tie-in is a monopolist, consumers can decide to forego their
purchase altogether. (This is not a viable altemative in markets that have relatively inelastic
demand.) Consumers always act as the free market's check on monopolist behavior because,
absent noneconomic coercion, they pick and choose which transactions to enter. If they believe
the price is too high then they will make the purchase from someone else. Agreements between
businesses are bad because they diminish the ability of the consumer to negotiate one-on-one
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acknowledged that the power to impose a tie-in is, in fact, monopoly power.2 49
Second, the oft-cited examples of the market power sufficient to coerce a tie-
in are all instances of monopoly power. The Supreme Court has articulated three
sources of market power sufficient to coerce consumers to accept a tie-in: "a
patent or similar monopoly over a product,... the seller's share of the market is
high, ... [and] the seller offers a unique product that competitors are not able to
offer[.]" 250 Each of these sources is tantamount to monopoly power, as that
concept is applied in Section Two analysis. First, by the Court's own language, it
is clear that the Court considered "a patent or similar monopoly" to constitute
monopoly power.251 For the first half century of the Sherman Act's existence, a
with the seller. This is true because the other sellers, with which this seller has entered into an
agreement, are having an influence on the transaction. Thus, the mere existence of some market
power in a tying product does not mean that a consumer is without options.
249 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992);
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969) (suggesting that the
"proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to raise prices"); E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTrIRUST AND rrs ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 260-61 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining that the Supreme Court's opinion in IBM
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), suggests "that without monopoly power in the
tying product market, this danger [of substantially lessened competition] would not be
present"); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the
Chimera ofForcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 & n.12.
Similarly, the Court's holding in Jefferson Parish is consistent with the argument that the
Supreme Court has treated sufficient economic power to impose a tie-in as monopoly power.
After all, the defendant hospital clearly had the power to force consumers to accept a tie-in as
shown by the fact that the hospital did successfully impose its tying arrangement on its patients.
What the hospital did not have is monopoly power and thus the Court found no illegal tying
arrangement. In short, the defendant had sufficient economic power, but not monopoly power
and the absence of the latter appears dispositive. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
250 Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 833 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16-17), cert denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
251 The "similar monopoly" refers to copyrighted goods. See United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144 (1998); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38,45 (1962)
("[The requisite economic power [for per se condemnation of a tie-in] is presumed when the
tying product is patented or copyrighted.").
In reality, patents and copyrights do not confer monopoly power unless they cover a
properly defined relevant market. See generally Brinson, supra note 241; Hamilton, supra note
241; Montgomery, supra note 241. Many courts now recognize that there is a distinction
between a legal monopoly and an economic monopoly, and have suggested that the power to
impose a tie-in cannot be inferred by the mere existence of a patent over the tying product. See
10 AREEDA Er AL, supra note 194, at 90; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994) (The Patent
Misuse Reform Act eliminates any presumption that a patent alone defines a relevant market or
implies market power.). The point here is not that patents and copyrights do confer monopoly
power, but that the Court claims that they do; thus, the Court has equated the power to impose
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de facto monopoly power requirement was employed in the sense that early tying
cases involved patented tying products.252 Second, high market share is the
hallmark of monopoly power.253 Courts often rely on high market share to find
economic power over the tying product.254 Finally, the notion of "a unique
product" that competitors cannot supply is simply a long-form way of saying
that a product is a market unto itself over which the seller has a monopoly.2 55
Indeed, the Court itself has equated this "uniqueness" with monopoly power.256
a tie-in with monopoly power.
252 See, e.g., International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); IBM v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502,
518 (1917); Henry v. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. 1 (1912); see also Loew's, 371 U.S. at 46; Times-
Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953) (suggesting that a seller
must "enjoy[ ] a monopolistic position in the market for the 'tying' produce' in order to violate
Section One of the Sherman Act); POSNER, supra note 28, at 172 ("[E]arly cases required
proof of monopoly power, or of some proxy therefor such as a patent, in the market for the
tying product.").
25 3 In monopolization cases, control of ninety percent of a market "is enough to
constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and
certainly thirty-three percent is not." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
424 (2d Cir. 1945). While market share alone is generally not dispositive in and of itself, see
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948), federal courts rely on the
market-share inquiry as the "earmark of monopoly power." United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948).
254 10 AREEDA Er AL., supra note 194, at 87 (" [T]he few recent cases allowing a jury to
find power [over the tying product] have emphasized that the defendant's share approached
100%, albeit in a relatively narrow market, or exceeded 50% when coupled with other factors
indicating power.") (citations omitted).
255 10 AREEDA ET. AL., supra note 194, at 116 ("When the defendant's [tying] product is
unique in that no other supplier can offer it or a reasonable substitute, it ordinarily comprises a
market in itself--a market obviously dominated by the defendant with a 100 percent share.").
The government in Northern Pacific tried to argue that the land used as a tying product was
equivalent to the patented tying product in International Salt by initially arguing that "patents"
had conferred the land on Northern Pacific. See Cummings & Ruhter, supra note 42, at 333; cf
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962) (stating that an owner of a film library
holds a "'monopolistic' position" in each film). Again, in reality, a unique product should not
be considered a monopoly unless there are no reasonable substitutes, and the product
constitutes a relevant antitrust market. This critical inquiry is evaded under current law because
tie-ins are not treated under Section Two, which begins each analysis with an investigation into
market definition.
25 6 Forter Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 505 n2 (1969)
("Uniqueness confers economic power only when other competitors are in some way
prevented from offering the distinctive product themselves. Such barriers may be legal, as in




In short, current case law is consistent with the conclusion that the power to
enforce a tie-in must be monopoly power. 257 Courts have not meaningfully
distinguished the power to impose an unwanted tie-in from monopoly power.258
Courts have not explained how the power to force a tie-in can exist absent
monopoly power over the tying product Indeed, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that "the essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding
of monopolistic leverage[.]" 259
If the current standard is tantamount to monopoly power, then why does it
matter what the courts call it? The problem with not being explicit in equating
"the power to coerce a tie" with "monopoly power" is that lower courts usually
forego the market power inquiry of Section Two cases and hence, impose tying
liability when monopoly power (and thus the power to force consumers to accept
terms against their will) is not present.260 Under current Section One tying
jurisprudence, after reciting the requirement of market power, many courts
assume it away by inferring such power from the mere existence of the tying
arrangement.261 For example, many courts assume the existence of coercion
257 Many tying holdings are entirely consistent with such a conclusion. For example, in
Jefferson Parish, the Court held that a defendant with a 30% share of the market in the tying
product does not have sufficient market power as a matter of law. This is similar to the
conventional wisdom that a defendant in a Section Two case cannot have monopoly power
with a mere 33% market share. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,424
(2d Cir. 1945).
258 See infra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
259 Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953).
260 See Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45 n.4 (noting that because tying cases do not require a
demonstration of market power as in Section Two cases, "it should seldom be necessary in a
tie-in sale case to embark upon a full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant market
for the tying product"); see 10 AREEDA Er AL., supra note 194, at 5. Areeda argues that the
Supreme Court put more teeth in the sufficient economic power requirement with its decisions
in Forner II and Jefferson Parish, but that some lower courts are still too quick to find such
power without adequate market analysis. See id at 76-77.
261 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958) ("The very
existence of this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's
great power[.]"); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977);
McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 (E.D. Mich. 1978)
(claiming that Fortner I "seems to be saying that if one has imposed a tie, one had sufficient
power to do so"). Perhaps the reason that some courts are so willing to infer coercion stems
from the implications of any contrary finding. Whenever a court finds that a seller does not
have sufficient economic power to force a tie-in, and yet a tie-in nonetheless exists, this
necessarily means that the consumer, without coercion, accepted a tie-in. Such a conclusion is
at odds with the deeply (though incorrectly) held notion that consumers are invariably hurt by
tie-ins and that tying arrangements serve no purpose other than to stifle competition. See
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) ("only the prospect of
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based on tying provisions in form contracts.262
However, the existence of a tie-in should not constitute proof that the seller
is exercising market power.2 63 Many tie-ins do not rely on coercion, such as tie-
ins imposed by franchisors on their franchisees.264 Furthermore, some tie-ins are
desired by consumers.265 The existence of procompetitive benefits of tying
arrangements suggests that they need not be the result of coercion.2 66 The
potential for such benefits should counsel against knee jerk inferences of
coercion because "even where a contract might be, on balance, anticompetitive,
a plaintiff would not suffer antitrust injury when the presence of significant
procompetitive effects suggests that the parties would have entered the very
same contract absent any prospect of obtaining or exercising market power. '267
Finally, given the harsh effects of a per se rule against tying, if it is shown that
the defendant has "sufficient economic power," courts should insure that this
requirement is meaningful by requiring that such power be proven and
substantial.268
In addition, explicitly acknowledging that unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements involve monopoly power allows courts to exploit the ready supply
of well-thought out consistent case law of Section Two of the Sherman Act.
Plaintiffs in Section Two cases must show that the defendant has improperly
acquired or maintained monopoly power through anticompetitive conduct.269
The inquiry into monopoly power is critical, and often dispositive, in Section
Two litigation. To determine whether a plaintiff has proven the existence of
monopoly power, courts applying Section Two analysis examine the defendant's
reducing competition would persuade a seller to adopt such a contract and only his control of
the supply of the tying device... could induce a buyer to enter one."); see also CARL KAYSEN
& DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYsIs 146-47
(1965) (sufficient economic power to impose a tie-in "would seem to be shown by the
existence of the contract itself').
2 62 See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of
Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 160 (1996).
2 63 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 29; cf United States Steel Corp. v. Former Enters.,
Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 614 (1977) (existence of tying arrangements was evidence of "appreciable
economic power" to force a tie-in).
2 64 See Meese, supra note 262, at 128 (demonstrating that coercion is not necessary for
some franchise tying arrangements).
2 65 See infra notes 365-70 and accompanying text.
2 66 See Meese, supra note 262, at 155.
267 Id. at 163-64.
2 68 See 10 AREEDAETAL., supra note 194, at 66.
269 Or, in the case of attempted monopolization claims, plaintiffs must show that there is a
dangerous probability that the defendant will acquire monopoly power.
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market share in the relevant market,2 70 the barriers to entry into that market,2 71
and other circumstantial indicia.272 The market power inquiry of Section Two
jurisprudence is both rigorous and meaningful, especially when compared to the
brief discussions that occur in most tying cases.273 In short, courts have a great
deal of experience in determining whether a particular defendant possesses
monopoly power. Finally, and more importantly, equating the economic power
requirement applied to unilaterally imposed tying arrangements with the Section
Two standard insures that the requirement is meaningful.274
The strongest argument against the position that "sufficient economic
power" is "monopoly power" is the Supreme Court's passage in Fortner 1275
stating that "[t]he standard of 'sufficient economic power' does not... require
that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the
market for the tying product." 276 While such language is not helpful, neither is it
270 Monopoly power does not necessarily mean that the seller controls or supplies 100%
of the market; rather, it refers to having the power to act as if one controlled 100% of the
market share. Monopoly power is often defined in terms of the ability to impose a
nontransitory price increase on a market. For example, a seller can be said to have monopoly
power if he may increase his prices 5% above the competitive levels for a period of two years.
271 See generally United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) [United
Shoe I.
272 These include price discrimination, supra-competitive profits, excess capacity, and
price trends.
273 Courts in tying cases often do a sloppy job of defining the relevant market in the first
place. See 10 AREEDA Er AL.,supra note 194, at 131.
274 Similarly, in determining whether competition has been substantially lessened under
Section Three of the Clayton Act, courts determine the relevant line of commerce "on the basis
of the facts peculiar to the case." Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327
(1961). The failure of many courts to properly define the tying product market renders the
market power determination meaningless. Cf 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 194, at 85
("Shares of a poorly defined market mean nothing.").
275 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
2 76 Id. at 502; see also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). Even the
Former I dissent suggested that "monopoly power or dominance in the tying market is not
necessary; it is enough if there is 'sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint
on free competition in the tied product.'" 394 U.S. at 510 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Times
Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608, 611 (1953)). It bears noting that while
Times-Picayune is cited to support the proposition that market dominance is not necessary, the
Court did in fact look at market dominance in that case. See Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 610;
see also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1957). Justine Black, writing
for the Court, stated in Northern Pacific:
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fatal. From the beginning this language has been condemned as loose and subject
to misinterpretation. 277 Indeed, at its first opportunity, the Supreme Court sought
to ameliorate the glaring errors of Fortner I by holding in Fortner 1 that the
seller did not have sufficient economic power to impose a tie-in.278 Fortner I
illustrates the problem of not applying monopoly power analysis to tying
While there is some language in the Times-Picayune opinion which speaks of
"monopoly power" or "dominance" over the tying product as a necessary precondition
for application of the rule of per se unreasonableness to tying arrangements, we do not
construe this general language as requiring anything more than sufficient economic power
to impose an appreciable restraint on competition in the tied product.
Id.
277 See Kenneth W. Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a
Borrower Nor a Lender Be," in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1, 25-26 (Philip B. Kurland, ed.
1969). Professor Dam explained the Court's language:
One important question in interpreting the Fortner decision is the meaning of this
language. Taken out of context, it might be thought to mean that, just as the "host of tying
arrangement' was "compelling evidence" of "great power" in Northern Pacific, so the
inclusion of tie-in clauses in contracts with "any appreciable numbers of buyers"
establishes market power. But the passage read in context does not warrant this
interpretation. For the immediately preceding sentence makes clear that market power in
the sense of power over price must still exist.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The Court in Fortner 11 endorsed Professor Dam's analysis of Fortner I as correct. See
Fortner If, 429 U.S. at 620 n.13; see also Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey Findi, The Individual
Coercion Doctrine and Tying Arrangements: An Economic Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
531, 561 (1983) (describing the language of Fortner las "unfortunate"). Indeed, Fortnerlhas
been attacked from many quarters as wrong. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 28, at 368-69.
278 See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 621-22 (1977);
see also Daniel E. Lazaroff, Reflections on Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc.: Continued Confusion Regarding Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Jurisprudence, 69
WASH. L. REv. 101, 148 n.265 (1994) ("Fortner If, however, cut back on an expansive use of
uniqueness as a short cut to finding the requisite power [to force a tie-in]"; William
Montgomery, The Presumption ofEconomic Powerfor Patented and Copyrighted Pro ducts in
Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1154 (1985) (arguing that regardless of the
language of Fortner I, the "actual decision in [Fortner I] indicates that... the Court had
already moved away from the ready willingness to find sufficient market power that it had
earlier exhibited").
The language of Fortner I has been gutted in other indirect ways. For example, the Court
in Jefferson Parish characterized Fortner I as an instance of a seller controlling a "unique
product that [its] competitors are not able to offer." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984). This is tantamount to monopoly power. See Brinson, supra note 241, at
41-42 (arguing that Fortner II and Jefferson Parish reigned in Fortner I and Loew's); see also
Meese, supra note 249, at 20.
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questions. The Court in Fortner I failed to properly define and analyze the tying
product market over which the seller allegedly exerted power;, if it had, it would
have determined that U.S. Steel could not possibly have had economic power in
the relevant market, namely credit. This is ultimately what the Supreme Court
concluded in Fortner 1T, but not until after the trial court held the seller liable for
imposing an illegal tie-in. The courts could have saved much time and eliminated
confusion, both among the legal and business communities, by employing a
traditional monopoly power inquiry.
In sum, the power to impose a tie-in is properly characterized as monopoly
power because without monopoly power, a seller should not be able to truly
"force" a buyer to do something that she does not want.2 79 Furthermore, if this
is so, then it makes much more sense to address unilaterally imposed tying
arrangement either as a Section Three violation in which courts traditionally
examine the relevant line of commerce or as a Section Two violation in which
courts define (and justify) the relevant product market in order to determine
whether a defendant has market power. In this way, courts can apply the vast
body of case law discussing whether a defendant has monopoly power in a given
market.280
C. Failure to Treat Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements as
Unilateral Conduct Creates Inconsistencies Across Section Two
Jurisprudence
The current law on tying creates inconsistencies in the overall structure of
2 79 Indeed, an argument can be constructed that even monopoly power is not sufficient to
force or coerce a consumer to make a transaction that she does not desire. To the extent that a
seller has a monopoly power if he can increase his prices to supra-competitive levels for a
nontransitory period, it is debatable whether this is enough power to force a consumer to make
an unwanted purchase. One can think of instances in which it would be more difficult to force a
consumer to purchase an entirely separate product that she doesn't want than it would be to
"force" her to pay 5% more for the one product that she did desire.
This explanation serves to question the coercion element of tying arangements under
Section One. On the one hand, it makes sense that there must be an element of coercion
because if the consumer purchases a second (allegedly tied) product voluntarily, then there is
no effect on the competitive marketplace. However, the power to coerce an unwanted purchase
is more closely akin to monopoly power than mere market power, and this suggests that the
proper statutory scheme is Section Two. If, in reality, the power to force an unwanted purchase
is actually monopoly power, then we have created an anomaly in which a Section One
violation requires that the defendant have monopoly power.
280 Additionally, tying arrangements can then properly be characterized as an abuse of
monopoly power, a category of conduct more properly analyzed under Section Two. See infra
notes 294-305 and accompanying text (discussing leveraging as an abuse of monopoly).
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American antitrust laws by treating one category of unilaterally imposed
restraints as a Section One violation. This raises the issue of why other Section
Two conduct cannot be pleaded, evaluated, and proscribed as Section One
conduct.281
Courts treat unilaterally imposed tying arrangements as a concerted restraint
under Section One because the tie-in is a term of a sales contract.2 82 The
presence of a contract between the buyer and seller converts the unilaterally
imposed condition into concerted action. If similar reasoning were applied across
the board in antitrust law and unilateral conduct were treated as joint activity
whenever the consumer submits to the seller's restraint of trade, Section One
would swallow much of Section Two.
Many Section Two restraints are the result of a unilateral policy that is
ultimately memorialized in a contract. Sometimes the policy involves coercion,
but often consumers buy a monopolist's product after the seller has engaged in
exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct. These sales are the culmination of an
anticompetitive course of conduct; indeed, these sales (often discussed in terms
of market share) are how we measure the success of the monopolist's business
plan. But while these sales-which by definition are contracts and therefore
concerted action-are the goal of the monopolist's policy, they do not convert
the monopolist's unilaterally conceived and implemented policies into concerted
action for antitrust purposes. If they did, Section Two case law would be in
shambles; because they do not, current tying law is inconsistent with the
remaining body of antitrust law. Several examples bear this out.
1. Unilateral Refusals to Deal
A unilateral refusal to deal can represent Section Two conduct.2 83 As the
Supreme Court noted in Colgate, a manufacturer or seller has a general right to
decide with whom she will conduct business, so long as her purpose is not to
create or maintain a monopoly.2 84 But Colgate does not provide absolute
281 This argument is the flipside of the discussion of how analyzing unilaterally imposed
tying arrangements under Section One creates anomalies within Section One jurisprudence.
See supra notes 192-210 and accompanying text. Whereas the discussion of anomalies
showed how treating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements as concerted action creates
inconsistencies within Section One jurisprudence, this section of the Article argues that
inconsistencies are also created within Section Two jurisprudence.
282 Seesupra note 115 and accompanying text.
283 See generally Oahu Gas Serv. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
284 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919); see also Byars v. Bluff
City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[B]usiness is free to deal with whomever
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immunity. For example, the Supreme Court has applied Colgate to hold that a
defendant violates Section Two when he refuses to deal with customers who also
conduct business with the defendant's competitor if the defendant's intent is to
secure a monopoly.285
In many cases, the unilateral refusal to deal is not an outright refusal but
rather is effected by the defendant demanding concessions or imposing onerous
terms that the plaintiff is unwilling or unable to accept. For example, in Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,286 two ski facilities had issued joint
lift tickets for several years. The defendant ("Ski Company") demanded a higher
percentage of the revenues received from the joint lift tickets. 287 Ski Company
did not expressly refuse to continue its joint ticket package; rather, it wanted to
change the profit split and only after drawn-out unsuccessful negotiations did the
plaintiff ("Highlands") pull out of the joint marketing arrangement. The
Supreme Court evaluated Ski Company's conduct as unilateral activity under
Section Two of the Sherman Act.
The challenged policy was clearly unilateral. Highlands did not accept Ski
Company's terms because acceptance would have been competitively
destructive to Highlands. But what if Highlands had accepted the defendant's
onerous terms? Ski Company's conduct would have been precisely the same; in
this scenario, only the plaintiffs behavior has changed. But now there is an
agreement. Does Highlands' acquiescence suddenly transform the nature of Ski
Company's conduct-which is the same in both cases-from unilateral conduct
to concerted action, subject to the lower standard of liability under Section
One?288
Unilaterally imposed tying arrangements are basically a form of unilateral
it pleases so long as it has no 'purpose to create or maintain a monopoly[.]') (quoting
Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307); Healthco Int'l, Inc. v. A'dec, Inc., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,703, at 61,692 (D. Mass. 1989) ("Even a firm with monopoly power ordinarily has no duty
to deal with a competitor, unless there is no legitimate business purpose for its refusal to
deal."); supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
285 See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (finding a
newspaper publisher violates Section Two by refusing to accept advertisements from
advertisers who also advertise on competing radio stations).
286 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
2 87 The defendant controlled three of the four ski locations served by the joint lift ticket.
See id. at 587-88.
2 88 If the plaintiff had accepted the reduced percentage of profits, why should this
constitute concerted action for Section One purposes, even though defendant had done nothing
differently between the two scenarios? There is no logical reason why the latter scenario is




refusal to deal.289 A tying arrangement announced by a single seller is no
different in terms of the defendant's conduct than the unilateral refusal to deal in
Aspen Skiing-. in both cases, a business announces the terms upon which it will
deal and those terms are considered onerous by the other party to the negotiation.
In tying, a seller imposes an onerous term, namely, "If you want X, you must
also buy Y." If the buyer declines to accept the onerous term, she could allege a
unilateral refusal to deal, subject to Section Two scrutiny. If the buyer accepts the
tie-in, under current law, this transaction becomes concerted action subject to
Section One scrutiny.
Allowing consumers to convert contract terms into causes of action at their
option creates both perverse incentives and inconsistencies across antitrust law.
If current tying law were applied to Section Two unilateral refusals to deal,
Section One could swallow a good deal of Section Two in this area because
plaintiffs have every incentive to accept a defendant's onerous terms.2 90 After
all, if the plaintiff declines the defendant's terms, she would have to show that
the defendant's conduct maintained or threatened an actual monopoly under
Section Two. In contrast, under the logic of unilateral tying arrangement cases,
the plaintiff could simply acquiesce to any unreasonable conditions--thereby
28 9 Professor Patterson explains that tie-ins can be characterized as unilateral refusals to
deal because:
[l]f it were alleged that a seller required the purchase of tied product B before it would
allow the purchase of tying product A, one could interpret the arrangement as one in
which the seller would sell A only to owners of B. However, if the buyer agreed to
purchase B in order to obtain A, the arrangement would be a tie.
Mark R. Patterson, Product Definition, Product Information, and Market Power: Kodak in
Perspective, 73 N.C. L. REv. 185, 191 n.29 (1994). In short, a tying arrangement is essentially
a business announcing the terms upon which it will deal and unilaterally refusing to do
business with anyone who declines to accept these terms. See also HOVENKAMP, supra note
34, at 200 ("Tying arrangements... can also be characterized as vertical agreements not to
deal.").
The essential facilities doctrine represents a specific type of unilateral refusal to deal. For
example, physicians who claim that a hospital has excluded them by means of a tying
arrangement are basically being denied access to an essential facility, namely hospital
privileges. See generally Scott D. Makar, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and the Health
Care Industry, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 913 (1994); Sylvia H. Walbolt, et al., Problems of
Access to Health Facilities and Equipment-New Competition for Limited Resources, 55
ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (1986). The reason that plaintiffs forego such arguments is that it is easier
to prove a tying arrangement under Section One than to prove monopolistic conduct under
Section Two.
290 Not all of Section Two would be swallowed because a flat out refusal to deal, without
any offer of onerous terms, would not be subject to plaintiff circumvention because plaintiffs
would have no opportunity to accept anticompetitive terms in order to create concerted action.
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forming a contract-and then turn around and sue under Section One's
significantly lower standard of liability.29 1 The plaintiff would not have to show
any tendency toward monopoly, but would merely have to show that the de facto
refusal to deal on "fair terms" was unreasonable.292 Thus, treating unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements under Section One creates a theoretical fissure in
the body of law on unilateral refusals to deal.2 93
2. Leveraging
Leveraging, also called monopoly leveraging, represents another example of
anticompetitive unilateral conduct. It is well established that a monopolist cannot
use its monopoly power in one market "to beget monopoly" in another
market.294 Courts agree that leveraging violates Section Two of the Sherman Act
when it creates or threatens a monopoly in a second market. 295 However, the
Second Circuit in Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak296 took leveraging one step
further and held that leveraging violates Section Two if a monopolist uses her
monopoly power in one market to gain competitive advantage in another market,
even if the leveraging does not threaten monopolization of the second market.297
291 It is not far-fetched to fear that consumers may accept a tie-in and then turn around
and sue. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,495 (1969).
Furthermore, because it is more difficult for a plaintiff to prevail under a Section Two
unilateral refusal to deal theory, defendants often claim that their concerted action is, in fact, a
unilateral refusal to deal. For example, in Kodak, Kodak tried to dress its concerted action with
parts suppliers in the clothes of a unilateral refusal to deal.
2 92 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
293 Some commentators have woried that by bringing consistency into this area of
antitrust law, "many ties would be removed from antitrust scrutiny, because they could be
redefined as sellers' unilateral refusals to deal with particular buyers." Patterson, supra note
289, at 191 n.29. While the conduct would be characterized as a unilateral refusal to deal, that
does not remove it from antitrust scrutiny, but merely from Section One scrutiny. Rather, the
conduct would be evaluated under Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the
Clayton Act. See infra Parts V.B & V.C.
294 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948). Monopoly leveraging includes a
broad category of conduct, including tying anangements and price squeezes.
295 See id; see generally Great W. Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 63 F.3d
1378 (5th Cir. 1995), amended by, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,281 (5th Cir. 1996);
Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publications, Inc.,
63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1995); Key Enter. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th
Cir. 1990).
296 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
297 See id. at 275.
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While most circuits have declined to enter the fray,298 others have explicitly
rejected Berkey.299 In rejecting leveraging as an independent Section Two
violation, the Ninth Circuit in Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines,300 held that
leveraging is not illegal unless it creates the risk of monopolization in the
downstream market. The court explained:
The anticompetitive dangers that implicate the Sherman Act are not present
when a monopolist has a lawful monopoly in one market and uses its power to
gain a competitive advantage in the second market By definition, the
monopolist has failed to gain, or attempt to gain, a monopoly in the second
market Thus, such activity fails to meet the second element necessary to
establish a violation of Section 2. Unless the monopolist uses its power in the
first market to acquire and maintain a monopoly in the second market, or to
attempt to do so, there is no Section 2 violation.30 1
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning is sound and has been implicitly endorsed by
the Supreme Court in Kodak.302 Section Two only proscribes actual and
2 98 See Multistate Legal Studies, 63 F.3d at 1551 n.8; Willman v. Heartland Hosp. E., 34
F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir. 1994); M&M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp.,
981 F.2d 160, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1992).
2 99 See Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1991);
see also Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171,206 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding
that "in order to prevail upon a theory of monopoly leveraging, a plaintiff must prove
threatened or actual monopoly in the leveraged market').
300 948 F.2d at 548-49.
301 Id. at 548.
302 504 U.S. 451,482-83 (1993). The Third Circuit followed Alaska Airlines in Fineman
v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 206 (3d Cir. 1992). Recently, several district courts
entering the fray have adopted and propounded the reasoning of the Ninth and Third Circuits.
For example, the district court inAdcom, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 812 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. La. 1993),
foundthat:
[T]he reasoning in Fineman and Alaska Airlines is unimpeachable. First, and most
importantly, the court believes, as did the Third Circuit, that Berkey Photo's leveraging
theory "does violence to the text of the Sherman Act and decimates" Congress'
purposeful distinction between concerted conduct that "restrains trade" in Sherman § I
and unilateral conduct that "monopolizes or attempts to monopolize" in Sherman § 2.
Id. at 84 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Advanced Health Care Servs. v. Giles
Mem'l Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488, 497 (W.Va. 1994) (criticizing Berkey as destroying the
Sherman Act's distinction between unilateral and concerted action by reasoning "when a
monopolist has a lawful monopoly in one market and uses its power to gain a competitive
advantage in a second market, the anticompetitive dangers that implicate the Sherman Act are
not present.") (citations omitted).
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attempted monopolization, not any use of monopoly power that may be deemed
anticompetitive. The entire structure of the Sherman Act is based on the fact that
a single firm can engage in anticompetitive conduct-conduct in which two
firms acting together could not engage--so long as it does not create, maintain,
or threaten monopolization. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan, "[Section Two] makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful
only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so." 303
This same rationale applies equally to unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements. After all, tying arrangements are just a form of leveraging market
power from one market to another.304 The Ninth Circuit's reasoning and result
illustrate the inconsistency in precluding leveraging as an independent theory of
recovery under Section Two while condemning unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements under Section One. Just as leveraging to gain competitive
advantage is not illegal unless it threatens monopoly, unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements should not be illegal under the Sherman Act unless they create a
dangerous probability of monopolization of the tied product.305 Unless claims
against unilateral tying arrangements are limited to Section Two analysis, there is
no principled reason why Section Two leveraging cases should not be considered
under Section One whenever any buyer submits to the leverage. In short, treating
one form of monopoly leveraging as a Section One violation, while evaluating
all other forms of monopoly leveraging-even those that involve contracts-
under Section Two creates a significant inconsistency in antitrust law. Pleading a
unilateral tying arrangement under Section One is basically an effective
mechanism to circumvent the law of monopoly leveraging under Section Two.
3. Price Squeezes
Another type of classic unilateral anticompetitive conduct is a price squeeze.
When a monopolist controls the market for an input and also competes in the
market for the finished product in a downstream market, a price squeeze exists if
the monopolist charges a high price for the input and a low price for the final
product, such that the business buying the input cannot compete in the
303 506 U.S. 447,459 (1993).
304 See infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
305 Unilaterally imposed tying arrangements may still be condemned under Section Three
of the Clayton Act under a lower threshold of liability, namely whether the tying arrangement
substantially lessens competition. See infra Part V.C. Because Section Three provides a
freestanding standard for liability, it can be employed without injury to the Sherman Act's
internally consistent delicate balance between unilateral and concerted action. See supra notes
2-20 and accompanying text.
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downstream market and earn a living profit.306 The price squeeze is perfected
when a consumer pays the monopolist's price for the finished good (and
necessarily declines to purchase the good from the monopolist's competitor).
There are at least two contracts involved in any price squeeze: (1) the
monopolist contracts to supply the input to the downstream competitor at an
impermissibly high price; (2) the monopolist contracts with the consumer to
supply the finished product at an impermissibly low price. But neither of these
contracts converts a price squeeze into Section One conduct.307
A price squeeze is clearly unilateral conduct to be evaluated under Section
Two.30 8 However, if the current reasoning on unilateral tying arrangements were
applied to other unilateral restraints, a price squeeze would fall under Section
One after the downstream competitor or consumer agreed to pay the requested
price because there are contracts that constitute concerted action and have the
(unilateral) intent and effect of diminishing competition. No one argues that price
squeezes should be analyzed under Section One, yet such conduct represents the
same type of leveraging involved in unilaterally imposed tying arrangements.
4. Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing is also classic Section Two conduct. Predatory pricing
exists when a business prices its products "below an appropriate measure of cost
for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing
competition in the long run." 309 Successful predatory pricing requires consumers
306 See Bonjomo v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 809 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,437-
38 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Alcoa").
307 There are many cogent explanations, despite the inherent existence of contracts in any
successful price squeeze, for why a price squeeze is analyzed under Section Two, and not
Section One. For example, if there is only one wrongdoer, the monopolist, there could only be
one defendant because the monopolist's competitor in the downstream market could not sue
the consumer who ultimately purchases the product from the monopolist. Similarly, the
consumer cannot sue the competitor for buying the input at an inflated price from the
monopolist. (Arguably, the consumer is a victim because the monopolist's competitor could be
able to sell the finished good at a lower market price if the monopolist would sell the input at a
"fair price.') While this may appear to be a reasonable justification for analyzing price
squeezes as unilateral conduct despite the presence of contracts, this precise anomaly is present
when courts analyze unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section One of the
Sherman Act. See supra notes 192-202 and accompanying text.
308 SeeAlcoa, 148 F.2d at 437-38; see also City of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915
F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1990).
309 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986). There is currently no
consensus among the circuits as to what constitutes the "appropriate measure of cost." See
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to purchase products from the defendant (because she has priced them below
cost) and forego purchases from the defendant's competitors, thereby driving
them out of business.
Predatory pricing depends on contracts for success. After all, only when a
consumer contracts to pay the predatorily low price does a defendant's
competitor suffer antitrust injury from the defendant's conduct.
Applying the current thinking on unilaterally imposed tying arrangements to
predatory pricing would remove the protection of Section Two's heightened
standards for pricing decisions. Whenever a consumer pays a predatorily low
price, there is a contract; but this does not convert predatory pricing into a
Section One violation as it would under the doctrine applied to unilateral tying
arrangements.3 10 Instead, predatory pricing properly remains a Section Two
claim.
5. Other Section Two Conduct
In addition to these specific examples of Section Two conduct, there are
several other contract-based Section Two violations that are not as easily labeled
and categorized. For example, one of the keystone cases in Section Two
jurisprudence involved the nature of the defendant's contractual relations. In
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States [United Shoe D71],311 the Supreme
Court held that the defendant's use of long-term leases of its machinery, as part
of an overall anticompetitive plan of operation, constituted a Section Two
violation because the long-term leases foreclosed competition.3 12 Although this
case was treated as unilateral conduct under Section Two, the leases involved in
the case were contracts and it is difficult to justify why the contract in a tying
case establishes Section One conduct while the contracts in United Shoe II7 did
not. In short, if the theory behind current tying law were applied across the
antitrust landscape, any Section Two violation that involves a monopolist
unilaterally imposing an onerous term into a contract could-properly pled and
presented-be converted into a Section One violation.
In sum, America's antitrust regime establishes a wall between unilateral and
concerted action, which provides greater latitude for unilateral conduct. Under
the school of thought holding that unilaterally imposed tying arrangements are
concerted action, every unilaterally imposed trade restraint that is memorialized
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,341 n.10 (1990).
310 Cf 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 12 ("[Tithe purchase of the second [tied] product is
inherently an agreement[.]").
311 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
3 12 See generally Michael Waldman, Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An
Alternative Explanationfor Leasing, 40 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1997).
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in a contract is potentially subject to Section One liability. The ultimate result of
such thinking would be a deterioration of the umbrella of protection provided to
businesses acting unilaterally.
D. Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
In addition to potential Section Two mischaracterizations, plaintiffs may also
label exclusive dealing contracts as tying arrangements in order to take
advantage of the lower burdens of proof applied to tie-ins. Section Three of the
Clayton Act proscribes both tying arrangements and exclusive dealing
arrangements. In order for exclusive dealing arrangements to be condemned, a
significant percentage of the market must be foreclosed.313 For example, several
courts have held that in order for an exclusive dealing arrangement to be
condemned a plaintiff must prove that at least 10% of the market has been
foreclosed.314 In contrast, a tying arrangement can be condemned without
showing that any given market share in the tied product market has been
foreclosed.315 Thus, if an exclusive dealing arrangement could be characterized
as a tie-in, it could be condemned if less than 1% of the market were foreclosed,
as long as a not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce were affected.3 16 As a
result, it is significantly easier to condemn a tying arrangement than an exclusive
dealing arrangement.317
What better way to avoid the relatively more difficult test applied to
exclusive dealing arrangements than to characterize exclusive dealing
arrangements as tying arrangements? The plaintiff has some latitude in
characterizing the restraint at issue because "the distinction between a tying
arrangement and an exclusive dealing arrangement may be difficult to draw." 318
313 Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence in Jefferson Parish that "[e]xclusive
dealing is an unreasonable restraint on trade only when a significant fraction of buyers or
sellers are frozen out of a market by the exclusive deal." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see generally Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
3 14 See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
3 15 See supra notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
3 1 6 See id.
3 17 See 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 17 ("Tie-ins are treated more harshly even though
the primary statute addressing them does not distinguish between tying and exclusive
dealing[.]"); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 261, at 147. It is also more difficult for plaintiffs
to prevail under an exclusive-dealing theory because courts are generally more rigorous in
defining markets in exclusive dealing cases. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320 (1961).
318 KAYSEN&TURNER, supra note 261, at 153.
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According to Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish, this is
precisely what happened when an exclusive contract between a hospital and an
anesthesiology firm was analyzed as a tying arrangement.319 By treating tying
and exclusive dealing under wildly different standards, despite the fact that both
are condemned by the same standard in Section Three of the Clayton Act,
plaintiffs have a powerful incentive to circumvent the higher standard applied to
exclusive dealing arrangements by characterizing conduct as a tie-in.320
Deciding which outcome-determinative test to apply based on such
characterizations undermines both the consistency and legitimacy of antitrust
law.
E. Conceptually, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements Resemble
Section Two Unilateral Conduct
Conceptually, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements look more like
Section Two unilateral conduct than Section One concerted action.321 The
current test for tying under Section One shares the same construction as Section
Two tests and includes many elements that reflect Section Two concerns. Taking
a step back and looking at unilaterally imposed tying arrangements with fresh
eyes, tying (and the legal test for tying) looks more like Section Two conduct
than Section One conduct.
1. Tying Violations Are Element-Driven
In order to violate Section One of the Sherman Act, a tying arrangement
319 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 1, 1 n.2 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); see also Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing After Jefferson Parish, 54
ANTrrRUSTL.J. 1229, 1230-31 (1986).
320 Cf 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 14 (showing how "the lure of easy victory under
tying doctrines stimulated government and private plaintiffs to view an integrated firm's
product as a tie of its components or inputs").
321 Anecdotal support for the conceptual argument is found in the fact that many antitrust
treatises treat tying arrangements as unilateral conduct. See, e.g., MILTON HANDLER Er AL.,
CASES AND MATERIAL ON TRADE REGULATION (4th ed. 1997) (discussing tying arrangements
in the chapter entitled Additional Limitations on a Single Firm Exercising Market Power-a
chapter that includes predatory pricing, essential facilities, and other Section Two conduct).
Similarly, it is worth noting that the European Union treats tying arrangements as
unilateral conduct under its competition law. Although "surprisingly few" tying cases are
brought under Article 85, the European analog to Section One, see Veltrop, supra note 229, at
557, tying arrangements are explicitly proscribed as an abusive practice under Article 86, the
European equivalent of Section Two. lIL at 568 (citing Article 86(d)); see also Andersen, supra
note 65, at 291-95 (discussing application of Article 86 in tying context).
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must satisfy several independent elements.322 If any of these elements are not
present, the defendant's tie-in does not violate Section One. These elements are
unique to tying arrangements; no other Section One violation shares any of these
elements.
Indeed, no other Section One violation has its own set of elements. 323 For
example, price-fixing-whether horizontal or vertical-does not have its own list
of elements; courts simply ask whether prices were fixed. In short, the analysis of
Section One restraints is not element-driven.
In contrast, many Section Two violations are element-driven, with
commonly asserted Section Two claims having their own individual elements
that must be satisfied.324 Similarly, anticompetitive conduct with respect to
attempted monopolization often has its own specific elements. 325 By having its
own set of elements, tying looks more like a Section Two violation than a
Section One violation.
2. Elements of Tying Claims Reflect Section Two Concepts
Not only does the current tying cause of action resemble a Section Two
violation because it is element-driven, most of the individual elements of a
unilaterally imposed tying arrangement, especially those that are foreign to
Section One case law, make more sense in the context of Section Two.
a. Requiring Two Products
Current tying law requires that the seller tie two separate products together.
The requirement makes sense because the core issue is leveraging market power
from one market into another separate market. However, leveraging is an
inherently Section Two concept.326 While no other Section One violation is
based on unilateral leveraging across markets, many Section Two violations
are.
327
322 See supra note 85.
323 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
324 See, e.g., City of Anaheim v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1377-79 (9th
Cir. 1992) (discussing the elements of a Section Two price squeeze); MCI Communications
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891
(1983) (listing elements for Section Two denial of access to essential facilities).
325 See, e.g., Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
223-26 (1993) (discussing predatory pricing elements).
326 See supra notes 294-305 and accompanying text.




Section One tying law requires that the seller condition her sale of one
product on the buyer purchasing another product. The condition is set
unilaterally. The conduct of only one party to the agreement is subject to
liability. This is common in most Section Two litigation but is anathema to
Section One jurisprudence.328
c. Requiring Sufficient Economic Power
Section One tying law requires that the seller have sufficient economic
power to coerce a tie-in. But as argued above, this power to force a tie-in is, in
fact, monopoly power, which is a fundamental Section Two construct 329 Even
when courts examine market power in a Section One Rule of Reason analysis, no
other Section One violation involves or requires de facto monopoly power.
d. Requiring Coercion/Forcing
Related to the economic power requirement is the coercion requirement; 330
current tying law under Section One requires coercion. While the coercion
requirement is anomalous under Section One,331 it is consistent with Section
Two jurisprudence. Economic coercion is a common Section Two concept.332
Finally, the remaining aspects of tying law that create anomalies under
Section One are completely congruent with Section Two jurisprudence. For
example, the major anomaly of current tying law-that there is only one
defendant-is perfectly consistent with Section Two violations, most of which
have but one corporate defendant. The remaining anomaly that the victim must
participate in order to have a cause of action for Section One tying does not
apply to Section Two jurisprudence because Section Two does not require any
contract or agreement; thus, the anticompetitive conditioning alone can form the
basis of Section Two liability.
328 See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
330 This is similar to the conditioning element, but they each highlight separate, albeit
related, concerns. The conditioning element shows that only one decisionmaker is imposing the
restraint and therefore only one defendant is on the line. The coercion element takes this one
step further and notes that not only is the restraint unilaterally imposed, but it represents the
type of conduct that traditionally belongs in Section Two.
331 See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
332 See, e.g., In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 930 (9th Cir. 1991); Portland
Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641,648 (9th Cir. 1981).
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F. Treating Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements as Unilateral
Conduct Provides a Reasonable Middle Groundfor Competing
Economic Theories
Analyzing unilaterally imposed tying arrangements as unilateral conduct is
more consistent with economic and leverage theory. Tying arrangements
represent a form of leveraging.333 Tying arrangements were originally
condemned because a monopolist is prohibited from using her monopoly power
over one product to achieve or secure a monopoly over another product. The
current test for evaluating unilateral tying arrangements under Section One is still
based on the notion that a seller with sufficient market power in the tying product
can leverage that power to decrease competition in the tied product market.334
Early doctrine asserted that there were no countervailing justifications for tie-ins
because courts assumed that tying existed solely to leverage market power. For
example, early Supreme Court case law was based on the premise that "[t]ying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition." 335
However, the Chicago School has challenged this line of thinking, arguing
that leveraging is impossible or irrelevant because a monopolist possesses a
finite amount of monopoly power. Chicagoans argue that leveraging only
redistributes the monopoly profits possible in one market across two markets.
For example, Robert Bork asserts that "there is no viable theory of a means by
which tying arrangements injure competition[." 336 A unilaterally imposed tying
arrangement cannot, under this view, decrease consumer welfare any more than
simply charging the monopoly price for the tying product. 337 This is so because
the seller must decrease the price charged for the tying product in order to induce
consumers to accept the tie-in. In other words, in a world of one product,
monopolists exercise their market power by raising the price; in a world of
333 See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614-15 (1953);
Kaplow, supra note 248, at 515 (stating that a tying arrangements represents the "most
common application of the leverage hypothesis"). It is instructive to think of tying
arrangements as leveraging because leveraging is a Section Two concept. This discussion
applies only to unilaterally imposed tying arrangements because concerted tying arrangements
are not merely a form of leveraging, but of collusion.
334 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
335 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,305-06 (1949).
336 BORIC, supra note 28, at 372.
337 See Meese, supra note 262, at 137-38 ("It is axiomatic that firms cannot exercise
market power twice. A firm that possesses market power over the tying product cannot both
charge a monopoly price for the product and use its power to 'force' a customer to take the tied
product as well.") (emphasis in original).
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multiple markets, the seller may forego some monopoly profits and impose a tie-
in. In theory, both schemes decrease consumer welfare by the same amount.
After reigning as the dominant theory in the 1980s, the Chicago School view
of tying arrangements has subsequently been attacked by theorists who have
presented scenarios where tying arrangements can be used by a monopolist to
secure additional monopolies at the expense of consumer welfare.338 For
example, leveraging from a traditional market to a market for a standardized
product can increase a business's profits by securing a monopoly position in the
standardized market that has relatively high barriers to entry.339 Similarly, a
monopolist can extract greater consumer surplus by employing a tying
arrangement as a mechanism to obscure true prices and trick the consumer into
paying more than he would pay in a truly competitive market with accurate
information. By obscuring the actual price, the tie-in both creates and exploits a
market failure.340
Both schools of thought have merit. Traditionalists explain how tying
arrangements can be used to leverage market power across markets. The Chicago
School stresses the general benignity of tying arrangements and argues that the
seller cannot increase her net gains through tying. In response to the Chicago
School, scholars have posited situations in which tying arrangements can expand
a seller's market power and, consequently, decrease consumer welfare.
Evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section Two
harnesses the wisdom of both schools. The Chicago School informs us that tying
arrangements are not menacing in general because the market acts as a check.
Thus, in the absence of certain market failures, a tying arrangement does not
present a dangerous probability of monopolizing the market for the tied product.
However, when market failures (whether or not created by the seller) make tying
a viable mechanism to expand monopoly power and reduce consumer welfare,
antitrust law should provide a check on the monopolist's conduct. Analyzing
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section Two of the Sherman Act
or Section Three of the Clayton Act strikes the proper balance because tying
arrangements are not proscribed unless they actually threaten monopoly (under
Section Two) or substantially lessen competition (under Section Three) in a
second market. This allows business room to maneuver but not to monopolize or
338 See Kaplow, supra note 248, at 525-26 (arguing that leveraging can decrease
consumer welfare, due to market failures); see generally Roger D. Blair & Amanda K.
Esquibel, Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging, 40 ANTrRusT BuLL. 371 (1995)
(leveraging can impose consumer loss, even if monopoly not achieved).
339 See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust qnd the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 1041, 1077 (1996).





V. MAKING TYING LAW DOCTRINALLY CONSISTENT WITH ANTITRUST
LAW OVERALL
Although some of the preceding argument invoked legislative history and
economic theory, it is primarily a doctrinal argument. Evaluating unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements under Section One of the Sherman Act creates
significant inconsistencies across antitrust caselaw. These doctrinal
inconsistencies would be eliminated if unilaterally imposed tying arrangements
were treated as unilateral conduct and evaluated under Section Two of the
Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act. This Part briefly notes the
importance of doctrinal consistency in antitrust law. It then explains why from a
practical standpoint it is appropriate to refuse to treat unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements as concerted action. After discussing the legitimacy of protecting
certain tie-ins by nonmonopolists, this Part argues that doctrinal consistency can
be efficiently achieved by analyzing unilateral tying arrangements under Section
Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act. In short,
evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under the higher standards of
Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act will lead to
more appropriate outcomes, proscribing only those tie-ins that threaten
competition, while still preserving doctrinal consistency.
A. The Value ofDoctrinal Consistency and Correct Doctrine
Making antitrust doctrine consistent by evaluating unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements as unilateral conduct is important for several reasons. First
doctrinal consistency is necessary in business law. Antitrust law defines some of
the basic rules for business conduct. The goal of antitrust law is not to regulate
the marketplace so much as to define the outer boundaries of legal competition.
These boundaries need to be clearly defined so that business may compete
vigorously, as antitrust law intends, without fear of liability.341 Otherwise, the
risk of antitrust liability could chill zealous competition. 342
Second, as a matter of economic theory and practice, unilateral business
behavior should not be subject to antitrust penalties unless it threatens
monopolization; yet current tying law proscribes unilateral tying arrangements
that are either benign or beneficial to competition. In an effort to encourage
vigorous competition, antitrust courts have consistently defined these boundaries
341 See 10 AREEDA T AL., supra note 194, at 284-85.
342 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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to include a safe harbor for most unilateral conduct by a nonmonopolist.343 Thus,
only those forms of unilateral conduct that threaten actual monopolization violate
antitrust laws.344 Defining the safe harbor in this manner insures that
nonmonopolists can engage in aggressive unilateral conduct-even if it is
considered anticompetitive-without worrying about the risk of antitrust
liability.345 This maximizes zealous competition, which the 1890 Congress and
over a century of federal court decisions have reasoned will produce the greatest
number of goods at the lowest prices.
Many unilateral tying arrangements are simply part of the rough and tumble
of the competitive marketplace 346-and that market acts as a control. Thus,
while businesses are free to increase price from a legal or regulatory standpoint,
the existence of other competing businesses prevents any one seller from
charging supra-competitive prices. Only when the market check mechanism
breaks down-such as when there is collusion between competitors or when one
business illegally obtains a monopoly--does antitrust law step in to constrain
business decisionmaking. Although one articulated purpose of antitrust law is to
maintain lower prices for consumers, barring unusual circumstances, antitrust
law protects the right of a business to unilaterally raise prices. Antitrust does not
regulate price directly because it is founded on the philosophy that a free market
can best determine the optimal price. The same market principles that regulate
price fluctuations should prevent abuse of tying arrangements.
To the extent that a tying arrangement is simply a package of goods offered
for sale, the best way to insure that the packages offered to consumers are those
that they most prefer is to rely on the market mechanism. This can be seen on
several levels. First, the market mechanism can better distinguish between
anticompetitive and beneficial tie-ins. Some unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements benefit consumers. For example, consumers often desire
promotional tie-ins that offer an attractive bundle of products at a good price.347
34 3 See supra note 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Colgate Doctrine).
344 Seesupra note 20 and accompanying text.
34 5 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260,266 (1986) (stating that even where the
effect is the same as concerted action, there is no Section One antitrust liability unless there is
concerted action).
346 The American economy and psyche are founded on the principle of free markets.
Overregulation of tying arrangements is at odds with America's laissez-faire philosophy. As a
society, we eschew price controls, despite the fact that this means that business is free to
increase, as well as decrease, prices at will. Of course, there are exceptions in extreme
situations such as wartime price controls and prohibitions on price gouging in emergencies.
347 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 518 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting). In Fortner I, it was the consumer who demanded the tie-in. See BORK,
supra note 28, at 369; see also Blair & Finci, supra note 277, at 561-62.
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Tying arrangements--including those that affect a not insubstantial amount of
commerce in the tied product-can sometimes facilitate better packages for
consumers. 34 8
More importantly, from an antitrust perspective, tying arrangements often
facilitate competition and indeed are a form of competition. As Justice White
explained in his Fortnerldissent:
34 8 For example, many consumers know the frustration of buying a product that requires
batteries only to discover that "batteries are not included." A large segment of consumers
would prefer that batteries be included in such products. This would represent a situation in
which the products are not merely shrink wrapped, but the tied product is included in the box
of the tying product. Some consumers may not even realize that they are buying the tied
product, although many will be happy that they did.
In response to consumer frustration, some manufacturers now include batteries in their
products. So long as the price of the tying product includes some of the cost of the tied product
(in this case, the battery), then some federal courts would hold that there is in fact a tying
arrangement between the tying product and the battery. See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1548 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1044 (1996) ("Where the price of a bundled product reflects any
of the cost of the tied product, customers are purchasing the tied product, even if it is touted as
being free."); see also 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 217-19. Conversely, if the manufacturer
gives away batteries without recovering its costs, it can be accused of engaging in predatory
pricing. See supra note 309-10 and accompanying text (discussing predatory pricing).
Despite the attractiveness of including batteries in certain products, batteries constitute a
separate product. Separateness of tying purposes is a function of consumer demand. If
consumers have independent demand for the two products, then they constitute two separate
products for tying purposes. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19
(1984). Consumers currently have separate demand for batteries; there is a thriving multi-
million dollar market for batteries. The fact that batteries are necessary to run the product does
not mean that batteries are not a separate product. Cf Jerrold Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 365
U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam). So long as the manufacturer of the tying product has "market
power" in the specific product-be it a hand-held game, a tape player, a pager-being sold,
then the inclusion of batteries could constitute an illegal tying arrangement so long as a not
insubstantial dollar volume of batteries is affected. This is true even if many targeted
consumers find the package to be an attractive one. This is precisely the type of package that a
free market should provide and upon which antitrust law should not intrude
Although this footnote is not intended to be a comprehensive exegesis on battery tie-ins, it
is worth noting that one reason why including batteries may not present a tying problem is
because some courts require that the defendant have an economic interest in the tied product.
See, e.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 104 (4th Cir. 1987). This may
provide a defense for those manufacturers that do not have an economic interest in batteries.
However, some manufacturers may receive a marginal profit from the batteries, satisfying this
requirement. Furthermore, some manufacturers of consumer goods do in fact manufacture
batteries, as well as the products in which they are used. For example, Kodak manufactures
batteries (and is not a stranger to antitrust problems in general or tying in particular).
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Where the seller exercises no market power in the tying item but buyers prefer
the tie-in because the seller offers the tying product on favorable terms-where
the price is unusually low or where the seller gives the product away conditioned
on buying other merchandise--the seller in effect is merely competing in the
tied product market.34 9
Indeed, some tying arrangements may introduce competition into a tied product
market that would otherwise be monopolized. Thus, Professor Areeda concluded
that "many actual ties-especially when tie-ins are broadly defined--can reflect
pro-competitive price competition without any prospect of real detriments." 350
Current tying law ignores the role of the market as a control mechanism and
assumes that consumers never desire tie-ins but rather are "forced" or
"coerced" to buy the tied product against their will.351 However, despite the
language of coercion in tying cases, absent extreme circumstances, consumers
are rarely truly "forced" to purchase a tied product.352 Consumers buying a
tying product are not forced suddenly to purchase the tied product without any
inquiry into its costs or merits.3 53 Rather, consumers examine the entire package
of the tied and tying product, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged.3 54 If a
34 9 Fortnerl, 394 U.S. at 518 (White, J., dissenting); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 323 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that requirements contracts
may very well be devices for waging, rather than suppressing, competition).
350 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 183; see also id. at 28 ("[Mlost litigated arrangements
that could be described as ties are either neutral in their competitive implications or even pro-
competitive[.]").
351 Cf Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 313-14 (1949).
352 True forcing could only exist if the consumer were also forced to take the tying
product. This could mean duress (as applied in contract law) or a tying product with a relatively
inelastic demand, such as insulin. If the only insulin seller in a geographic market tied insulin to
syringes, then diabetics would-given these facts-be forced to purchase syringes from that
supplier. But such an extreme case is rarely found among the hundreds of reported tying cases.
See e.g., Mark A. Hurwitz, Bundling Patented Drugs and Medical Services: An Antitrust
Analysis, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1188 (1991) (discussing the use of the schizophrenia drug
clozapine as a tying product).
353 Cf Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) ("By
conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the
abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates it
from the competitive stresses of the open market.").
354 See United States Steel Corp. v. Former Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 618 (1977);
Brinson, supra note 241, at 37 ("A buyer faced with a seller's tying arrangement will simply
weigh his desire for the tying product against the price of the tying and tied products."); Note,




tie-in is onerous, the consumer can forego the purchase; she can decline to
purchase the tying product at all or she can purchase it separately from another
supplier.355 Even if tying arrangements abound in certain markets, there can still
be competition among bundled packages.356
Not all tying arrangements are the result of coercion. 357 Current tying law
fails to recognize that tying arrangements are sometimes valued by consumers
and can be harmless to competition or actually promote it. This failure is
embodied in the judicial presumption that if a tying arrangement affects a high
number of buyers, then there is coercion.358 But this misses the point that
ubiquity is as much a signal of consumer demand as it is of seller coercion. 359
Whatever the buyer regards as burdens of the tie-in, whether low quality of the tied
good, inability to deal with preferred tied good sellers, or the risk inherent in being
restricted to a given purchase in advance, these burdens should be fully reflected in a
decrease in what the buyer will pay for the package.
Id.
355 The only reason that this would not be possible is if the supplier enjoyed a monopoly
over the tying product. See supra notes 235-80 and accompanying text. In such a situation,
antitrust law should forbid the tie-in if it substantially lessens competition in the market for the
tied product. See infra Part V.C.
356 See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38,40-41 (1962).
3 57 See Meese, supra note 249, at 99 ("Because ties can arise without any exercise of
market power, the mere presence of a tie, even when coupled with the existence of market
power, does not logically give rise to a presumption that forcing is present[.]").
35 8 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958) ("The very
existence of this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's
great power[.]"). Some courts are prone to assert that offering an attractive product or package
is evidence of coercion. Some unfortunate language in Fortner 11 invited courts to assume
market power from the mere existence of a tie-in by interpreting its prior decisions as
"focus[ing] attention on the question whether the seller has the power, within the market for
the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could
not be exacted in a completely competitive market." 429 U.S. at 620. To the extent that
subsequent courts have treated the tie-in itself as a "burdensome term," the existence of the tie-
in becomes proof of the seller's economic power to impose it. But the Fortner H court
explicitly rejected such a conflation except in "the absence of other explanations for the
willingness of buyers to purchase the package" of tying and tied products. Id at 618 n.10; cf
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 518 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("But I question that buyers' acceptance of the tie-in-the simple fact that there are
customers-will always suffice to prove market power in the tying product.").
359 See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1225 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) ("Obviously, if the question is whether there is a 'tie,' proof that
large numbers of buyers accepted a burdensome or uneconomic 'tie' is not helpful. The 'proof
assumes the answer rather than proving it."); Veltrop, supra note 229, at 553. Veltrop states:
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Current law conflates a product's desirability with coercion. 360 This result is
inconsistent with the underlying theory of antitrust in that encouraging sellers to
offer product packages that sell well is the essence of competition. If a
nonmonopolist constructs a desirable package of bundled goods, then high sales
show that she has read the market correctly. High sales are as much evidence that
the market is working as they are that the market is broken.
Furthermore, this conflation of ubiquity and coercion also distorts a
supplier's incentives to respond to perceived consumer demand.361 After all, if
offering an attractive bundle of products that consumers decide to purchase
constitutes coercion, then sellers have decreased incentives to compete by
offering attractive packages and subjecting themselves to antitrust liability.362
Antitrust is not supposed to quell such forms of competition.363 Nowhere else in
[M]ost products purchased by consumers are divisible into several components, e.g. an
automobile usually comes with tyres, seats and a windscreen, and products are often
packaged together because of distribution efficiencies and consumer preferences. Where
package discounting occurs, moreover, it is difficult to determine whether a buyer has
been coerced or has simply struck an advantageous bargain.
Id.; see also Meese, supra note 249, at 67 ("[Tjhe presence of a tie is equally consistent
with the hypothesis that the agreement is purely voluntary contractual integration[.]").
360 For example, the Court in Loew's held that "the crucial economic power [to impose a
tie-in] may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers[.]" Loew's, 371 U.S.
at 45.
361 At first blush, it seems odd that a business (with some level of market power over
Product X) can market Product X with a campaign of "Buy one X, get another X free," but
cannot market Product X with a marketing strategy of "Buy one X, get one Y free." The
former scheme would not constitute a tying arrangement because there are not two separate
products. The latter marketing plan would constitute a tying arrangement because there are two
separate products, X and Y. See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Legal & Prof'l Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1546-48 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1044 (1996). This is so even if X and Y cost the same when sold separately or if most
consumers would never want more than one X but would like a Y to go with their X. In other
words, current tying law does not inquire into consumer utility or consumer demand beyond
merely defining whether two products are " separate" for antitrust purposes.
362 Cf Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977) (suggesting that there is no defense based on consumer
convenience).
363 See Maple Flooring Mfirs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563,583 (1925).
It was not the purpose or the intent of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law to inhibit the
intelligent conduct of business operations, nor do we conceive that its purpose was to
suppress such influences as might affect the operations of interstate commerce through the
application to them of the individual intelligence of those engaged in commerce,
enlightened by accurate information as to the essential elements of the economics of a
trade or business ....
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antitrust do we impose additional burdens on a nonmonopolist simply because
she sells a desirable product or package. If competition is not substantially
lessened, courts should not punish sellers for offering a popular bundle of goods.
As Justice Jackson observed in his dissent in Standard Oil, "[i]f the courts are to
apply the lash of the antitrust laws to the backs of businessmen to make them
compete, we cannot in fairness also apply the lash whenever they hit upon a
successful method of competing." 364
Many tying arrangements are desired by consumers, as suggested by the fact
that tying arrangements are common throughout the American economy.365
Most of these tying arrangements have no effect on competition. 366 For example,
a tying arrangement is imposed whenever a fast food restaurant offers a "meal
deal" where one food item is given free with purchase of a combination meal. 367
Strict enforcement of current tying law against all such tying arrangements that
are routine and affect a "not insubstantial" dollar volume of commerce would
prohibit such "meal deals". Writing in a non-tying context, Professor Elhauge
has observed, "unilateral exercises of modest market power (for example,
pricing by the comer convenience store) are so ubiquitous that subjecting them to
plenary antitrust scrutiny would impose excessive litigation costs and deter much
desirable conduct." 368 That tying law is not so enforced is of little solace;
business planning and marketing must have greater certainty than merely relying
on the kindness (or passivity or ignorance) of consumers and prosecutors.369
Id.; see also United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945)
("The Anti-Trust Laws were not enacted for the purpose of forcing every type of business
enterprise into a common mold[.]") (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I
(1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911)).
364 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 324 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
365 See 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 27 ("tie-ins are omnipresent when broadly
defined... [and] cannot all be condemned without disrupting ordinary and useful
arrangements that threaten no harm.'); see also Hamilton, supra note 241, at 609 (illustrating
that bundling is common between computer software and maintenance services); Meese, supra
note 249, at 1 (describing tying arrangements as "endemic in the modem economy").
366 See 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 104 ("[M]ost litigated tie-ins have involved a very
small foreclosure that.. lacked any potential to affect the structure or competitiveness of the
tied market[.]").
367 See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l
Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1044
(1996).
368 Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope ofAntitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 668, 735
n.314 (1991) (citing 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTrrRuST LAW 813, at 301,
833d, at 342 (1978)).
369 See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 623 (1953)
("Doubtless, long-tolerated trade arrangements acquire no vested immunity under the Sherman
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More to the point, the popularity of certain tie-ins illustrate that such bundling is
often-rightly or wrongly-valued by consumers. Thus, by inferring market
power from the mere existence of such a tie-in and then proscribing tie-ins that
affect a not insubstantial volume of commerce, current tying law outlaws
bundling that consumers desire. While admittedly it is difficult to distinguish
harmful tying arrangements from beneficial ones,370 that does not justify
imposing a .de facto presumption that all tying arrangements are harmful
products of coercion.
In sum, antitrust doctrine needs to be consistent, but it also needs to be
correct. The current law governing tying arrangements is based on the false
assumption that all tying arrangements are the result of coercion and,
consequently, should be proscribed. This thinking fails to acknowledge that
many tie-ins are desired by consumers and are beneficial to competition. The
result is that-because the legal test for condemning tying arrangements under
Section One is so low-beneficial or benign tie-ins are punished. This causes
long-term detriment to competition.
B. Achieving Doctrinal Consistency Through Section Two of the Sherman
Act
Treating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements as concerted action creates
significant doctrinal inconsistencies across antitrust law.371 One way of
eliminating these inconsistencies is by evaluating unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements under Section Two of the Sherman Act.372 Section Two is
intended and structured to regulate unilateral restraints. The anomalies created by
evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section One disappear
when Section Two is used in its stead.373
However, evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section
Act[.]").
370 See Meese, supra note 249, at 45.
371 See supra notes 189-210 and accompanying text.
372 See Posner, supra note 28, at 182.
[E]ven if there were no separate prohibition of tie-ins, the general prohibitions of
monopolistic behavior in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act would remain available to
deal with cases where a firm had imposed a tie-in with the purpose or likely effect of
monopolizing the market for the tied product
Id.; see also Homick, supra note 216, at 720 ("[E]xploit[ing] consumers in the market for the
tying product may be regulated adequately under Section Two of the Sherman Act.").
373 Seesupra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
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Two will necessarily alter the results of some tying cases.374 In contrast to
Section One's "not insubstantial" volume test, in order to violate Section Two, a
tying arrangement must create a dangerous probability of monopolization of the
tied product. The latter is clearly a more rigorous test. For example, while the
loss of a single sale of $100,000 in goods may satisfy Section One,375 such an
amount would probably not satisfy Section Two. In short, those currently
proscribed unilateral tying arrangements that affect a mere "not insubstantial"
dollar amount of commerce in the tied product but that do not threaten actual
monopolization of a tied product would not constitute an illegal tying
arrangement under Section Two. For this universe of cases, currently proscribed
tying arrangements will become permitted under Section Two. This is the cost of
consistency, of shoring up the safe harbor for unilateral .conduct by a
nonmonopolist.
This raises the question of whether changing the ultimate results of cases
involving unilateral tying arrangements is desirable.376 The altered outcome in
most cases is absolutely appropriate.377 Unilateral conduct that affects merely a
not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce should not invite antitrust liability,
let alone treble damages.378 The fundamental purpose of antitrust law is to
preserve competition. Trade restraints are prohibited because of their effect on
competition.379 Yet after Jefferson Parish, the so-called per se rule against tying
374 Before examining the potential for and desirability of different results of unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements, it bears noting that there should be little, if any, change in the
result of cases involving concerted tying arrangements, although the reasoning to arrive at that
result will resemble traditional Section One analysis.
375 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
376 Of course, how we phrase the question can drive the answer. Phrasing the question,
"Should businesses be able to impose tying arrangements so long as the tied product market is
not monopolized?" may invite the answer that the law should not allow such tying
arrangements. However, if we ask the question in terms of whether we want American
business to make independent business decisions-such as product packaging and marketing
decisions-free from government price controls, then the invited answer may change.
377 See supra notes 341-60 and accompanying text.
37 8 Independent but related to the argument that evaluating unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements under Section One undermines the intent of the Clayton Act, the not insubstantial
volume test is also inconsistent with Section Two of the Sherman Act. Whereas the Supreme
Court has held that unilateral conduct does not violate Section Two unless it creates an actual
monopoly or threatens to do so, prohibiting unilaterally imposed tying arrangements that
merely affect a not insubstantial volume of commerce makes the conduct of a single firm
unlawful without inquiry into whether it actually monopolizes a market or threatens to do so.
379 Not all courts invoke a requirement that the plaintiffprove an anticompetitive effect in
the tied product market. One explanation may be that such a requirement is only necessary
under Rule of Reason analysis. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d
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arrangements pennits inquiry into all aspects of the trade restraint except the
effect on competition, which is simply assumed as a matter of law.380 Evaluating
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section Two insures that there is
an actual effect on competition before the unilateral restraint is condemned under
the Sherman Act.38 1
However, if all unilaterally imposed tying arrangements were subject to only
Section Two liability, many anticompetitive tie-ins would escape liability.382
792, 799 (1st Cir. 1988); Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F2d 712, 721
(7th Cir. 1987); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1503 (1 1th Cir.
1985), cer. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986).
Similarly, some courts have held that when there is no competition in the sale of the tied
product, there is no illegal tying arrangement. See Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n,
680 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 837 (1982); Community Builders v.
City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that because state law already
precluded competition in the tied product market, tying agreement could have no effect on
competition); Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1974);
Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1022 (1974); Friedman v. Adams Russell Cable Seres., 624 F. Supp. 1195, 1196
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that tying is not unlawful when the defendant possesses lawful
monopolies in both the tying and tied product).
Most courts only require some competitive effect in the market for the tied product. See
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 815 n.11 (1st Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988); Hand v. Central Transp., Inc., 779 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d
1486, 1503, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986).
However, some courts have held that the plaintiff must prove "a substantial danger that
the tying seller will acquire market power in the tied product market.' Carl Sandburg Village
Condominium Ass'n v. First Condominium Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 210 (7th Cir. 1985); see
also Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1129 (1986); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfr. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 834 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Smith Mach. Co. v. Hester Corp., 1987-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 67,563, at 60,383-84. This would indicate that a tying arrangement is in fact quite
similar to attempted monopolization.
380 See Phillip Areeda, Rule ofReason-A Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTrIRUST L.J.
571,587 (1986) ("The only inquiry that the Jefferson Parish per se rule excludes is proof of the
fact or likelihood of adverse effects .... At the moment, adverse effects do not have to be
proved, but every other element has to be proved.").
381 Evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section Two comes closer
to preserving the Clayton Act's requirement that a tying arrangement substantially lessen
competition or tend toward monopoly in order to violate antitrust law. See supra notes 374-77
and accompanying text. Section Two is still necessary because Section Three cannot reach
certain tying arrangements, such as those involving services.
382 This risk is inherent in the Sherman Act's dichotomy between unilateral and
concerted action. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See also I SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAWV, ABA, ANTrrRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 301 (4th ed. 1997).
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While moving such tying arrangements from Section One to Section Two would
insure doctrinal consistency, the cost in terms of the practical effects in many
cases could be high. Because Section Two requires a dangerous risk of actual
monopolization, many anticompetitive tying arrangements would not be
condemned until after the defendant had done significant damage to the
competitive marketplace, perhaps driving many competitors permanently from
the market. Indeed, the Clayton Act reflects the congressional belief that tying
arrangements were particularly dangerous and, thus, should be singled out for
special treatment and not merely treated like other forms of unilateral restraint
under Section Two.3 83
In short, independent of the doctrinal arguments (which clearly support
evaluating unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section Two), the
liability threshold under Section One is arguably too low and the corresponding
threshold under Section Two is arguably too high. However, there is another
weapon against tying arrangements that, while maintaining doctrinal
consistency, provides an intermediate threshold for antitrust liability.
C. Restoring Doctrinal Consistency by Evaluating Unilaterally Imposed
Tying Arrangements Under Section Three of the Clayton Act
The best alternative to using Section Two of the Sherman Act to reach
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements is to employ the one federal law
specifically enacted to regulate tying arrangements: Section Three of the Clayton
Act. Such an approach has several advantages. First, using Section Three
preserves doctrinal consistency. Unlike Section One of the Sherman Act, Section
Three of the Clayton Act clearly reaches tying arrangements that are unilaterally
imposed by a single seller because the Clayton Act prohibits any one person
from making a sale on the condition that the purchaser accept a tie-in.3 84 This is
demonstrated by both the text of the statute and the legislative debates. Certainly
analyzing unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under the Clayton Act does
nothing to muddle the unilateral-concerted dichotomy of the Sherman Act. Thus,
One implication of the dangerous probability of success requirement is that it
prevents Section 2 from reaching unilateral conduct by a small finn that is unlikely to
achieve actual monopoly. If the objectionable conduct is unilateral, and thus beyond the
reach of Section 1, it may not be prohibited by the Sherman Act regardless of how
egregious it is.
Id
383 See Advance Bus. Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
384 See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
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unilateral tying arrangements can be proscribed under Section Three without
impairing antitrust doctrinal consistency or legislative intent.
Second, evaluating unilateral tying arrangements under Section Three
provides an appropriate middle ground between Section One's low threshold for
liability and Section Two's high threshold. Section One imposes too low a
threshold of liability for tying arrangements; unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements violate Section One even if they have no effect on the competitive
process, so long as a not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce in the tied
market is affected.385 This overreaching standard inflicts liability on beneficial
tie-ins that do not harm competition.386
Section Three imposes a higher (and more appropriate) threshold for liability
than Section One.387 Section Three proscribes only those tie-ins that
"substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. ' 388 The
Supreme Court has defined the phrase "substantially lessen competition"-as
used in Section Three of the Clayton Act-in adjudicating cases of exclusive
dealing arrangements (also called "requirements contracts"). In Tampa Electric
Co. V. Nashville Coal Co.,389 the Court held that Section Three's "substantially
lessen competition" standard is evaluated in the currency of market share, not
dollar volume:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the probable
effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into
account the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of
commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant
market area, and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption
of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein. It
follows that a mere showing that the contract itself involved a substantial
number of dollars is ordinarily of little consequence.390
Thus, in order to show that a requirements contract or exclusive dealing
385 See supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
386 See supra notes 347-50 and accompanying text.
387 Many courts and scholars argue that these standards are the same. See, e.g., Grappone,
Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the test
for tying is the same "regardless of whether a plaintiff charges a violation of Sherman Act
Section 1 or Clayton Act Section 3"); 9 AREEDA, supra note 30, at 257 n.23. This Part argues
that the standard articulated in the text of Section Three is more demanding than the common
law test applied by courts to Section One.
388 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
389 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
3 90 Id at 329 (emphasis added); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
322 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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arrangement "substantially lessen[ed] competition," a plaintiff must show that
market share was substantially affected.3 91 More recently, while discussing
exclusive dealing arrangements in Jefferson Parish, Justice O'Connor reiterated
that "[e]xclusive dealing is an unreasonable restraint on trade only when a
significant fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a market by the
exclusive deal."' 392 In general, if less than ten percent of the relevant market is
foreclosed, then competition has not been substantially lessened. 3 93
The phrase "substantially lessen competition" should mean the same thing
when applied to both tying arrangements and exclusive dealing arrangements
given the "normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. ' 394
Additionally, it is inconceivable that Congress, in enacting a section that
proscribes two trade restraints, intended the same three words (used but once in
the section) to mean "dollar value, not market share" when applied to one
restraint and "market share, not dollar volume" when applied to the other
391 This standard makes sound economic sense because market share, rather than dollar
volume, is the appropriate measurement for effect on competition. See supra notes 227-34 and
accompanying text.
392 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
393 See, e.g., Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1234 (8th Cir. 1987) (8% to
10% market foreclosure is insufficient); In re Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 184 (1982)
(7% to 8% market foreclsoure is insufficient); see also Department of Justice Vertical
Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 623-03, 6,268 n.24 (1985) (a safe harbor exists for 10% or
less).
394 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 230
(1993) (citations omitted); see also Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S.
427, 433 (1932) (there is a "natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of
the same act were intended to have the same meaning"). The argument is even stronger in this
instance given that the identical words--'substantially lessen competitin"-are not used in
different parts of the same act but are used only once. If the same phrase used twice must have
one meaning, then clearly a phrase used once should only have one meaning. Despite these
well-established rules of statutory constructions a half a century ago, the Court hinted at
justifying divergent interpretations for the same single clause when it suggested that:
[E]ven though the qualifying clause of § 3 is appended without distinction of terms
equally to the prohibition of tying clauses and of requirements contracts, pertinent
considerations support, certainly as a matter of economic reasoning, varying standards as
to each for the proof necessary to fulfill the conditions of that clause.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1949). At most, this should justify
the use of different evidence for each type of restraint, for example the length of term of




For a tying arrangement to violate Section Three, it must substantially lessen
competition by foreclosing a substantial share of the market.396 This is a higher
threshold than is currently used in Section One tying cases, which require only
that a not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce be affected. Even if
"substantial" and "not insubstantial" mean the same thing, Clayton Section
Three and Sherman Section One case law are dealing in different units of
currency. The Clayton Act measures injury to competition in market share; the
Sherman Act examines dollar figures.397 Utimately, the Section Three test for
tying liability is more stringent than the Section One test.398
395 There is certainly no evidence of a congressional intent for the phrase "substantially
lessen competition" to measure injury to competition in market share for excessive dealing
arrangements and in dollar volume for tying arrangements.
396 See Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 314 ("[T'he qualifying clause of§ 3 is satisfied by
proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce
affected[.]").
397 See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
398 Some commentators have argued that Section One and Section Three standards are
the same. For example, Professor Areeda argues that the "unreasonable" test of Section One
and the "substantial lessening of competition" test under Section Three should be considered
identical standards. See, eg., 2 AREEDA, supra note 181, at 7. But this downplays the actual
text and application of the Section One test, in which a plaintiff need only show that a not
insubstantial volume of the tied product be affected. While Section Three's substantial
lessening of competition standard is not objective, it certainly requires more than ten thousand
dollars in goods be affected or the loss of a single sale. Furthermore, the Section Three test
measures effect on competition, rather than the mere dollar amount. At most, Section Three has
simply been ignored and folded into Section One cases without discussion or justification. But
that does not mean the standards are identical.
Initially, Section One of the Sherman Act and Section Three of the Clayton Act employed
divergent standards, with Section Three being the easier test for plaintiffs to satisfy. This makes
sense in that "§ 3 of the Clayton Act was directed to prohibiting specific practices even though
not covered by the broad terms of the Sherman Act .... " Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 297 &
n.4 (stating that Congress proscribed tying arrangements under Section Three because the
Court had held them "not to be in violation of the Sherman Act"). An examination of early
Supreme Court cases shows that Section One originally imposed a higher threshold for liability
than Section Three. For example, in United Shoe 1, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), the court found a tie-
in illegal pursuant to Section Three of the Clayton Act, but not the Sherman Act. (The Court in
United Shoe II held that United Shoe I was not res judicata because United Shoe I was
governed by the Sherman Act, not by the Clayton Act, while United Shoe II was brought under
the Clayton Act. See id).
Thus, Congress originally intended Section One and Section Three to entail different
standards-Section Three being the lower threshold. Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 312.
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That Section One has evolved to a lower test for liability than Section Three
provides an independent argument for why unilateral tying arrangements should
not fall within Section One: current Section One tying case law renders Section
Three of the Clayton Act's tying provision superfluous. If unilaterally imposed
tying arrangements violate Section One (and its lower threshold for liability),
there is no need for Section Three.399 The Clayton Act is an amendment to the
Sherman Act, intended to shore up the inadequacies of the latter.400 As a general
rule, statutes should not be read to render amendments superfluous, in the same
way individual statutes are not to be read such that a word or clause is without
moment.401 Interpreting Section One to reach any unilaterally imposed tying
It seems hardly likely that, having with one hand set up an express prohibition against a
practice thought to be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, Congress meant, with the
other hand, to reestablish the necessity of meeting the same tests of detriment to the public
interest as that Act had been interpreted as requiring.
Id.; see also Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
Since then, there has been an evolution in which the Clayton Act, which was intended to
be the more powerful weapon against tying arrangements, has been surpassed by the easier-to-
satisfy not insubstantial test of Section One of the Sherman Act. It is far easier to establish an
illegal tying arrangement under Section One because the plaintiff does not have to prove that
competition has been substantially lessened, as she would under Section Three. Section One
dramatically lowers the threshold for the competitive impact a plaintiff must prove in order to
invalidate a tying arrangement. See generally Lazaroff, supra note 278, at 144-45 n.257
(arguing that the Sherman and Clayton Acts employ different standards, the latter representing
a lower threshold for liability).
399 It is difficult to understand why a rational plaintiff would plead a Section Three claim,
except to piggyback on a Section One claim. Further evidence that Section One jurisprudence
has undermined the utility of Section Three is seen in the fact that, while plaintiffs routinely
plead a Section One tying claim without asserting a Section Three claim, no rational plaintiff
would rely solely on a Section Three tying claim without also alleging a Section One violation.
4 00 See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
401 See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (arguing a contract is not necessarily
a contract in restraint of trade). Anticipating such an argument, Professor Areeda argues that
"the 1914 Congress did not enact a freeze on Sherman Act development" 2 AREEDA, supra
note 181, at 8. While it is true that case law would continue to define and regulate emerging
forms of anticompetitive conduct, that does not give federal courts license to ignore the
Clayton Act and condemn conduct that Congress made a conscious decision not to prohiit,
such as unilateral tying arrangements that do not substantially lessen competition or tend
toward monopoly. Professor Areeda argues that "Clayton Act provisions can be superfluous
today without being historically irrelevant." Id. But under Professor Areeda's-and most
courts'--reading, the Clayton Act is both superfluous and historically irrelevant because those
unilateral tying arrangements that Congress chose not to invalidate (those that do not
substantially lessen competition) nonetheless form the basis of antitrust liability under Section
One. Finally, analyzing tying arrangements under Section Three of the Clayton Act does not
freeze the development and evolution of antitrust law. Concerted tying arrangements can be
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arrangement with a greater than de minimis effect on competition undermines
the protection that Congress afforded to those tying arrangements that do not
substantially lessen competition.402 Characterizing a challenged restraint as a
tying arrangement under Section One is basically an attempt to circumvent the
more rigorous standards of Section Three of the Clayton Act.403
Section Three advances a more appropriate standard for evaluating unilateral
tying arrangements than does current Section One tying law. By proscribing
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements that affect a not insubstantial dollar
volume of commerce-without inquiry into market share or actual competitive
effects-Section One prohibits tying arrangements that may actually facilitate
competition in the tied product market and may be desired by consumers. This
means that harmless or beneficial unilateral tying arrangements can be
condemned under Section One of the Sherman Act, In contrast, if unilateral tying
arrangements were dealt with solely under Section Three of the Clayton Act, the
plaintiff would have to show that the tying arrangement "substantially lessen[ea
competition or tend[ear to create a monopoly." Thus, benign and competitively
beneficial unilateral tying arrangements would be permitted while those that
harm competition would not.
In addition to representing a higher-and more appropriate-threshold for
liability than Section One of the Sherman Act, Section Three of the Clayton Act
also reflects a lower-and again, more appropriate-threshold for liability than
Section Two of the Sherman Act. Evaluating unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements under Section Two would restore doctrinal consistency to tying
law. However, this consistency would be at the cost of permitting some
anticompetitive tying arrangements because Section Two does not "kick in" until
monopoly is threatened.40 4 Section Three minimizes the cost of wholesale
reliance on Section Two because Section Three has a lower threshold for liability
than Section Two.405 While a unilateral tying arrangement does not violate
analyzed under the lower standard of liability found in Section One case law. Tying
arrangements involving services can be found liable under the higher standard of liability
contained in Section Two.
402 See Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 301 (noting that Section Three "was not intended
to reach every remote lessening of competition is shown in the requirement that such lessening
must be substantial") (citation omitted).
403 This also simultaneously circumvents the significantly higher requirements of Section
Two of the Sherman Act.
404 See supra notes 382-83 and accompanying text.
405 While unilaterally imposed tying arrangements do represent unilateral conduct, it
makes sense to evaluate them under a lower standard of liability because, unlike other forms of
Section Two conduct, Congress passed a specific statute to proscribe them. Congress believed
that a tying arrangement should be prohibited whenever the tie-in substantially lessens
competition.
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Section Two until it creates a dangerous probability of monopolization, the same
tie-in would violate Section Three once it affects a substantial share of the
market.406
In sum, current tying law under Section One of the Sherman Act
overproscribes tying arrangements because it reaches those beneficial and benign
tie-ins that are, in effect, a form of competition4 07 -and it does so while creating
significant rifts in doctrinal consistency. Section Two protects doctrinal
consistency but proscribes too few tying arrangements, permitting tie-ins that
may substantially lessen competition but do not create a dangerous probability of
monopolization of the tied product. Finally, Section Three of the Clayton Act
restores doctrinal consistency while still invalidating those tying arrangements
that substantially lessen competition; it neither proscribes beneficial and benign
tie-ins nor does it wait for a tie-in to risk actual monopolization before stepping
in. In short, it restores doctrinal consistency at the right price.
VI. DEVELOPING MEANINGFUL TESTS FOR EVALUATING TYING
ARRANGEMENTS
Breathing life back into Section Three of the Clayton Act does not eliminate
the Sherman Act as a basis for liability in tying cases. If a tying arrangement is
the result of concerted action, the plaintiffs may still bring suit under Section One
of the Sherman Act, which has a lower threshold for liability than Section
Three. 40 8 Section Two of the Sherman Act remains important because Section
Three cannot reach tie-ins involving noncommodities.40 9
At this point, it should be clear that there is a fundamental distinction
between concerted and unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. Because
concerted tying arrangements are, by definition, concerted action, they should be
analyzed under Section One of the Sherman Act. Under Section One, a concerted
tying arrangement should be condemned only if it is determined to be
unreasonable, using either per se or Rule of Reason analysis. In contrast, a
unilaterally imposed tying arrangement is, by definition, unilateral. Thus it
should be evaluated under Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of
the Clayton Act and condemned only if it threatens actual monopolization or
substantially lessens competition, respectively.
4 0 6 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,329 (1961); see also supra
note 391 and accompanying text.
407 See supra notes 346-56 and accompanying text.
408 This is appropriate because a concerted tying arrangement is more deleterious than a
unilaterally imposed tying arrangement. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
409 See supra note 232 (noting that the Clayton Act is limited to contracts for "goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities").
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Proper differentiation of tying arrangements as either concerted or unilateral
is the first step in bringing clarity to tying law and consistency to antitrust law.
After characterizing a tying arrangement as either concerted or unilateral, the
court should apply the appropriate test to determine whether the challenged tying
arrangement injures competition. Part VI lays out legal tests to evaluate tie-ins,
depending on whether the tying arrangement is concerted or unilaterally
imposed.
A. Concerted Tying Arrangements
Concerted tying arrangements should continue to be evaluated under Section
One of the Sherman Act. Because only concerted tie-ins would remain in Section
One, there is no need to employ a unique tying test, as is currently done. Rather,
the standard Section One framework that is applied to all non-tying violations
can now be applied to tying claims as well.
The plaintiff would first have to prove the existence of an agreement
between two or more defendants, other than the ultimate contract with the buyer.
The plaintiff could show an agreement between two competitors that have
agreed to tie two products together, between the seller of the tying good and the
seller of the tied good, or between a dominant seller and alternative suppliers.
410
As with all nontying Section One causes of action, such an agreement could be
inferred from circumstantial evidence if two competitors simultaneously impose
similar tying arrangements or if two businesses appeared to cooperate in some
other fashion. 4 ' When there are separate sellers of the tying and tied products, it
may be relatively easy to infer concerted action. For example, if Seller A
announces that he refuses to sell Product X unless the consumer also buys
Product Y from Seller B, it may be difficult for A and B to assert that they have
not coordinated the allegedly "unilateral policy" of Seller A. Nonetheless, an
explicit finding of an agreement must be made before the court proceeds to
consider whether the tying arrangement is unreasonable under Section One of the
Sherman Act.
Having proven an agreement, the plaintiff would next have to prove that the
tying arrangement at issue was unreasonable. Whether the concerted tie-in is
evaluated under per se rules or the Rule of Reason should be a function of
whether the tying arrangement results from a horizontal or vertical agreement. A
horizontal tying arrangement exists when businesses that should (or could) be
competing in the market for the tying product, the tied product, or both products,
4 10 See supra notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
411 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 789 (1946); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,227 (1939).
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jointly agree to impose a tying arrangement. This form of concerted tying
arrangement should be per se illegal because it can have the same effect as price
fixing.412 Similarly, when the concerted tying arrangement operates as a
concerted refusal to deal or a concerted boycott, then it should be treated under
per se rules. 413
However, not all concerted tying arrangements are horizontal. For example,
when a business that sells one product and another business that sells a non-
competing product agree to bundle their products, the agreement is not
horizontal.414 The businesses are not in competition with each other;, they sell
different (and presumably, complementary) products. As with most nonprice
trade restraints, this tying arrangement should be judged less harshly than a
horizontal tying arrangement. In other words, such a concerted tying
arrangement should be evaluated under the Rule of Reason.
Whether per se or Rule of Reason analysis is employed, some of the key
elements that are currently applied in the Section One test for tying are no longer
necessary. First, there is no need to prove two separate products, because a rule
against concerted tying arrangements is not concerned with leveraging power
from one market to another. Rather, it is concerned with the combination of two
business entities acting together to decrease consumer choice or increase prices
charged to consumers.
Second, there is no need to show coercion in cases of concerted tying
arrangements, because the purpose for the coercion requirement is no longer
present. The coercion requirement is currently necessary to bring unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements within Section One because tie-ins have to restrain
trade in a way that voluntary sales contracts do not. This creates an anomaly in
which the requisite agreement must be coerced.415 But under a mature tying
regime that recognizes the difference between unilateral and concerted ties, the
agreement requirement for concerted tying arrangements is satisfied by proving
the first element of any Section One claim-namely joint activity between two
businesses directed at another business or consumers.
Third, for those concerted tying arrangements evaluated under per se rules,
there is no need to show market power. Just as traditional price fixing and
concerted boycott schemes are condemned without inquiry into market power,
horizontal concerted tying arrangements should be similarly condemned. In
412 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
413 Such a position finds tacit support in International Salt, which applied per se analysis
to tying arrangements, because the International Salt Court relied on Fashion Originators'
Guild ofAm. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1947), which was a concerted boycott case. See generally
International Salt Co. v. United State, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
414 See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
4 15 See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
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contrast, inquiry into market power may still be pertinent for cases of vertical
concerted tying arrangements. 416 This is consistent with the fact that market
power is a relevant factor under the Rule of Reason for other vertical restraints.
Finally, the plaintiff would have to prove an effect on interstate commerce
and the existence of causal antitrust injury. If a plaintiff can establish these
elements, then she has made out a prima facie violation of Section One based on
a concerted tying arrangement. In short, the process for evaluating concerted
tying arrangements employs the same test used to evaluate all other Section One
violations. The net result: doctrinal consistency.
B. Unilateral Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement that is unilaterally imposed by a single buyer could be
analyzed under either Section Three of the Clayton Act or Section Two of the
Sherman Act, depending on what is being tied together. Since Section Three is
limited to tying arrangements involving two commodities, it cannot reach tying
arrangements involving services,417 land,418 and intellectual property.419
To prevail under either Section Two or Section Three, a plaintiff would first
have to prove that the defendant had monopoly power in the relevant market In
the case of a challenged tying arrangement, the relevant product market is the
market for the tying product because that is the source of the alleged market
power. As in any Section Two case, the plaintiff would have to define the
contours of the relevant market and show why the defendant has monopoly
power in that market.420
After establishing monopoly power, the plaintiff would have to prove that
the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct. It is not uncommon for many
4 16 Because the parties effecting the tie-in are not competitors, their concerted action does
not increase their market power in any market. Whether their concerted tie-in has any effect on
competition will be a function of the pre-existing market power of the supplier of the tying
product. In contrast, when competitors jointly agree to impose a tying arrangement, they do
increase their shared market power over the tying product. This is inherently anticompetitive
and, like horizontal price-fixing, can be condemned as a category of trade restraint that always
or almost always tends to decrease competition.
417 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-63
(1992).
418 Cf Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 521 (1969)
(Fortas, J., dissenting) (noting that Northern Pacific had to be brought under the Sherman Act
because the Clayton Act does not apply to land).
419 See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (trademark).
420 The plaintiff would also have to demonstrate the relevant geographic market, but that
inquiry is not meaningful for our purposes.
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types of traditional Section Two conduct to have their own unique set of
elements, all of which must be shown in order to satisfy the second prong of a
monopolization claim.421 In order to satisfy the second prong of a
monopolization claim based on tying as the anticompetitive conduct, a plaintiff
should be required to prove three elements.
First, there must be two products. If there are not, a monopolist could simply
be charging a supra-competitive price for what is essentially one product,
something she is permitted to do under antitrust law. Presumably the tying
product has already been defined in establishing the first prong of monopoly
power. Courts may also define the market for the tied product in order to gauge
whether the defendant has achieved market power in the target market. However,
the "two-product inquiry" is slightly different than traditional Section Two
market definition in that the court must explicitly find that there is separate
consumer demand for each product, a finding not necessary in Section Two
litigation involving one product. Similar analysis is appropriate under Section
Three. In enacting the Clayton Act, Congress was concerned about monopolists
leveraging market power from one market to another, a problem manifested only
when there are two products.
Second, under either Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of
the Clayton Act, the plaintiff must show that the monopolist imposed the tie-in
by means of force or coercion. The coercion requirement insures that a
monopolist is not punished for a tying arrangement that the consumer actually
desired, and perhaps even requested.422 Thus, every bundling of goods does not
automatically subject the seller to liability, and consumer-driven bundling is
allowed to continue.
Third, the plaintiff will have to show an effect on competition. If the plaintiff
is proceeding under Section Three, she will have to prove that the tying
arrangement substantially lessens competition. This should be done through a
market share analysis. If the plaintiff cannot utilize Section Three and must
instead rely on Section Two, she would have to show monopolization of the tied
product market as a result of the unilaterally imposed tying arrangement.423 This
will no doubt be the hardest element to meet in most cases. To the extent that a
plaintiff may have difficulty proving actual monopolization of the tied product,
421 See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
422 This rationale also applies to unilaterally imposed tying arrangements currently
evaluated under Section One. One major difference is that the consumer does not have to
accede to this coercion in order to have a claim because there is no agreement requirement
under Section Two.




she can plead a cause of action for attempted monopolization.424
If these elements are shown, then the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case against the unilaterally imposed tying arrangement under either Section
three of the Clayton Act or Section Two of the Sherman Act.425 Note, the court
is not punishing the monopoly in the tying product market. It is merely an
element of the claim. If the plaintiff believes that the defendant has improperly
acquired or maintained a monopoly over the tying product, she may allege a
separate Section Two violation.
After a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of monopolization based
on tying, a defendant should still be permitted to argue that the tie-in is justified
by legitimate business reasons. Such a defense currently exists in tying law.
Potential justifications include maintaining consumer goodwill426  and
eliminating free-riding. 427
C. Whether to Plead a Section One, Section Two, or Section Three Tying
Arrangement
As with many trade restraints, a plaintiff can plead both a concerted and a
unilateral tying arrangement. If the plaintiff can prove that the tying arrangement
is the result of concerted action, the arrangement will be evaluated under Section
One and held illegal if it is deemed unreasonable. If the plaintiff fails to prove the
existence of an agreement, the tying arrangement would instead be considered
under Section Two of the Sherman Act or Section Three of the Clayton Act. The
plaintiff would be afforded the opportunity to show that the tie-in substantially
lessens competition (for a Section Three cause of action) or creates a dangerous
probability that the defendant would monopolize the market for the tied product
(for a Section Two cause of action). In a sense, the plaintiff gets two bites at the
apple, but this is common in litigation in which plaintiffs assert multiple causes
of action, knowing that some may be dismissed or lose at summary judgment. Of
course, plaintiffs without a viable agreement theory should only plead a Section
Three or Section Two tying arrangement. Plaintiffs who can show neither an
424 To prevail on a claim of attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must show
anticompetitive conduct, a specific intent to monopolization, and a dangerous probability of
success. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,453 n.4 (1993).
425 Note that "sufficient economic power" over the tying product is no longer part of the
substantive tying test because it has been folded into the monopoly power element inherent in
all Section Two monopolization claims.
426 See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir.
1987).
427 Professor Alan Meese provides such a rationale for allowing tie-ins in the franchise
context. See generally Meese, supra note 262.
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agreement nor substantial lessening of competition would do best to find another
cause of action or to forego litigation altogether.
VII. CONCLUSION
Antitrust laws in general-and the Sherman Act in particular-are
concerned with two issues: concerted action by competitors and anticompetitive
conduct by monopolists. Unilaterally imposed tying arrangements by a
nonmonopolist implicate neither of these concerns. Tying arrangements are
dangerous in two instances: if there is concerted action between competitors or if
a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement substantially lessens competition in the
tied market. Antitrust liability should be limited to these situations, lest zealous
competition be prohibited in the name of protecting competition.
Treating a single contract between a buyer and seller as illegal concerted
action runs ramshod over the body of antitrust law that has consistently and
consciously sought to afford greater protection to unilaterally imposed restraints.
To end the inquiry into concerted action as soon as one finds a contract
misconstrues the purpose of the concerted action requirement-namely, that
businesses should not concentrate their market power against their competitors
or their customers. To maintain its legitimacy and consistency, antitrust law must
elevate substance over form. The search for substance should consider the nature
of the parties to the challenged contract. After all, the marriage between a seller
and a buyer that marks every sale is fundamentally different from an assignation
between competitors.
The ultimate goal of this Article is to start a discussion about the nature of
tying arrangements and their place in the overall structure of the American
antitrust framework. While there are certainly arguments for evaluating
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements under Section One, they should be
made explicitly by courts and supporters of the status quo. Neither silence nor
inertia are persuasive arguments for preserving the current treatment of tying
arrangements given the harm done to doctrinal consistency by treating conduct
that is essentially unilateral as though it were concerted. Whatever the outcome,
antitrust doctrine can only be clarified and improved by a spirited debate over the
nature of tying.
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